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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

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***Political Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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16 May 1991

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### 'Soyuz' Deputies on Extraordinary Congress

PM1904153591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 11 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Express-interview dated 9 April with "Soyuz" people's deputies by S. Karkhanin under headline "In the USSR Supreme Soviet Parliamentary Groups"; place of interview not stated: "The Vector of Stability"]

[Text] It is not surprising that this news worried many people and immediately got into the sensational category. Will the "Soyuz" parliamentary group really try to get an extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies convened urgently? Strictly speaking, the motives for doing so are clear: the crisis in the economy, the blazing centers of interethnic conflicts, the strikes at the mines, the discontent among voters which, like prices, is on the increase, and Russia's unclear political future. But at the same time as defending central authority, the group that unites the supporters of a unified state and which is supported by the results of the nationwide referendum has always oriented itself along the vector of political stability. And in one way or another, demanding that a congress be convened meant joining the camp of those who are "rocking the boat"...

Participants at a "Soyuz" evening meeting held 9 April had to make a choice. The deputies talked about their positions and arguments in a SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA express-interview.

Yu. Blokhin, cochairman of the All-Union Deputy Association "Soyuz":

"Quite apart from anything else, the meeting was interesting because many of our comrades who did not speak very often before got up onto the tribune. One of the deputies, a peasant from the Moscow area, put the question directly: Who on earth is governing our country at the moment? On the whole the debate centered around this point: Should there be an extraordinary congress or not? On the whole the idea met with a positive reception, although different positions were expressed. Eventually the following was decided: The question of the extraordinary congress should be left open until we have studied the president's program for combating the crisis and listened to the draft of the new Union Treaty in the Supreme Soviet. Discussions on this matter might be continued 20-21 April at the congress of our all-union deputies' association.

"The president had invited us for talks the previous day, and these lasted for two hours. As leaders of the group, we stated that the contents of the draft Union Treaty does not conform to the results of the referendum, and that it is necessary to put an immediate stop to the bloody conflict in South Ossetia, about which the Supreme Soviet had already expressed its opinion. 'We will be adopting a decision,' Mikhail Sergeyevich answered. Quite frankly, we would like to have more specific information.

"There was a discussion about the president's 'team.' In our view, people who pursue a flawed policy could be replaced by representatives with scientific potential who are capable of really helping the country to break out of the crisis. Strictly speaking, this is in large measure dependent on the agenda proposed at the extraordinary congress: The situation in the country and an account of the USSR president's activity."

Yu. Sharipov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for the Republics' Economic Relations:

"In my opinion, the extraordinary congress will not resolve our problems; these can only be resolved by working on a Union Treaty. So that people can have a loaf on the table, you must go to the field, not the tribune. The Union Treaty will allow us to define ourselves in relation to those republics that oppose a single Union but obtain cheap raw materials and products from us and have an easy time of it, so to speak.

"Occasionally we happen to hear that major economic managers are among those who advocate that a congress be convened as a matter of urgency. I doubt if this is so. I shall speak about my own Kirov Science and Production Association in Ufa: In the first quarter the volume of production grew by a third, workers' pay increased by 18 percent, and profits doubled. And therefore we must immediately tackle a package of economic legislation—it is specifically this which will enable us to implement a program for getting out of the crisis.

"It is time to get away from a confrontational way of thinking and from political gibberish about a change of leaders. How many of them is it possible to overthrow? N.I. Ryzhkov has quit—so what, has anything improved? I shall remind you that he proposed only a doubling of prices, but now they have gone up by three times or more..."

L. Sukhov, member of the "Soyuz" group:

"If the question of Mikhail Gorbachev's resignation is raised, in my view power should be transferred to the Supreme Soviet, and nationwide elections for president must be held. The country is rolling into the abyss, and there are no brakes. The other thing is the need to prepare the congress thoroughly, otherwise we will get the people agitated once more for no reason.

"The other day I made a statement in the Supreme Soviet. The point is that we remember the advantages of the socialist choice less and less. Free education, the public health service—must we reject these? Many people have already sensed that we have to pay for everything now: These are the first signs of the market, which make my fellow countrymen indignant. The fact that someone who did honest work all his life is now finding life difficult while robbers prosper... This is why I said from the tribune that some of my deputy colleagues have a vested interest in dubious laws, since they themselves, in my opinion, intend to become the new bosses in life."



N. Kostishin, member of the "Soyuz" group:

"The Russian Federation Congress has just finished, and I do not think that we should now embark on yet another round of political discussion to addle people's brains. People are tired of listening to endless speeches and mutual recriminations. In my view it is far more important to temporarily suspend the preparation of new laws in the Supreme Soviet and make a thorough analysis of the extent to which the ones that have been adopted are being carried into effect.

"As regards interethnic conflicts, it seems to me that there is no necessity to appeal to the center on any grounds and then accuse it of passivity. Where I come from in the Dnestr area we have found ways of fighting for our rights by ourselves—we have begun to transfer funds to the union and not to the republic budget. And Moldovan leaders have been warned that any attempt by them to use force against us will be strongly rebuffed."

A. Chekhoyev, cochairman of the All-Union Deputy Association "Soyuz":

"The idea of convening an extraordinary congress was discussed beforehand in the coordinating council of our all-union deputies' association, and then in the parliamentary group presidium. I emphasize that no collection of signatures was made among the deputies, and that we did not raise the question of the president's resignation. But it seems to me that it would be worth discussing the situation in the country. But the group meeting will have the final say.

"Events in Georgia are catching my attention. The republic has decided to stop broadcasting the television program "Vremya." The encircling blockade around Tskhinvali, which was broken by USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, has closed up again—only one truck convoy has managed to get through to the city with food and fuel. Ossetian villages are ablaze like they were before... We spoke about this during our meeting with the president.

"We told Mikhail Sergeyevich that if he decides to declare a state of emergency or presidential rule in these or other regions, we are prepared to support him. But decisive measures are called for. The time for maneuvering and posturing is over..."

E. Kim, member of the parliamentary group presidium:

"It is hard to say where the rumor that our group is collecting deputies' signatures in support of convening an extraordinary congress has sprung from. It may be that someone had an interest in instigating this step. But in my opinion one of the merits of "Soyuz" is precisely the fact that we have never rushed into adventurist tactics.

"It is unclear why the congress is meeting. The president's program for combating the crisis will be presented

to the Supreme Soviet. So who gains by removing M. S. Gorbachev? Only those who advocate personal dictatorship.

"We can criticize the president: Let's agree that his work is not error-free. However, a realistic approach prompts us to say that our society's move toward democracy and a rule-of-law state, even if it is slow and tortuous, is still linked with Mikhail Sergeyevich's efforts. Any other path leads to a dead end. This is evidenced by the recent Russian Federation Congress, at which it was decided to elect a president for the republic without setting out his future powers beforehand and without making any amendments to the Constitution.

"I can understand the feelings of my comrades who represent Russian-speaking minorities in the parliamentary group,—the fight against separatists in some regions is hard going. But we, USSR people's deputies, should in my opinion strive for the unity of the whole of our state, and then will we succeed in overcoming all the difficulties in the republics. We must proceed from this basis, and not from parochial interests.

"I agree that there are inconsistencies in the draft Union Treaty. But a document on which representatives from many republics have been working could not have been otherwise. I think that the preparation of a new Constitution will remove the basic problems. Let's remember that the USSR exists, and that it has enormous potential. And, it seems to me, the USSR president in his capacity as representative of the Union State should put his signature to the Union Treaty together with republic leaders. And I am sure that our Supreme Soviet will not remain on the sidelines."

### CPSU CC Body Discusses Ideology Training

PM2604151591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
20 Apr 91 Second Edition pp 1,2

[Unattributed report: "Propagandizing Humanitarian Values"]

[Text] "Concerning the ideological and theoretical training of Communists in the present-day conditions of party activity"—this was the theme of a routine session of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Commission. It was opened by A.S. Dzasokhov, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He stressed that the entire period since the CPSU Congress had been characterized by a tense political atmosphere in the party itself and in society as a whole. The process of the renewal of the CPSU, the influencing of the character and depth of the reformation of all spheres of public life, and the performance of the functions of political vanguard in conditions of the pluralism that is taking shape depend to a crucial extent on the theoretical training of party members and their ability to absorb new knowledge in the interests of independent, vigorous activity.

But the prevailing system of political training is not functioning as the times demand and is itself experiencing crisis phenomena—the number of schools and seminars has decreased. Communists are unwilling to be propagandists, and aktiv seminars in rayon committees [raykoms] are being wound up for purely formal reasons. The reasons for this are well known. They are due primarily to the fact that the content of political training was formed under the influence of the ill-considered, to some extent false theoretical concepts contained in the CPSU program documents. The study of the Marxist-Leninist legacy was suffering from dogmatic interpretation.

N.B. Bikkenin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of the journal *KOMMUNIST*, reported on the question under consideration. He noted that during the years of perestroika political training, which is meant to enhance Communists' ideological and theoretical standards, has undergone changes. However, the state of it does not correspond to the new conditions of CPSU activity. The exacerbation of the political struggle caught many party members unawares and plunged them into a state of confusion.

It was stressed at the session that many party organizations are neglecting the political education of Communists and their theoretical and ideological training. But in the past it was disorganized and haphazard. The propaganda cadres were ill-prepared for activity in the new conditions. The slack pace of perestroika in the sphere of theory and the inability of the party's academic cadres to provide conceptual answers to the difficult questions posed by life have led to the emasculation of the content of training and have meant that Communists essentially feel impotent in terms of ideology and theory.

In accordance with the demands of the CPSU Statutes for Communists to improve their political and cultural standards, Ideological Commission members noted, ideological and theoretical training of Communists should be regarded as a very important task of intraparty work. It must be completely reorganized. It has to contribute in every way to the development of the character of the CPSU member who is capable of independently analyzing the processes and phenomena of social and political life, intrinsically combining the interests of the party and the individual Communist, defending and propagandizing them, and carrying out active political work among the masses.

The content of Communists' ideological and theoretical training should include the achievements of Soviet and world progressive social thought and all the wealth of civilization's humanitarian ideas. The new system, that is taking shape, of theoretical views of socialism as a natural historical process of the development of civilization is to be the philosophical core of the training of party members. The elaboration of a new (fourth) CPSU Program is of special importance in this connection.

The commission members believe that it is advisable to focus attention on the study of such topical problems as the correlation between the class, the ethnic, and the common human elements, between ownership and power, the market and the social protection of working people, the destiny of the Soviet Federation and the evolution of civic society, patriotism and internationalism, democracy and discipline, a multiparty system and CPSU political leadership, the spiritual renaissance of society and the consolidating role of culture, moral improvement and freedom of religion, ecology and the country's security, interpretation of the historical experience of the 20th century and the future of world civilization, and others. In conditions of the country's varied and dynamic social and political life party organizations are supposed to be constantly incorporating in the content of training questions reflecting the specific features of regions and labor collectives and the nature of the tasks that are being tackled by primary party organizations.

The commission considers it necessary to recommend that all work on ideological and theoretical training be organized on the basis of Communists' interests and practical needs and the tasks facing party organizations. The personal responsibility of every party member for the level of his own ideological-theoretical and political maturity must be increased and various forms of monitoring must be used to that end.

Experience shows that at party raykoms and city committees [gorkoms] it is advisable to have a ramified network of political seminars, debating clubs, lecture agencies, and permanently operating conferences to meet the needs of the different categories of Communists, including the party and ideological aktiv and propagandists. CPSU raykoms and gorkoms are supposed to be special social-political centers, establishing strong links with the broad masses of Communists and nonparty people through the organization and staging of various political education measures.

The session noted the need to carry out ideological and theoretical training taking into account people's social status and educational level and the nature of their production and public activities. Party committees and organizations were recommended to persistently introduce modern forms and methods of ideological and theoretical training of Communists, based on dialogue, discussion, and the individual approach. It is necessary to create conditions for the free discussion of different problems, comparison of views, and development of the skills involved in conducting strongly argued polemics with political opponents and adversaries in debates and discussions and at rallies and to help Communists get really involved in political processes. The constant and persistent self-education of every Communist is an essential element of ideological and theoretical training.

The discussion's participants stressed that the provision of cadres for ideological and theoretical training and the recruitment of the party's best people for it, people, that

is, who are capable of interpreting social-political processes from modern theoretical and methodological positions, are tasks of special importance. Current conditions demand the training of a new type of propagandist, capable of performing the role of consultant and lecturer, of conducting a skillful debate, of reacting expertly to an opponent's arguments, and of gearing the collective quest for answers to the questions posed by life.

Party committees' social-political centers must operate at full power. They must organize their work on a democratic basis, be open and accessible to all strata of the population, and provide an arena for broad dialogue with various social-political movements and forces.

The Ideological Commission's members stressed the need to create in the CPSU an atmosphere of creativity and great intellectual and academic authority and seek to make the improvement of politico-philosophical and general culture an intrinsic need of every party member.

The discussion participants were B.G. Kibirev, secretary of Krasnodar Party Kray Committee [kraykom]; A.S. Savkin, secretary of Kaliningrad CPSU Obkom; G.A. Zyuganov, secretary of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party Central Committee; Ye.V. Mironov, first secretary of Donetsk Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom; R.A. Medvedev, USSR people's deputy and writer; M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Press; V.V. Sekretaryuk, first secretary of Lvov Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom; M.M. Drobyshev, member of the CPSU Central Control Commission; S.L. Tolyautas, head of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee news agency, and others.

At the end of the session A.S. Dzasokhov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, summed up the discussion. He noted that the main thing now is to keep all party members constantly informed about very important aspects of its policy. All party institutions must work on solving this task.

It is very important to organize a discussion of the new CPSU Program, the main ideas of which, as is known, were set out in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in January. The second issue of *IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS* published the draft outline. The new CPSU Program will reflect everything of value that has been generated by progressive social thinking. It is to determine the principal directions of the country's and party's development and provide answers to the pressing questions of public life.

It is exceedingly important to creatively interpret Lenin's legacy. A movement in defense of the cause and name of V.I. Lenin is unfolding in the country in difficult political conditions. It is supported by a number of labor collectives, by creative unions, veterans' councils, and nonparty people. The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat adopted a resolution "On the 121st anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth," which determined the appropriate

measures to celebrate the anniversary. Similar resolutions were adopted by a number of republican communist party central committees and CPSU obkoms and kraykoms.

### **CPSU Factions Criticize Leadership Actions**

*PM2904132391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 91 p 2*

[I. Sichka report on appeal by Ukrainian Communist Party Gorkom and Raykom secretaries; statement by "Communists for Democracy"; and statement by "Democratic Russia": "What Is Worrying Communists..."]

### **[Text] Consistent Communists**

A conference of Ukrainian Communist Party gorkom [city party committee] and raykom [rayon party committee] first secretaries has sent a special appeal to the CPSU Central Committee. Ukrainian communists are concerned about the absence of measures to halt the criminal actions of antisocialist forces and the inflammation of hatred against communists. In this situation, the authors of the appeal believe, the CPSU Central Committee has in effect reconciled itself to the fact that the president of the country, who is at the same time general secretary of the party Central Committee, is not using the powers at his disposal.

Having clearly perceived that the price rises have provoked an extremely negative reaction from the population, the authors of the appeal shrewdly note the following trend: Since the decision to increase prices was adopted by a government that consists mainly of communists, this undermines the prestige of the entire party.

The authors continue to consider the party to be the guarantor of the country's renewal, and the president and the government to be obliged to implement the course elaborated by the party. In the opinion of the signatories to the appeal, all the communists and the working people of the Soviet Ukraine oppose the fragmentation of the USSR into "separate independent states."

It would appear that the last statement was made somewhat hastily. The decision adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on state sovereignty (independence) for the republic has still not provoked any noticeable protests from the population. And in general it would appear that the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's brief "truce" with the party apparatus has again been violated. At least—in the Ukraine...

### **"Democratic" Communists**

The organizational committee of the "Communists for Democracy" movement has adopted a political statement "On the Situation in the Party."

The organizational committee believes that the 28th CPSU Congress decisions placing the priority of pan-human values at the center of the party's political activity have now been subjected to revision.

The movement's organizational committee sees the leaders of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee as one of the main threats to democratic transformations in the country. Their activity "reveals a conscious desire to set one section of society against another" and "to provoke anticommunist sentiments."

In these conditions the movement's organizational committee appeals to local party organizations to raise the question of calling the leaders of the CPSU and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party at all levels to account to the party masses for what they have done to implement the 19th Party Conference and the 28th CPSU Congress decisions, and also to create the prerequisites for the organization of a nationwide "Communists for Democracy" movement. It is deemed expedient to go beyond the limits of the intraparty struggle and hold a wide-ranging public dialogue at a round-table of all the democratic forces and political and social movements.

It would appear that the experience of "Democratic Platform's" activity has failed to clarify once and for all the question: Is the CPSU liable to radical reformation? Colonel Rutskoy and his fellow thinkers have started a new experiment. It seems that the game really is worth the candle...

#### And Meanwhile...

The Coordinating Council of the "Democratic Russia" movement has also proved to be not averse to the practice of political statements, having its say on the subject of price rises. In the opinion of "Democratic Russia," the "Pavlov" reform is not a step toward but a step away from the market. It is to all intents and purposes a reform against the poor, whereas the "500 Days" program proposed a reform at the expense of the rich.

"Democratic Russia's" proposals are that, as soon as possible:

- a list should be determined of property which the state is to part with in view of the urgency of the situation;
- tax deductions should be lowered on the output of enterprises working for the market;
- the distribution of land should begin to all citizens who want it, and areas of more than 0.15 hectares should be sold at the market price.

Traditionally the CPSU has not escaped "Democratic Russia's" field of vision. The party whose government is in power must give guarantees to the population against the possible devaluation of their savings deposits in view of the fact that compensation for them is not full, and has moreover been frozen for three years. CPSU property

could constitute that guarantee. Provided that the population receives full compensation (taking account of inflation) for their investments within three years, this property would be returned to the party.

An approach, let it be noted, that is as amusing as it is unrealistic. Although the train of thoughts is itself interesting: to transform the CPSU from an extremely abstract "guarantor of renewal" into a pledge of genuine material prosperity for the population.

#### PRAVDA Interviews U.S. Press Secretary Fitzwater

91UN1456A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 91  
Second Edition p 7

[Report on interview with Marlin Fitzwater, press secretary for U.S. President George Bush, by PRAVDA staff correspondent V. Gan; in Washington, date not given: "The Kid From Abilene"]

[Text] Washington—*He met me at the door to his office and invited me to enter with a broad gesture, as a cordial host should. He has the appearance of a good-natured, merry man who you would expect to make jokes or laugh. His eyes, intelligent and astute, appearing to miss nothing, are remarkable. U.S. President G. Bush calls him "an excellent fellow" upon whom he relies completely. I often hear comparisons with "a breath of fresh air" from my colleagues, and I am not surprised to see them applaud him. He calls himself "the kid from Abilene," the rural Kansas town in the vicinity of which he came into the world 48 years ago...*

As his father testifies, the heart of Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, assistant to the U.S. President, was never into farming. Large cities, which appeared mysteriously sparkling and full of breathtaking adventures, beckoned him.

Incidentally, he is the first White House press secretary in history who has worked at virtually all levels of the government bureaucracy; others usually came from the outside. Fitzwater's career in the capital city was interrupted only once: In the late 1960's, he served for two years in the U.S. Air Force. Otherwise, his tenure here has been almost a quarter of a century long. He was a speech writer for the secretary of transportation, worked for the Environmental Protection Agency, and was deputy assistant secretary of the treasury for public relations.

This last position was precisely the one to give Marlin Fitzwater the momentum that brought him to the White House. At the time, Donald Regan, a close friend of President Reagan, was secretary of the treasury. When Regan was appointed White House chief of staff, he took along Fitzwater whom he valued for being intelligent, hard-working, and conscientious.

Having become a deputy press secretary for the President, Marlin differed favorably from his direct superior from the very beginning. No matter what Speakes tried



he could not establish a good relationship with journalists. At first, he was gentle and sweet, and later harsh and haughty. Speakes did not gain the confidence or even the good will of the press.

Mutual antagonism inflamed the situation at daily briefings to such a degree that they took to calling them nothing but a bullfight with the press secretary in the ring. Or worse yet, feeding time at the zoo, information being the meat thrown by the press secretary to "voracious animals" represented by the journalists.

Understandably, the journalists are far from being a "godsend," and their hair-splitting ways which frequently border on aggression may anger even an angel. Almost all briefings without exception turn into noisy confrontations one way or another, regardless of who conducts them.

However, there are confrontations and there are confrontations. The atmosphere at Marlin Fitzwater's briefings is absolutely different. I would even say friendly. There is no hostility between the sides, and the verbal exchanges which occur do not transcend the framework of benevolence. They believe him, and for his part he approaches the needs and interests of journalists with great care and sympathy. On one occasion, Fitzwater said: "As an old bureaucrat, I have learned to answer the phone and call back."

This is not all. Marlin truly likes his job, referring to it as "intellectually captivating." Perhaps, this is what his style of working with the press is based on. Fitzwater has gained a reputation for being one of the best White House press secretaries in history due to his sincerity, openness, affability, and professionalism. Of course, there is his sense of humor which is frequently self-effacing. This is why few people were surprised by the ovation with which the correspondents responded to Marlin's appointment instead of Speakes', when the latter resigned in 1987. The fact that George Bush decided to retain Fitzwater in charge of press liaison after winning presidential election was considered quite natural by all.

Being a mild-mannered person, Marlin personally has done a lot to eliminate the element of suspicion which is always present in the attitude of the correspondents toward presidential power. Ronald Reagan, who on the whole emerged unscathed from the Iran-Contra scandal, should be grateful specifically to him. Without a doubt, Fitzwater defended him as best he could, but did not deviate from the truth or act against his conscience in the process.

He passed this test honorably, enjoying the confidence of the journalist community even at a time when Reagan and his entourage were being examined by the press literally through a microscope. How did he do this? Marlin simply told the correspondents what he knew, or stated that he did not know this or that he was indeed uninformed. However, he does not deny the need to

refrain from providing all information: "I am not irritated by any question. You may ask me whatever you want. However, there are questions that I cannot answer either for political reasons or for security considerations."

Fitzwater has his own principles, his own "ten commandments" which he observes religiously. He is convinced that, in particular, a press secretary should never infringe on the public's right to information, forget who his boss is (the President), take anything for granted, despise the journalists, neglect his access to the President, forget to ask questions during conversations with the sources of information, or lose his sense of humor. All of this together is aimed at acting successfully as a go-between for the correspondents who hunger for information and government officials who are usually very reluctant to provide it.

As a matter of fact, this is what I discussed with Marlin in his White House office.

[Gan] Marlin, what are the main traits a press secretary should have?

[Fitzwater] First of all, you must be patient. Of course, you should strive to make the press happy. When you accomplish this you get the greatest satisfaction, naturally, apart from the fact that by working as a press secretary one becomes an immediate witness to history.

[Gan] Do you take any part in preparing decisions? Do you give advice concerning what should be told to the press?

[Fitzwater] Participation by the press secretary in this process may assume various forms. The most direct form is to give advice on how a particular decision should be presented to the press, what to say, and which arguments will work better. Knowing the interests of journalists and their way of thinking, you suggest how a particular question should be answered in general. You frequently have to give advice concerning what is acceptable from the point of view of public perception, and what is reasonable. On occasion, you spend a lot of time with the President, and offer your views on particular issues. The President inquires about your views because as much information is available to you as it is to him. However, all of this certainly depends on the relationship between the President and the press secretary. If the President believes that his press secretary has common sense and good intellect, he may even consider his press secretary to be more of an adviser than others.

[Gan] At this point, I will allow myself a digression in order to note that this is precisely how Bush treats Marlin, who is a member of a narrow circle of the President's confidants, so much of a confidant that Fitzwater became a participant in meetings developing plans for the Panama invasion operation. He was made privy to secret plans for holding a meeting between G. Bush and M. Gorbachev on Malta four months before they were communicated to the U.S. secretary of defense

and even the CIA director. On one occasion, Marlin was referred to as Sancho Panza to the President, and this was not an exaggeration. Fitzwater has all the traits which G. Bush values greatly in people—loyalty, prudence, circumspection, caution, and a respectful attitude toward people. Marlin is boundlessly devoted to the President and, as a newspaper noted, "is prepared to defend his right to pretend that he is pursuing one policy, whereas Bush is actually pursuing another." This is what Fitzwater himself said concerning this: "The right of the people to know is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the Constitution says nothing about when they should know."

My question was associated with the above:

[Gan] Marlin, is it permissible not to give a straight answer and to obfuscate? To what degree do you resort to such devices?

[Fitzwater] I am categorically against this. However, there are times when you just cannot say everything that there is, for example, due to security considerations and secrecy. During the war with Iraq, it so happened on many occasions that I was forced to tell the journalists: I do not intend to answer questions concerning the course of combat action because this would amount to violating military rules. I felt that the correspondents understood me and agreed with my arguments. However, if you keep saying "No, no, no" all the time without explaining anything you should expect trouble in relations with the press.

[Gan] Can they make you say falsehoods?

[Fitzwater] I do not think so. I will bet that if you follow my briefings carefully you will not be able to cite even one case when I acted in this manner. There often are cases when I say: We are not prepared to respond to this or that, or that we do not have an answer. My experience tells me that if you are aware of what is happening with regard to a particular issue, a particular program, but cannot answer a question asked by the press for some reason, there are always ways to be honest. Based on your experience, you know how to behave in such situations which, incidentally, you immediately recognize. One more thing: During the years of my work, I have become convinced that if someone lies, the lie will sooner or later become apparent; it will always be detected one way or another. The press never forgives this. The price is too high. You cannot lie and survive as a press secretary. The journalists will simply annihilate you.

[Gan] What do you feel when you are made to make a statement and tell the correspondents what is contrary to your personal views and convictions?

[Fitzwater] As a professional press secretary, I will tell you that I do not have a personal position as far as the press is concerned. I have my personal views and positions which I state to my mother, my wife, and my friends. However, in conversations with members of the

press, I act as a spokesman for the position of the government and the President. When I am asked about a position on a specific issue, I give an answer which, as I know, reflects the point of view of the administration though, of course, I may have a completely different point of view. As you well know, the journalists are not interested in what Marlin Fitzwater personally thinks or says. They are interested in what George Bush thinks and says about this. I am valuable only because I am the interpreter of what George Bush thinks and says.

[Gan] We must say that, compared to his predecessors, the current President makes Marlin's task easier, appearing in person before the journalists eagerly and frequently. Perhaps, he has already set a record as far as the number of press conferences and separate and group meetings with the members of the press is concerned. Fitzwater has also been instrumental in ensuring such openness, facilitating it in every way possible.

However, this understandably does not relieve Marlin of his duty to always be on guard and prepare most thoroughly for every business day. His day begins at 0700 hours and lasts 12 or 13 hours. At 0700, 16 employees of the White House press office headed by Fitzwater begin to read newspapers. Within approximately two hours, they compile a list of eight to 12 topics that may be expected to come up in questions at the briefing. Marlin knows some answers himself ahead of time, and he gets others from specialists: An interdepartmental communications circuit which the White House has is helpful. Writing the answers down personally takes approximately an hour. Later, particularly intricate problems entailing the need to make an assessment or a judgment are discussed with the President. A rehearsal of answers with his assistants completes his preparations for meeting the "70 best" journalists. American professionals.

The workload is tremendous. In four hours, between 0700 and 1100, Marlin must absorb all the information available, and produce it for an hour in response to demands by voracious and inquisitive correspondents. One hour lasts very long when you are besieged on all sides. As Marlin admits, he feels devastated by the end. A mistake is not very likely. However, if a mistake occurs its consequences may be very serious, and at times days are needed to take care of them.

Strange as it may seem, he considers mutual relations with the employees of federal departments, who have to be persuaded that press secretaries may also approach information responsibly, to be one of his difficulties. This is why he tries to impress on the officials that if the government makes no effort to explain to the people exhaustively its perception of a particular problem it is plain useless to expect that the solutions proposed will be accepted by the people...

Toward the end, I asked him:

[Gan] How do you spend your spare time? Do you have a hobby?



[Fitzwater] I play tennis, and I like cigars; however, I should stop smoking them. I read a lot, and I take an interest in yachts. However, I do not exercise, and unlike the President I do not jog.

[Gian] Marlin has one more occupation which becomes apparent as soon as one walks into his office. He is a passionate collector of hats. Fitzwater has hats, apparently of all kinds, origins, and shapes, and for any conceivable occasion, everywhere at home and in the office.

"His hour" draws closer again. There is commotion in the press room. Correspondents known to all in America take 48 reserved seats with brass signs indicating the names of particular press, radio, or television organs. This is the privileged elite of journalists representing leading press and TV companies. Their seats cannot be taken. The lesser members of the fraternity take seats behind them depending on who comes first. Those who are left without seats crowd around, propping up the walls. There is a multitude of cameras in the back of the room. There are also four TV sets which are on continuously. Studio lights drown everyone in artificial brightness, silence descends, and Marlin Fitzwater, press secretary of the U.S. President, enters the room, surrounded by his aides—"the kid from Abilene" who has come a long way to the top...

#### **Girenko Notes Political Significance of 17 March Referendum**

91UN1371A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 14, Apr 91 pp 8-9

[Interview with A. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR people's deputy, by correspondent V. Arkadyev: "Complying With the People's Wishes"]

[Text] On 17 March our country held its first ever all-Union referendum, which was devoted to the most important question—the future of the USSR. Our correspondent V. Arkadyev asked A. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR people's deputy, about the results and meaning of the referendum.

[Girenko] The political results of the referendum were studied by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo at a meeting held on 25 March with M.S. Gorbachev presiding. It was observed that the decision to hold a USSR referendum had been adopted in an atmosphere of growing economic and social and political crisis in the country. It was acknowledged that implementation of the measures to overcome the crisis phenomena outlined by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies was possible only within the framework of a renewed union, whose creation had been and continues to be seriously resisted. Under these conditions an appeal directly to Soviet citizens and the ascertainment through a referendum of the wishes of the peoples of the country was not only expedient but also extremely necessary.

The results of the referendum both in the country as a whole and in the republics, krais, and oblasts which took part in it are unequivocal—the vast majority of Soviet people (more than 76 percent of those who voted) see their and their children's future in a renewed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a federation of sovereign state-republics. This confirms the viability and the conformity with the people's fundamental interests of the political guideline of the 28th CPSU Congress pointing to the renewal and preservation of the USSR on the basis of a combination of the national and international interests of all peoples of the country. From 75 to 97 percent of the electorate took part in the referendum in the RSFSR, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Ukraine, and from 70 to 97 percent of the citizens voted for preservation of the Union.

The results of the referendum are a mandate for the country's highest leadership for increased efforts to implement anti-crisis measures and for the continuation and successful completion of the transformations begun in the country.

[Correspondent] Andrey Nikolayevich, how should we evaluate the ambivalent position regarding the referendum of certain local soviets and, particularly, the republics which decided not to hold a referendum at all?

[Girenko] As you know, the leadership of six republics officially declined to take part in the all-Union referendum. The Supreme Soviets of Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Estonia thereby violated the USSR Constitution and the basic rights of their citizens and the rules of democracy. The actions of the local soviets which removed themselves from or even counteracted the organization of the USSR referendum (Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Ryazan, Lvov, Ternopol, Ivano-Frankovsk) may be categorized likewise. Yet an all-Union poll (referendum) is the most democratic form of ascertaining the opinion of the whole population on one question or another of vital importance to the people.

Speculating on the economic difficulties, opposition forces (Democratic Russia, Rukh and the Republican Party in the Ukraine, the Moldovan People's Front, and other such organizations in all the other republics) launched an unprecedented campaign against the idea of a united union and against the president and the CPSU. Shameless lies, fact-juggling, a variety of rumors and newspaper canards and so forth were set in motion. On the other hand, an attempt was made to substitute for the referendum question a vote for one or another politician. It was for this reason, in my view, that the leadership of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet insisted on organizing its own referendum on a president of Russia also.

[Correspondent] Yes, the atmosphere during preparation for the referendum was complex...

[Girenko] Of course. And the party organizations and the Communists had a great deal of work to do. I will give you just a few facts.

The Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Belorussia, Russia, and the Ukraine adopted a joint appeal to members of the CPSU, all working people, and the peoples of the USSR in support of preservation of the Union. Similar appeals were presented by the plenums of many party committees—of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Yakutia, Udmurtia, and Bashkiriya, Smolensk, and Bryansk Oblasts and many others.

The party organizations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (CPSU) had to operate under extreme conditions. The Azerbaijan CP Central Committee emerged from a difficult situation (there was very little time) with dignity.

I have to say that in this work the party perceived the support of a number of leading public organizations—the unions, war and labor veterans, peace movements, and women's organizations. Finally, representatives of all the main religious creeds requested support for the referendum (and this also for the first time in our history).

But the results of the referendum—and this was emphasized at the Central Committee Politburo meeting—could have been more convincing. The party committees and organizations were not able everywhere to confront the concentrated psychological pressure on the part of destructive forces. Granted all the complexity of the situation in the republics, the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova could, evidently, have adopted a more scrupulous position. This time even overseas Armenians were sending telegrams with a reminder and warning that Armenia and its people had been saved from extermination by Russia and that the republic had a future only in alliance with Russia.

The party's positions in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Kiev, and other large industrial and cultural centers proved the most vulnerable. Why? Careful and painstaking analysis is needed. But it is clear even today that certain party committees found themselves insufficiently prepared for an unconcealed, uncompromising struggle for political influence on all strata of the population. The arsenal of political weapons which they employed were outdated and proved ineffective.

Of course, it was in the capitals and large oblast centers that the opposition forces were the most active. Nonetheless, the party organizations of Moscow and Leningrad took a pronounced step forward compared with the preceding elections and were able to defend their positions and achieve a positive referendum result.

[Correspondent] And what next? Will the referendum results help the party organizations be quicker and more effective in augmenting political initiative and assertiveness in the interests of perestroika?

[Girenko] Only provided that the party organizations not confine themselves to intra-party problems but in an alliance with all healthy social and political forces act the part of nucleus of the political center about which M.S. Gorbachev spoke at the meetings in Belorussia, and openly and actively defend the working people's interests. The situation is changing rapidly. It is evidently necessary to appreciably update our practical programs and the party's measures in connection with the transition to market relations. The party organizations can and should take advantage of their opportunities for the development and strengthening of long-term direct production relations, a strengthening of order and discipline, the development of new production relations and implacable struggle against violations in the sphere of distribution, particularly against profiteering.

[Correspondent] It is now essential, evidently, to consolidate the wishes of the peoples expressed in the result of the referendum by completing work on the new Union treaty?

[Girenko] Of course. But complex work remains to be done on concordance of a number of the treaty's positions. It is essential, it would seem, to considerably stimulate the activity of the party groups and communist factions in the republic supreme soviets. It would be a good thing were the highest authorities of the republics to declare a freeze on the adoption of legislative instruments capable of complicating or delaying the concordance of issues pertaining to the Union treaty and to accelerate the formulation of proposals and the formation of groups of empowered representatives for signing the treaty. Such work is being performed actively in the Belorussian SSR. A draft Union treaty has already been discussed, observations have been expressed and an authorized group for participation in the completion of the work on the draft and determination of the procedure to conclude the treaty has been confirmed at the highest level at a session of the Supreme Soviet here.

[Correspondent] At the same time, however, work is, as you know, being performed insidiously in a number of republics, and there is a perception of uncertainty and doubt.

[Girenko] You see, the fear of the republics which do not have autonomous and national-territorial formations fear that they will find themselves in an uneven position, as it were, with other republics, particularly the RSFSR, was manifested in the alternative approach of the draft treaty to the building of the country's highest organs of power. But this is only an apparent difficulty. After all, it is a question of the exercise of the functions of the legislative authority, which concerns merely the strictly drawn jurisdiction of the Union, not individual republics, where the supremacy of their laws, within the republic authority, is preserved. The procedures for regulating decision-making in the event of a clash of interests of one republic or another may be negotiated also. Finally, I believe, there is no complication which cannot be removed by the appropriate mechanism for

removing contradictions. It is necessary to do everything to have the treaty signed as quickly as possible.

As far as the communist deputies are concerned, the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee December (1990) Plenum should serve as the reference point for them in this work.

[Correspondent] During the referendum not only was there a stimulation of all political forces but their polarization, particularly in the Russian Federation, was revealed also. Opponents of the CPSU finally gave notice of themselves as political opponents, tore off, as they put it, their masks and conducted an unconcealed offensive for the purpose of seizing power. In this situation how can we prevent an open confrontation, prevent a civil war?

[Girenko] There is such a danger, unfortunately. And it not only is not diminished but, on the contrary, is increased by the speeches of B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, who is calling for implacable confrontation, the resignation of the president of the country, the abolition of Union power structures and the breakup of the Soviet state. This is the goal of the actions of the present Russian leadership, which has accelerated bilateral interrepublic treaties and is proposing a four- and five-party republic treaty, which, if it were signed, could blow up the whole process of concluding a new Union treaty.

A particular danger is that, having been defeated in the course of the USSR referendum, the opposition forces could resort to nonparliamentary means of struggle, bring people out onto the streets and call for civil disobedience and political strikes.

On the other hand, some people could get the idea that if the bulk of the people has unambivalently advocated the Union, it is essential to begin pursuing a hard line toward the forces which are in opposition and impose virtually with an "iron hand" the will of the majority on the regions which expressed a different opinion in the referendum. But this path would lead to impasse also.

The CPSU will seek a way toward concord and solution of the crisis. The wishes of the peoples must be fulfilled, but without violence and bloodshed. The solidarity, purposiveness, and unity of action of all healthy forces of our society are now more important than ever. The party is prepared for constructive cooperation. This is demanded by common sense and the highest interests of the peoples of our multinational country.

#### **Continuous Work of CPSU's Rehabilitation Commission Viewed**

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Second Edition p 2

[Interview with N.F. Katkov, deputy chairman of the Central Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party, member of the working group of the CPSU

Central Committee Politburo, by V. Potashayev, A. Chernyak: "The Duty of Memory and Truth: date and place not specified]

[Text] Recently, one does not encounter as often as previously reports about the restoration of historical truth and the rehabilitation of the victims of the repressions in the mass media (with the exception, perhaps, of IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS). The readers of PRAVDA are interested in this connection in: "Why, has rehabilitation already come to an end?" We readdressed this question to the deputy chairman of the RSFSR CP Central Control Commission, N. F. Katkov. Nikolay Fedorovich for a long time was concerned with problems of rehabilitation in the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee, he is a member of the working group of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission for questions of rehabilitation.

[Katkov] Rehabilitation is continuing. I have in mind primarily rehabilitation with respect to party membership, in which I am directly involved. This is part of the general, let us put this way, sanitary process being carried out in accordance with the policy direction taken by the CPSU to fully eliminate the "blank spots" in our history. A large volume of work has been done by soviet, law enforcement, and party organs in the center and in the provinces. Thus, during the past three years alone, almost 17,000 persons have been rehabilitated for the RSFSR Communist Party.

But, I will not hide, and here I am in sympathy with those who express a certain uneasiness over the reduction in the rates of rehabilitation.

[Question] Why? Has the interest in the fate of people disappeared?

[Katkov] No, the reason lies somewhere else, in our lack of resourcefulness. For example, the instruction of the USSR President to the government to introduce proposals in the USSR Supreme Soviet concerning the restoration of the rights of citizens who suffered from the repressions is being implemented slowly. There is also no legislative act that sets forth a list of concrete crimes and a procedure for recognition, by the court, of people who were sentenced for committing them and who are not subject to rehabilitation. Corresponding instructions have been given by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies to the republic Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. But they, too, have not yet been implemented.

The realization of these instructions is being awaited by the workers of the judicial organs. They are, naturally, also being awaited by the workers of the party control organs, who, in examining the question of party membership, cannot but base themselves on court and legal documents.

[Question] The authors of some letters to PRAVDA express the idea that, they say, that the slowdown in

rehabilitation is reminiscent of the Sixties, when it even came to a complete standstill. . . .

[Katkov] I do not agree with this. Without special analysis, a basic difference is striking. The repressions carried out with respect to citizens for political, social, and other reasons, have been officially recognized as unlawful and as contradicting the basic civil and socioeconomic rights of man. This is of fundamental significance. In the Sixties, we did not yet rise to such assessments.

[Question] In the Ukase of the president the chronological limits of the political repressions were extended to the mid-1920's. With what is this connected? The CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission, as many know, investigated the materials of a more narrow period of time. What would you say about this?

[Katkov] Yes, the commission did act in this manner in the beginning. However, the search for the explanation of the reasons behind what happened in the 1930's and later induced it to also look into the 1920's. Why? In the mid-1920's, unfounded repressive measures were taken against the engineering and technical intelligentsia, specialists, and scholars.

To investigate all this now—I have in mind objectively, thoroughly—is not as simple as it seems at first glance. But to do this is necessary. A great deal here depends on the social formations and the various groups of people united through the noble task of the restoration of truth. The thorough understanding of the tragic pages of our past on the part of lawyers and historians is very necessary.

In the mentioned Ukase of the president of the USSR, the coordination of the activity in regard to questions of rehabilitation was entrusted to the Presidential Council. As is well known, it has now been abolished. It seems, the USSR Supreme Soviet or some structural subdivision under the president of the USSR could take these functions upon itself.

[Question] Did the practice of the examination of questions about party rehabilitation not undergo changes?

[Katkov] If this practice has undergone changes, then, in my view, for the better. But there are also quite a few difficulties. There are simply no materials according to which one can judge the degree of guilt or innocence of a person. We find out, as a rule, only the decision on exclusion from the party, often without reasons being given. Neither information nor objective data on the person. They also excluded people on the basis of lists.

The fate of a Communist was decided essentially not by the party organization, but by the investigation organ. The party cards in many cases were confiscated during arrest and sent to the corresponding party committee, where the procedure of exclusion or removal from the party was at times reduced to the mechanical "invalidation" of the party cards. They put a cross on the first page

with the photograph of the holder—and that's all. One can only imagine how at this time the atmosphere of comradely relations in the party was poisoned by the artificial (and, let us say directly, skillful) injection of distrust, suspiciousness, and "fear of the enemy."

[Question] Are there cases of refusal of party rehabilitation?

[Katkov] There are. This pertains, above all, to persons who, as was established in the review of their cases, had committed serious crimes, to the falsifiers of investigation materials during the years of repressions, and to those who, having turned out to be in the position of being persecuted (often—with a view to self-defense), chose the path of slander and aspersions in regard to their party comrades. There were also those who not as the result of force, but voluntarily, having accepted the "rules of the game" proposed by the investigation, for a number of years engaged in instigation and made provocative statements.

[Question] Now, it seems, the fate of almost all party figures is basically already clear. But what about L. B. Kamenev and G. Ye. Zinoviev, has the question of their party membership been reviewed?

[Katkov] In judicial terms, both of them have been rehabilitated. Materials have been prepared also concerning the question of the party membership of Kamenev and Zinoviev, but they have not yet been reviewed.

In passing, I want to report the fact that the question of the party rehabilitation of the participants of the so-called "Leningrad Center" has been reviewed, with the exception, of course, of L. B. Nikolayev, who committed the villainous murder of S. M. Kirov. The remaining 12 individuals who went through this case, were falsely accused of belonging to the anti-Soviet Zinovievite organization and the murder of S. M. Kirov.

[Question] They say, time is the best judge. It puts everything in order. Here we have now received answers to many burning questions concerning the repressions. But who is guilty of them? The spread of opinions is wide. What is your judgment about this question?

[Katkov] Yes, time and the flow of information do their work. But, you are right, the discord in opinions remains. On the level of everyday consciousness, you hear even today: "Beria is to blame for everything. He shoved under. . . ." Another believes: "Stalin, and only he." On the same level, but at times also on an intellectually higher one, some are inclined to generalizations, to attempts to put the blame on the party. The party, they say, itself organized the repressions. It is difficult to say what is greater here—the lack of information, the bitter emotions splashing out all over, or the conscious inclination in passing to cast a shadow on the party.

The party could not have organized and carried out the repressions alone because of the fact that it itself, above



all, became their object. During 1937-1938, at the peak of the repressions, 1,372,392 people suffered, including 116,885 Communists, that is almost every ninth. No, not the party was the organizer of the repressions. It could not have turned them against itself. Precisely among the victims of the repressions there proved to be quite a few of those who resisted the lawlessness and criticized the conditions in which the arbitrariness and ill will of some leading officials had no limits.

The measureless and unforgivable guilt for the bacchanalia of crimes, directed against the party and the people, is personal. It rests on the shoulders of concrete individuals, who were the initiators and organizers of the repressions, as well as the obedient and zealous executors of the illegal repressions. Stalin and his immediate entourage—that is who, above all, is personally guilty before the party and the people for the unjustified mass repressions and for the creation of the socio-political and moral-psychological situation in which they became possible.

[Question] Incidentally, when did the first lists appear?

[Katkov] The first list lay on Stalin's desk on 27 February 1937, on the day of the opening of the February-March Plenum, the same one at which Bukharin and A. I. Rykov were arrested. Then the lists went into the system. They were prepared by Yezhov, and then by Beria who took his place. Stalin signed them, and as a result hundreds and thousands of people were destroyed.

Together with him, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Zhdanov signed. In one day alone, on 12 December 1938, Stalin and Molotov signed about 30 lists, thus having sentenced 3,187 persons to capital punishment. Neither this, nor a great deal else, did or could the party know. Only now, with the appearance and publication of ever new documentary data, did the full realization of those monstrous acts come.

[Question] What do you think, Nikolay Frolovich, is the rehabilitation in general and party rehabilitation in particular being conducted sufficiently publicly and openly?

[Katkov] In my view, sufficiently. You see, never before have so many materials devoted to this complex problem been published in the press, and above all in the party press.

Sometimes people ask: In publishing materials on rehabilitation, are we not helping the enemies of the party, are we not arming them with additional arguments in their attacks on the party, on socialism? It seems, it is just the other way around. The restoration of justice and the truth about the past proceeds from the party. People understand, approve, and value this.

[Question] We talk about the tragic events of the remote past. But something similar, albeit by far not on this scale, took place quite recently. A Communist expressed disagreement with the glorification of a new leading

official, his next and clearly undeserved high award, and they attacked him from all sides, making the most ridiculous accusations. And how much misfortune did the people suffer who came out with sharp and correct criticism? In short, heterodoxy was persecuted through administrative measures, criminal proceedings, and party discipline. Are such cases being examined?

[Katkov] Yes, they are in the purview of the control organs. Without the existence of democratization and glasnost, they would most likely lie in the secret archives.

It goes without saying, it is important to restore justice with respect to all, to remove the former slander.

[Question] What, in your view, should be undertaken for the completion of party rehabilitation in the near future?

[Katkov] It seems, above all to adopt a decree on the party rehabilitation of Communists subjected during the 1920's, on the basis of the Ukase of the President of the USSR and by analogy with it. It could be adopted on a sufficiently high level, let us say, at a joint Central Committee Plenum and the CPSU Central Control Commission. Such proposals, as far as I know, have been introduced in the CPSU Central Committee.

Of course, some individual cases, if not everything with respect to them is clear to the judicial organs, will have to be reviewed on an individual basis. But the main thing is not to drag out this matter. Such is the political and moral demand of the time.

### Deputy Highlights Flaws in Soviet Democracy

PM2904101191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
25 Apr 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by USSR People's Deputy V. Samarin under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Perestroyka: "Impasse or Junction?"]

[Text] The first word of the heading is increasingly rarely on the lips even of the initiator of the radical renewal of the country's life. Indeed, it seems out of place to use it now, when the cost of living has tripled, many social guarantees have become a sham, and democratic freedoms have turned into economic chaos and harsh political and interethnic strife.

"Bring back cheap sausage and take away your democracy!" can be read among the slogans in the square. "Hand over power to us and we will ensure that the country prospers!" the adherents of the latest theory of "salvation" state. Both bring the miners out from the coal face and the machine-builders out of factory shops, understanding that without the will of the people "the voice of an individual is thinner than a squeal." Parties for the "social protection of working people" and even "protective" newspapers are appearing. Official and "free" trade unions present the government with one

ultimatum after another. Everything for the people. Everything in the name of the people... But against whom?

Scarcely had the passions of the extraordinary Russian conference—convened in order to overthrow (you have to call a spade a spade!) Boris Yeltsin—cooled, when the coordinators of the "Soyuz" parliamentary group initiated another "personal case"—that of Mikhail Gorbachev. However, the haste and sudden determination of the elected representatives of the people is understandable: Banners proclaiming no confidence in the USSR Supreme Soviet and appeals to dissolve the Congress of the USSR People's Deputies have become a common occurrence on the squares of Minsk, Moscow, and other cities.

#### **Without the President, Without the Parliament, Without the Congress!**

It does not embarrass the revolutionaries to put the question like this. The orthodox among them are gambling on "committees of national salvation," whereas the ultrademocrats are putting their faith in a "roundtable," and a "government of popular trust." And there is no problem with filling the positions in these supreme structures of "the people's salvation": The only candidates are "their guys," with no allowances made for our renowned pluralism. The only problem is obtaining authority from the populace. But there are plenty of examples in history of people managing to get around this obstacle perfectly well...

At the USSR Supreme Soviet sitting held 12 April, one of the people's deputies proposed proclaiming the slogan "The fatherland is in danger!" This was the expression of inner pain, confusion, and powerlessness when faced with an all-engulfing crisis. But what in fact should be done for its salvation?

This perhaps depends largely on a principled assessment of the situation in which we have found ourselves on this difficult and unfamiliar path. If you agree that perestroika has trundled into an impasse, that would mean going back to where we were originally (and then sitting back calmly and thinking up something better). That is at least some kind of certainty. Awaiting each of us there is the half-forgotten wisdom of leaders, the guiding and directing hand, and the unanimous election of all candidate deputies, while strikes are defined as sabotage and as attacks on our foundations. We will defend this without fail, the only model of society of its kind. And everything we have at our modest disposal, we will give away to create the most powerful army in the world.

To my mind, there is a more objective representation of the situation in society. We have arrived as it were at a major junction from a miserable little narrow-gauge railway: We are dismayed by the unbelievable traffic, the discordant hullabaloo, and indeed the opportunity that has presented itself to continue the journey in any direction. The choice is too wide for our taste and habits. Everyone is hurrying to their chosen train and pulling

their friends and familiars by the hand, demanding that the train make an unscheduled departure. "National Sovereignty Takes Precedence!", "Immediate Privatization of All Property!" and "We Will Not Allow Principles To Be Waived!"

May I be forgiven for this rather bizarre way of presenting very serious things, but this will provide a more graphic picture of the position of the stationmaster—the country's leader. Indeed whom should the president listen to in the first instance?

The people, of course. The people should have the first say! Well, this is an axiom. But it is as difficult as it is clear. After all, the people comprise the rebellious miners, and the suffering refugees from South Ossetia, and the 3.5-million-strong Army, and the 16-million-strong detachment of Communists. They are the "greens," anarchists, democratic Russians, liberal democrats, private farmers, and supporters of the kolkhoz system. All of them are the people. How can you hear them all?

We now rarely turn to Lenin for advice, and not only to him, but also to many other authorities on human society. Pride in the supremacy of our own intellects is increasingly causing us to repeatedly re-invent the bicycle. Yet, since ancient times the people's rule, or democracy, has been interpreted as rule exercised at the behest of a people's assembly. But it was only in 1989 that our country even approached a truly democratic form of functioning by the soviets.

Indeed, we people's deputies recognize that the current composition of the Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet by no means always adequately reflects and understands the current problems and cataclysms in the life of society. We do not have enough experience as politicians, and we do not have enough knowledge of life, authority, perspicacity, or a creative attitude. There is not enough time. We are impeded by the tendency to be strictly restricted to party matters, by stereotypes in thinking, and by red tape.

The biggest problem was the shortage of responsibility—we do not need loud words about the motherland, the people, or the electorate that handed us our mandates of trust. But whereas, for instance, Yeltsin and Gorbachev have already frequently been "through the mill" of having to account for their actions and attempts to call for votes of no-confidence in them, the voters have now been deprived of the right to subject their own deputies to examination. To our shame, the examination of the Law on the Procedure for the Recall of USSR People's Deputies has been postponed for a very long time. And I think that that is a large part of the reason why, instead of a dynamic collegiate organ of power, we still have a structure that is inaccessible to active criticism, and therefore to improvement.

What emerges is that, while developing democratic mechanisms in the economic, social, and legal spheres,



we have not concerned ourselves about the same mechanisms for regulating our own legislative and supervisory institutions. The rotation of the Supreme Soviet, which occurs without any kind of consideration of the people's opinion, gives us nothing apart from allowing a greater number of deputies access to participation in practical parliamentary work.

Thus, the necessary stabilization measure today should be the successive and simultaneously dynamic renewal of the parliamentary structure in accordance with the changing and increasingly complex tasks facing this parliament. The main principle of renewal is the active participation in this process by the voters themselves through the recall of a deputy or through proposals from them for the rotation of Supreme Soviet members.

Now to the president—it is not so much a question of doubts about Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership qualities. We can only hope that his future, happier successors will have the same desire and commitment to improve the complexion of society, the same patience and restraint. I am talking about something else: the incredible difficulties that even this remarkable individual has encountered when responsibility for the fate of a multinational society of 300 million has been placed on his shoulders alone.

When the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet was debating the institution of the presidency, I stated that the establishment of this post would not of itself solve the problems either of interethnic relations or of the distortions in our finances and consumer market. As the situation in the country got worse Gorbachev's opponents would simply have an opportunity to make the president alone answerable for everything. These sad predictions are now coming true: A chorus of voices are now disparagingly and sometimes even abusively chanting "Out! Out! Out!"

And neither left-wingers, right-wingers, nor party and state figures made wiser by experience are taking the trouble to ask themselves whether a state leader can work productively for the good of perestroika under such pressure. Is the practical implementation of presidential authority possible if all of the head of state's decisions are sabotaged at every turn?

That is why it is no surprise that in these circumstances many people—including politicians—see the transition to dictatorship as the only way out of the crisis of power. "Reasonable" arguments are put forward: Pinochet did pretty well, they say. Yet the transition to an effective institution of power lies precisely in the opposition direction—the development of real democracy.

We have forgotten that the people's power is still in its infancy in our country, that we will need to reform its model—and not just once!—and that we will need to bring it into line with the dynamics of the development of political and social processes. We have not proposed anything in this area as yet (general declarations about setting up a "roundtable" or transferring power to the

Federation Council do not count, of course). There has not even been the slightest serious attempt to improve any aspect of the structure and system of power, or its mechanism. A vivid example of that is the current examination of the package of anticrisis measures submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers.

The Supreme Soviet has concentrated on its details and specific points rather than trying to work out its own parallel program of anticrisis political actions. Such a program could embody proposals from different political trends, as well as questions of strengthening the presidency by means of collegial support for it. Needless to say, this should not be done hastily or to satisfy some "measure," but at a serious, creative, and competent level.

Without clear-cut positions agreed at the political level it will be hard not only to make progress but to counteract catastrophic destabilization. Without a well-oiled precision mechanism to ensure the shaping and functioning of power and controls over it, the only possibility will be "mob democracy" and random destructive riots which will inevitably end in tragedy—not only for our rulers, but for the nation.

### **New Names for Republics, Autonomous Oblasts Published**

91UN13881 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 8,  
20 Feb 91 p 14

[Report by O. Filatova under the rubric "SOYUZ Reference": "What We Are Called Now"; word order of names as published]

[Text] In conjunction with the fact that several republics and autonomous republics have been renamed recently and taking into account the requests of the readers, we are publishing the new names of the republics. At the same time we emphasize that the constitutions of the USSR, the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan do not make note of the aforementioned changes.

Azerbaijan Republic

Republic of Armenia—Ayastan

Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic—Bashkortostan

Buryat Soviet Socialist Republic

Gorno-Altay Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Republic of Georgia

Kalmyk Soviet Socialist Republic—Khalmg Tangeh

Soviet Republic of Karakalpakistan

Republic of Kyrgyzstan

Komi Soviet Socialist Republic

Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Latvian Republic—Latvia

Lithuanian Republic—Lithuania

Mari Soviet Socialist Republic—Republic of Mari El

Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova

Mordovian Soviet Socialist Republic

Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic—Tatarstan

Udmurt Republic

Chechen-Ingush Republic

Chuvash Soviet Socialist Republic

Chukchi Soviet Autonomous Republic

Estonian Republic—Estonia

Yakut-Sakha Soviet Socialist Republic

Yamal-Nenets Republic

## RSFSR

## RSFSR Presidential Election Law Viewed

91UN1365B Moscow *RABOTNAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by observer Aleksandr Tayurskiy: The Scoring Has Started: Making the Numbers Fit"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of Russian will soon have to carry out an important task: adopt a law on the election of the republic president. A couple of days ago the chairman of the Committee for Legislation of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet S. Shakhrai presented in several newspapers simultaneously his own personal viewpoint, which, incidentally, coincides with the one "expressed in the draft of the Russian law" regarding this procedure.

The draft law has also been published. According to it, presidential candidates may be nominated by registered republic parties, social organizations, mass movements, labor collectives, and citizens. One million votes are sufficient for the last group to do this.

Democratism is broad but it still has limits. Thus, for example, the CPSU may not nominate its own candidate—by definition it is not a republic but a Union party. And the RSFSR Communist Party may not either, since it has not been registered yet. These are minor restrictions, but they are dear to the "democratic" hearts, and they give them a certain number of points even before things get started.

After giving many interested people a chance to nominate candidates, even the Russian democrats are taking things firmly in hand. "The second round can include candidates who receive support from no less than one-third of the RSFSR people's deputies—that is, 355 deputies." This is supposedly done so as "not to have many, endless rounds of the elections." But that is devious. In the majority of civilized countries there are only two stages to presidential elections—in the first, they determine a couple of leaders who will enter the second round, and then the winner is determined.

To be frank, the Russian law is intended to insert a congress filter on the path to free expression of the will of the people.

But why not have two-round elections? Because the result of the real expression of the will of the people could turn out to be quite different from what is desired by those who control the Russian power structure.

Therefore, all the components of the future law are being structured in such a way as to program the necessary result. Thus, it is no secret that B. Yeltsin's popularity has been plummeting with increasing speed recently. The speed of the campaign should appreciably neutralize this factor because the election blitzkrieg will put B.

Yeltsin's competition at an obvious disadvantage. Neither the rural residents who are engaged in planting nor the students who are in session will have time to look them over or listen to them.

And a powerful filter in the form of one-third of the deputy votes is being arranged, taking into account the alignment of factional forces in the Russian congress. It will guarantee Yeltsin's nomination. In order to make the guarantee 100 percent, the authors of the draft have decided to tie the hands of "democrats" of all hues—from pink to blue. S. Shakhrai announces this with remarkable candor: "...the democrats are nominating dozens of candidates. The rule that only one can make it through will force (!—A. T.) them either to unite or to be left with no presidential candidate at all." It is extremely remarkable that the rule must "force" democrats! In fact, of course, they are being forced not by the rule but by the party-political will of a quite definite group who are now writing this election law. And through their democratically coquettish smile, you can still see the party fangs of Democratic Russia.

But even that is not enough! It seems that they have even determined in advance the one with whom Boris Nikolayevich will fight the final duel! "I personally am convinced that the conservative...forces are consolidated and will nominate one candidate," S. Shakhrai states unceremoniously. He is right, and the logic of his thinking can be reconstructed fairly easily. It is based on a bloc analysis of the factional structure of the Russian congress. One of the largest blocs is the Communists of Russia. Whom will this bloc nominate? It immediately becomes clear that the speed of the campaign will force it into a corner—there is no time for the election, not to mention a large campaign for anyone, even a God-given but still little known candidate! Therefore, they will almost inevitably have to unite around a candidate from the old crowd. Thus the tricky draft law is forcing the problem of the election of the president into the final equation which can be seen even today. For example, "Yeltsin-Polozkov."

There you have it. The Russians have not even had a chance to think about future elections, and they have already been taken care of by the writing of a law that will direct the unsuspecting people into the necessary channel.

"The idea of separation of powers is united with the Soviet power," S. Shakhrai pleases his readers. This "separation through unification" may be included in the category of outstanding discoveries in the area of state law. True, it is not used very much in developed countries: In the United States the Senate does not elect the president and it does not filter the list of candidates. And the French National Assembly does not do this. They trust the voters there.

## RSFSR Presidential Election Law Assailed

### Derided As 'Political Farce'

91UN1392A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 24 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Eduard Volodin: "Popular Drama in a Two-Round Farce"]

[Excerpt] [Passages omitted]

One asks where, in what country, in violation of the constitution, a supreme power is created which can replace the power structure and the organization of governmental and regional administration? This may probably take place in a country subject to a political coup d'etat. In our country, this has not been officially announced, for which reason the introduction of presidential rule is anti-constitutional.

In Russia as well, in violation of the current Constitution, without having amended it, the Congress of People's Deputies is introducing a presidential form of government, although the results of the referendum and the nonparticipation in it of several autonomous formations have provided no grounds whatsoever for any change in the political power structure. However, I repeat, despite the established rules, the congress passed a constitutional resolution on the election of a president of the RSFSR and, together with his Committee on Legislation, Deputy S. Shakhrai is drafting an amazing Law on Presidential Elections.

How can one not be amazed when the electoral system combines demagogic hypocrisy and open scorn for the will of the people? On the one hand, anyone who so desires could nominate candidates for the presidency—parties, public organizations and movements, and even individual citizens. This is unrestricted democracy. The law will watch over the nominees, going so far as to protecting them from legal liability or dismissal from their jobs, and ensuring payment for their transportation (other than by taxicab). The propaganda campaign could be paid for by anyone other than the state: the candidate himself, his friends and relatives, interested citizens, labor collectives, public organizations, and mass movements. The freedom of speech is such that a candidate for president has the right publicly to express his views and programs, which would include in the information media if, to add a personal remark, they would let him do so.

All of this was written by the RSFSR Committee on Legislation. I would have very much liked personally to congratulate S. Shakhrai and his fellow-workers for their progress toward a law-governed society, even though they may have forgotten the anti-constitutional nature of the law they are drafting!

However, further reading makes us lose the wish to enjoy and congratulate. The crux of the matter lies not in the benefits and the freedoms but in the secret balloting.

Thus, the number of candidates for the presidency is not limited but "the ballot for secret voting for a president of the RSFSR must include candidates... who have obtained, no later than 15 days prior to the elections, the support of no less than one-third of the total number of RSFSR people's deputies (Article 7)."

Imagine, parties, movements, and private citizens, in a thrust of democracy and glasnost, nominate candidates, collect funds, and close ranks. The candidates travel around the country, publicly presenting their views and, together with their teams, work on political and economic programs, and do everything possible to get to the information media.... At the end, however, everything is decided not by the people but by those same legislators, who determine for whom, as an alternate, the people should vote.

Such is the draft of the law which "takes into consideration" the opinion of the people and which leaves the final say to the RSFSR people's deputies. What is then the sense of having an electoral campaign? According to the draft Law on Presidential Elections, the opinion of the people is ignored, and the electoral campaign itself turns into a disgusting and degrading farce for the candidates. Actually, one should campaign not among the people but among the deputies.

In the spirit of the draft RSFSR Presidential Elections Law, I submit the following suggestion: by the time that the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies meets, the presidential candidates will already have been nominated. Therefore, in the evening the candidates should compete with each other. Some would engage in a beauty contest, others would compete in the arts, and others again would perform gypsy dancing.... Meanwhile, the people's elected deputies, having determined whose name will be on the secret ballots of the people, could relax.... However, even in this case there should be a minor correction. S. Shakhrai specifies the following: "The balloting should be 'strict': every people's deputy could cast his ballot in support of a single candidate only. Theoretically, this means that after the congress, in the second round (i.e., those whose names will be on the ballot—author) there will be three candidates. I believe, however, that at the end there will be two candidates and the secret ballot will include two names, for such is today the actual deployment of forces."

And so, this is it. The jurist has confused law with politics and concocted prognoses, having forgotten even the newly baked draft. Hypocritically, he also describes this scandalous comedy as "first round" nomination. Political manipulations with the votes of RSFSR people's deputies are described as the "second round." But is this not a political farce being prepared for the benefit of the people of Russia in choosing a president? Is this "two-round election," stipulated by S. Shakhrai, not a mockery of the will of the people?

This intended political anti-constitutional somersault has already found a way to gain some support and to

create its own power structures. This was openly mentioned at interregional meetings and in the political satire by G. Popov "What Is To Be Done?" This is also mentioned in the Yeltsin-Rumyantsev draft Russian Constitution. It was mentioned at Dom Kino by B. Yeltsin himself, who spoke of his readiness to send special representatives in the localities. It was reported also in the interview given by S. Shakhrai. Like presidential elections, elections for chairmen of soviets should be held in all the territories; based on the availability of funds, they would choose their professional "teams." I now quote S. Shakhrai: "He alone would bear the responsibility for the team's activities and for his ability to guide it. An end would be put to endless discussions. The lower soviets will not become political debate clubs (this, on the one hand) or else **invade areas subject to daily management** (author's emphasis)." Such is a better description of those special representatives and this is a program for "legitimately" to remove the soviets from power and management. It is precisely the way through which the system of personal power would be supported by the corresponding political structure and ensure the implementation of any program, even the one which promises prosperity not in 500 days but in a few weeks.

Could it be that our lawmakers do not realize that their draft two-round political farce will inflame passions even further? And if they confuse jurisprudence with political studies, they should nonetheless understand some basics: the staging of an all-Russian comedy described as "presidential elections" will leave no space between the stage and the public in the hall. Such a bad comedy could turn into a national drama in which neither the special representatives nor the special chairmen of soviets would be retained even as make-up specialists or stage cleaners.

### Deputy Details Objections

91UN1392B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 24 Apr 91 First Edition p. 2

[Article by Yu. Slobodkin, RSFSR people's deputy, chairman of the Solnechnogorsk City People's Court, Moscow Oblast, candidate of juridical sciences: "Draft Law 'On a Given Topic'"]

[Text] It is clear that in connection with the forthcoming introduction of the presidential form of government in the RSFSR, problems related to the procedure for the nomination and registration of candidates for president, the conditions for the organization and conduct of the electoral campaign, and questions of the extent of the rights of the future president and the coordination of the institution of the presidency with the rights of the soviets of people's deputies on different levels assume the greatest possible significance. The deputy groups represented in the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies must apply maximal efforts to reach agreements on these matters.

It is already obvious that the date for holding the presidential elections, set at the third (extraordinary) Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies (12 June 1991), is arbitrary and unrealistic. It would be not only sensible and justified but also necessary for the next congress to consider this matter more substantively, having ensured that the elections for the first president of our Republic rest on a real legal basis.

I well realize that my opponent may accuse me, along with those who share this view, of allegedly trying to delay the holding of presidential elections. It is well known, however, that in no country in the world has a day for electing the head of state been set before the fundamental law (the Constitution) has defined the status of the president and before the existence of laws defining the procedure for electing a president. Our eternal trouble is that we put the cart before the horse and are then amazed at the lack of progress.... The procedure for nominating candidates for the presidency and for holding elections requires not less but more time than the election of people's deputies, which are set three months before election day.

The neglect of common sense, under the influence of current political aspirations has, unfortunately, become chronic in our country. This disease has so profoundly shaken our society that it has created extremely dangerous spin-offs, in the form of "war between laws," and led to a number of extreme situations. In this sense the draft RSFSR Law on the Election of the RSFSR President, drafted by the legislative activities sector of the Juridical Department of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, headed by RSFSR People's Deputy S.M. Shakhrai is no exception.

In any draft law dealing with elections, the question of the time allotted for the preparations for and the organization and conduct of the electoral campaign is basic and axiomatic.

According to Article 7, it is only a candidate who has the support of no less than one-third of the total number of RSFSR people's deputies, and who has submitted proper proof to this effect to the Central Electoral Commission "no later than 15 days prior to the day of elections" is accepted as "valid" candidate for president. Nonetheless, Article 8 of the draft includes the following strict requirement: the registration of nominated candidates for RSFSR president and their managers must take place no later than 22 days prior to the elections. The result is an obvious stupidity: an individual registered as a candidate for the position of president is essentially not a candidate unless he has been able to submit proof of support of one-third of RSFSR people's deputies. Furthermore, this individual has a week during which to campaign for the votes of deputies but risks not to be included in the secret ballot for the election of the president if the "hunt" for deputy votes has been unsuccessful.



Actually, on what basis have the authors of the draft included as a prerequisite for participation in and competing for the presidency the demand that the candidate must be supported by a certain segment of the corps of RSFSR people's deputies? It might have been possible to explain this if the president of the Republic were to be elected by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies; since a national vote is contemplated, no justification exists for this kind of trick. The only possible conclusion is that the authors of the official draft Law on the Election of a President of the RSFSR are doing everything possible to eliminate, even prior to the elections, any candidate who could provide a real competition to the one who is now, shamelessly and flatteringly described as RSFSR president.

In any case, the Liberal Democratic Party and the other public organizations which have nominated or intend to nominate their candidates for president would accomplish nothing if this draft becomes law.

Was this why we codified, on a constitutional basis, the principle of a multi-party system and proclaimed freedom of participation in the political life of society? The type of "democracy," which tries to "create" laws merely for the sake of preventing other political forces to participate in the struggle for the nomination of their representatives for state positions is unthinkable. It immediately reveals its totalitarian-dictatorial power, which offers no choices, and which tells its competitors that they are nothing but crickets which should not go beyond the limits of their hearth....

Having proclaimed in Article 7 that "candidates for RSFSR president are nominated by political parties, trade unions, and mass sociopolitical movements registered in the RSFSR..." the authors of the draft have essentially blocked also the possible nomination of candidates by the RSFSR Communist Party, for the party does not have the juridical status of a Republic political party but is considered a Republic organization of the all-Union political party (CPSU). Therefore, reading the text of the official draft of the Law on Presidential Elections, which deprives them even of the chance to participate in the struggle for the presidency, the liberal democrats may seek consolation in the fact that even the largest political organization in the Republic, such as the RSFSR Communist Party, finds itself in an even less enviable position.

The authors of the draft also put their best foot forward when they broadly proclaim that labor collectives, enterprises, establishments, organizations, and collectives of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions and citizens' meetings have the right directly to nominate candidates for RSFSR president, for this right is immediately reduced to naught and if they are sincere, turns into an open mockery.

The point is that the nominee of any labor collective, in order to become a candidate for the presidency, should earn the support of no less than one million citizens of

the RSFSR. This support should be expressed through a vote, held in accordance with the stipulations of the Law on Referendums in the RSFSR. How is it possible, for the forthcoming elections, which are set for 12 June, to organize the holding of mini-referendums if a notification on the holding of such referendums should be completed one month before election day?

But even that is not all. The candidate for president, nominated by a labor collective must, in terms of the referendum, also take into consideration that "the cost of the nomination of candidates and electoral campaign expenditures must be paid out of the personal funds of the candidates and voluntary contributions by interested citizens, labor collectives, public organizations, and mass movements" (part 4 of Article 5 of the draft).

What labor collective, enterprise or secondary specialized school would decide to nominate a candidate for president if only for a regional or local referendum it would have to spend millions of rubles? And all of this is merely for gaining the support of one million citizens and becoming a candidate for president.

The logic of the authors of the project discourages the electorate, for the voters realize that the Social Democratic Party, let us say, which according to the co-chairman of its board numbers some 5,000 members, could register its candidate for president without bothering to hold a referendum, whereas a labor collective of several thousand people should hold such a referendum.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that the draft has been obsequiously formulated by a "search-oriented legal science," not for the sake of holding democratic elections for president of the RSFSR but for simulating such elections, and that it is a particularly clear example of what is usually described as a farce.

An alternative to the official draft is a draft of the RSFSR Law on the Elections of President of the RSFSR, which was formulated as a legislative initiative by deputies, who are part of the "Russians Communists" group, and by authoritative legal scientists.

Article 3 of that draft stipulates that the elections for president must be set by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies for not earlier than four months prior to the day of elections; this proves that ensuring the democratic principles in the organization and the holding of elections, with a view to determining the true feelings and wishes of the people, is ascribed a decisive significance.

This draft guarantees to all Republic political parties, public organizations and movements, Republic organizations of all-Union political parties, public organizations and movements, as well as labor collectives, and assemblies of military servicemen in their military units located on RSFSR territory, the possibility of unobstructed nomination of candidates, who must be between the ages of 35 and 65 and, based on their state of health, able to fulfill presidential duties. No other limitations are set for presidential candidates; nor is any kind of



preliminary "support" for participating in the competition for the position of president required. It is the people who must determine who is worthy of becoming president of the RSFSR, by expressing their attitude toward the candidates directly through the balloting.

According to this draft, the registration of the candidates starts three months before and ends one month before the elections. No restriction is placed on the number of candidates for RSFSR president, although there can be no less than two.

Refusal of the Central Electoral Commission to register a candidate for president may be appealed to the RSFSR Supreme Court which must consider the complaint within three days and whose decision is final.

In order to eliminate unequal opportunities for the candidates in the competition for the presidency, the draft prohibits the financing and material support of the candidates by any organizations or individuals, including foreign organizations and foreign private individuals. It stipulates that the expenditures related to preparations for and holding of elections for RSFSR president are met by the state.

The future president of the RSFSR must enjoy a sufficiently broad support of the people in order efficiently to implement his duties. That is precisely why Article 13 of the draft stipulates as follows: "The president of the RSFSR shall be considered elected if more than one-half of registered voters have voted for him.... Furthermore, the candidate for president of the RSFSR must have garnered more than one-half of the votes of the electorate in the majority of republics and autonomous formations and in the majority of krais and oblasts."

If no candidate obtains the required number of votes, in accordance with the stipulations of this article, within one month the voters must vote again for either of the two candidates who have obtained the highest number of votes in the first round." A second round is considered as completed if no less than one-half of the registered voters have voted. The candidate who has obtained more than one-half of the votes of the voters who cast their ballots shall be considered elected, providing that he has also garnered more than one-half of the votes of the electorate in the majority of republics and autonomous formations and the majority of krais and oblasts.

We are on the threshold of a very serious and responsible political action, for which reason elections for president of the RSFSR should not become a scripted show.

#### **RSFSR Presidential Candidates Suggested**

91UN1402A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No. 16, 18 Apr 91 p 5

[List of Russian presidential candidates suggested by RSFSR people's deputies: "Candidates"]

[Text] **One candidate for the post of president of Russia is already known. This is B.N. Yeltsin. Are there others who**

**wish to run against him? RSFSR people's deputies express their opinion.**

**Sergey Shakhray:** From the right center—V. Bakatin and B. Gromov who are known on the populist plane as protectors of the Russian population.

**Oleg Poptsov:** From the Communist Party of Russia A. Sokolov might be nominated; from other political forces—B. Fedorov, G. Yavlinskiy, and V. Bakatin

**Yuriy Yeltsov:** V. Bakatin.

**Aleksandr Kosopkin:** At a sufficient distance from B. Yeltsin, A. Sobchak might play a role, and also V. Bakatin, who has the aura of someone driven out from the higher echelons.

**Nikolay Kuznetsov:** N. Travkin, Yu. Afanasyev, A. Sobchak, S. Shakhray, S. Baburin, but none of them can compete with Yeltsin.

**Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev:** Mr. Travkin, Mr. Polozkov, and Mr. Sobchak could run, but they have no chance of winning.

**Petr Filippov:** A. Sobchak could run. But he will not win.

#### **Sverdlovsk 'No' Vote in Union Referendum Examined**

91UN1397A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent S. Ryabov: "On the Side of the Road. Why Sverdlovsk Oblast Expressed Distrust of a Renewed Union"]

[Text] **Sverdlovsk Oblast—Waving one's arms about after a fist fight is a somewhat futile exercise. But I think that it is necessary following the results of the all-Union referendum in Sverdlovsk Oblast.**

**Its results were exceptional. At least on the scale of the RSFSR. Who would have thought that from among the Russians, the workers in this "region that is a bastion of support for the authorities" would express their distrust when they have done so much for its development and consolidation?**

**But facts are facts: Only 49.3 percent of the inhabitants of the Central Urals voted for the renewal of the Union. In Sverdlovsk itself the figure was even lower, and more than 62 percent of the population voted "no" for renewal of the Union.**

**Let us try to find out what these figures mean. Are they random, or are they law-governed.**

#### **Who Owes What to Whom?**

Several days before the referendum an incident occurred at the Pervouralsk major industrial center that was at

first blush only of local significance. As a sign of protest against the milk shortages a young father left a nursing infant in a store. "Since I cannot buy milk, feed him yourself!" he said in despair to the administration of the store, and off he went. The salespeople just threw up their hands: what was to be done? On that day only 180 liters of milk had been delivered instead of the 2,000 liters.

It is not difficult to guess what that young father wrote on his Union voting ballot. If, of course, he even bothered to visit the electoral precinct. And there are many such here. With increasing frequency people are blockading workers in food stores, demanding that they receive goods for their ration cards, and sending messengers to the various official offices and meetings. With each month that passes the social position of the inhabitants of the Central Urals is worsening. At whom should their main reproach be directed, the central departments or their own local departments?

The absolute majority of workers are employed at enterprises of all-Union subordination. For example, in Sverdlovsk, 90 percent of them are employed at those enterprises. Consequently, the center should be the "natural father" for the oblast. In practice, however, it behaves like a "wicked stepfather." For example, for the past two months (note that this was on the eve of the referendum!), compared with the corresponding period last year, trade received 27 percent less subsidies for meat, 44.1 percent less for dairy products, 43.9 percent less for fish, and 40 percent less for sugar. People have only one memory of butter: Since November of last year none of the coupons for it have been exchanged. Indeed the position of the people of Sverdlovsk has also deteriorated in terms of other products.

The CPSU Oblast Committee Bureau recently examined the question "On Providing Food for the Population of the Oblast." It was decided to ask the prime minister of the RSFSR, I.S. Silayev, to send a competent commission to provide emergency help for the people of Sverdlovsk...

"Once again we are on our knees begging for what has already been allocated to us," said rolling mill operator at the Verkh-Isetskiy Metallurgical Combine, Yuriy Ankudinov. "It would be fine if we were sitting here like parasites on the neck of the government. But last year the oblast's industry met its contractual obligations and state orders quite well..."

One of the greats remarked that in their misfortune people are inclined to blame fate, the gods, and anyone else, but not themselves. Without in any way justifying the interruptions in supplies of products from other parts of the country, I would like to go back one-and-a-half or two decades to when the food stores in the oblast were freely selling pork and poultry and meat and eggs, and potatoes and vegetables. And home-produced. Perhaps there are now fewer kolkhozes and sovkhoses and

poultry farms? No, not so. Or is it that over the years natural calamities have befallen the land of the Urals? No, again not so.

These matters were of interest to workers in the Sverdlovsk Oblast Executive Committee, when the activity of the agro-industrial committee led by E. Yasinovskiy was discussed twice during March. On both occasions the leadership of the agro-industrial complex displayed its "failure." In fact, last year the department's targets crashed for all the main indicators. Even the plans that were lower against 1989, the year of the drought.

In my opinion, the true reasons for the sharp decline in the level of output in the public sector were discussed in a well-argued manner in an interview for URALSKIY RABOCHIY given by S. Lobanov, deputy chief main controller and auditor for the RSFSR Ministry of Finance Control and Audit Administration for Sverdlovsk Oblast.

"The material well-being of the very inflated apparatus of the agro-industrial complex does not depend in any way on work results. Even if not a single ear of wheat ripened and the cows gave not a single drop of milk, the officials in the agro-industrial complex would still receive their salaries. And with respect to the loss of cattle, what is happening is just terrible! The animals are dying for the most ordinary of reasons—because of the crush and the dampness, and the drafts, while the cattlemen and the milkmaids do a bad job of looking after the animals and feed them poorly. And the striking thing is that no one is being held responsible for this, and virtually no one has been made to pay a single kopek out of his own pocket. The losses are simply written off—the bookkeeper deals with everything..."

And what about the oblast soviet and its executive committee, which E. Rossel heads? I am sure that hardly anyone would open his mouth to rebuke Eduard Eduardovich for passiveness or indifference or reluctance to feed hungry farmers. Unfortunately, his repeated visits to the Union and republic governments and his talks with the leaders of the "hospitable" krais and oblasts are not always successful: "We can help no one, please God we survive ourselves..."

We do not dispute this; in an emergency situation cries for help are justified. But neither should we forget about our own "unclaimed" resources. And they are considerable. Last year, for example, the oblast executive committee drew up the "Myaso" ["Meat"] program, allocating R13.5 million to implement it. And the result? Subdivisions of the agro-industrial committee barely managed to assimilate one-fourth of it. Notwithstanding, R24 million have now been allocated for the program. Is this any guarantee that this time the funds will be used as intended?...

We see that "intrigues" at the center are not involved here. For it has been known for a long time that sufficiency in the home of a good manager is created not by

donations from a distant relation or rich neighbor but first and foremost by his own hands.

The empty-bellied inhabitants of the oblast also gaze at the empty shelves in the stores selling industrial goods. The problem of clothing and footwear is particularly acute. Perhaps with imports it would be better? Alas, there are no contracts at all here for sewn articles or footwear...

"After the referendum I visited a number of labor collectives," V. Kadochnikov, first secretary of the party oblast committee, tells us. "Many people are really astonished that the Central Urals said 'no' to the Union." "We are against the rigid diktat from the center," people told me in interviews, "and its inefficient economic policy, but we do not want to leave the Union! We hope that a sovereign Russia will represent our interests in it in a worthy manner." It is impossible to blame only the central organs of power for everything. Do we not have a Russian Supreme Soviet and a Russian Council of Ministers? But for some reason this did not receive the attention it should have during the referendum. People had a single stereotype in their heads: The president of the country, the Union parliament, the Union government are to blame...

#### On the "Saviors" Hook.

In every electoral precinct in Sverdlovsk Oblast two people followed each voter into the secret voting booth—M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin. This is hardly just my fantasy. The voters as it were saw two portraits on the ballot sheet—the president of the USSR and the head of the Russian parliament. The essential nature of the Union referendum was pushed into third place. But this is what remains a mystery in the psychology of the Sverdlovsk voter. It is common knowledge that Boris Nikolayevich, on whose name his fellow countrymen set a very high value, made a personal choice late last year: Russia must be part of the USSR. And he had expressed himself in favor of a renewed Union before 17 March, on Central television.

Notwithstanding, the people of Sverdlovsk for some reason did not "listen to" their own idol but ventured their own opinion. So the conclusion is that within the oblast there are other forces and "authorities" capable of actively shaping the public awareness in the direction they want. Let me cite an excerpt from a curious document.

"Most democrats share illusions associated with the possibility of the Union and cooperation with Gorbachev," it states. "In the past months he has shown himself to be openly in solidarity with the most reactionary forces. It follows from this that the time has come to declare yourselves openly and unambiguously in opposition to the leadership led by Gorbachev, and that the task of coming to power should be the political program on the agenda. Solve the problem of financing your organization. Establish contacts with private businessmen—people in cooperatives, leaseholders, small

enterprises—we express their interests. You should have a clear idea of how to organize a meeting or a manifesto, and particularly a strike."

The signature beneath this very original set of instructions "to seize power" that has been brought to Sverdlovsk Oblast is not that of some self-taught politician but of USSR People's Deputy A. Murashev, one of the leaders of the "Democratic Russia" movement. The reader will note that there is no direct appeal to boycott the referendum or split the USSR. But even a first-grader can grasp without difficulty what is being said.

About two weeks before the referendum I met the deputy from the Leninskiy Rayon Soviet in Sverdlovsk City, Ye. Kostitsyn.

"The position of our Democratic Party of Russia vis-a-vis 17 March is set forth here." And Yevgeniy Germanovich courteously handed me a sheet of typewritten text, and added: "I am chairman of the city organization of the Democratic Party of Russia, and there are about 200 of us in the oblast."

So what were the ideas that were "brought to the masses" on the eve of the national referendum by the members of this party? Let me cite verbatim an extract from the leaflet given me:

"Remember: By voting 'yes' at the Union referendum you will be voting for the socialist choice. Does it suit you to have a continuation of the experiment on the people with the promise of a 'bright future' tomorrow, when after 73 years what you have today is blood, poverty, and ruin? Does it suit you to have a military dictatorship and civil war? Are you against a truly sovereign Russia, against the formation of the Union 'from below,' by the republics, against the policy of B.N. Yeltsin? Your choice is in your hands! Do not yield to provocation, answer 'no' at the referendum."

I read the leaflet and was astonished: you have to be skillful to stand on your head! But the facts show that in terms of activeness and sophistication of methods used to influence public opinion, the CPSU opposition achieved the best results. At so tense and crucial a moment our establishment ideologists preferred the safe rearguard to the advanced front line. Avoiding direct clashes with the "enemy," they believed that people were supposedly capable of themselves separating the wheat from the chaff and making the choice of which side of the barrier to take their place. And it did not happen. The illusions remained illusions.

"We must make the choice for ourselves," says V. Denisenko, first secretary of the Sverdlovsk City Party Committee. "That is, consider our own attitude toward the various parties and movements. If their programs provide for social protection for the working man, improvement in his living conditions, and rational paths for economic and political transformations, we should not be in conflict with 'those of different creeds' but should unite our efforts. And finally it is high time to

turn to the workers movement—not stand aside from it but merge with it and lead it, if need be.”

Vladimir Alekseyevich cited the following fact. In November of last year the passenger transport enterprises in Sverdlovsk city decided to go on strike. It was not difficult to imagine how this action would threaten 1.5 million people. The CPSU city committee bureau supported the demands of the labor collectives. First it obliged communists who were leaders of the city soviet of people's deputies and its executive committee to draw up within one month measures to eliminate the conflict. Second, it appealed to the transport workers, asking them not to go on strike during that period. This direct and interested participation in the fate of the collective had an effect: people did not resort to extreme measures.

In the opinion of V. Denisenko, today the authority of the CPSU depends largely on its “connections on the ground” in the political and economic problems of the working class.

In short, the party committees still have much to do to make the “oath of allegiance” to proletarian hegemony not simply a phrase but something filled with specific and practical content.

But let us return to the results of the referendum.

Naturally, it is impossible to count how many of the people of Sverdlovsk were scared by the “reactionary Gorbachev” and the inevitability of “civil war.” It can be said, however, that many human souls are in troubled waters that are being thoroughly stirred up by the latter-day “saviors of Russia” with people's dissatisfaction about the collapse of the consumer market, the instability in the economy, and their lack of faith in the morrow. That is why the people of Sverdlovsk have found themselves on the side of road, as it were, of public opinion in the country. Vexing...

#### **Tatar First Secretary on Sovereignty, Role in RSFSR**

91US0478A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 91  
Second Edition p 4

[Interview with R.R. Idiatullin, first secretary of the CPSU Tatar Republic Committee, by correspondent N. Morozov; place and date not given: “Sovereignty and Unity”]

[Text] *The complex, more, painful process of the transition of our country and state from unitarism to a new qualitative condition has appreciable particularities in different republics and regions. This subject will undoubtedly be raised in the course of the present CPSU Central Committee plenum also. His vision of the complex processes of the formation of the statehood of Tatarstan in a union in renewal and the role and place in these processes of the republic's Communists is set forth in conversation with a PRAVDA correspondent by R.R. Idiatullin, first secretary of the CPSU Tatar Republic Committee.*

[Morozov] Revo Ramazanovich, to judge by everything, there is no more important task today than preservation of the Union of SSR. What is your vision of the country's form of government and the place of Tatarstan in a renewed union?

[Idiatullin] Summing up now the historical experience of almost 70 years, one involuntarily concludes that the unitary type of state that took shape following 1922 brought about the inequality of the peoples and their forms of national-state arrangement in the form of an ordering of the territorial-state formations in terms of size into Union and autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts and okrugs. Sooner or later, such a division could not have failed to have stirred a mass of contradictions of an economic, political, and interethnic nature. It ultimately became an impediment to the development of many of the country's peoples, of our republic included.

I would like for the sake of clarity to recall that the present economic potential of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic is higher than that of many Union republics. Thus in terms of the volume of production, say, it is equal to the three Baltic republics put together. Is it fair to consider Tatarstan an “autonomy?” We have a surplus import-export balance on the order of R1 billion. We export finished products to 30 countries of the world, developed countries included. The republic has given the country more than 2 billion tons of oil alone. At the same time, however, we are experiencing a chronic shortage of petroleum products. On account of the unjustifiably low prices, we incur annual losses from oil production, and the republic's southeast oil zone has become an environmental disaster zone. Even in the oil-producing areas of Tatarstan the level of gas supply constitutes only 12-15 percent. Villages are perched on gas and oil deposits and are heated by firewood. Such a thing became possible as a result of the omnipotence of the department monopolists of the two “centers”—the Union and the RSFSR. Here are some figures: 80 percent of the value of the fixed capital of the republic's industry is the property of Union ministries, and more than 17 percent, in the charge of the RSFSR, and only little more than two percent is at the disposal of Tatarstan.

Naturally, we cannot continue to put up with such a situation. This problem is becoming particularly urgent for us in connection with the transition to market relations and the impending denationalization of property. In addition, the citizens of Tatarstan could find themselves without property altogether if its denationalization takes place under the jurisdiction of the two “centers.” The experience of the Kama truck plant has shown that these fears are not groundless—the republic had to exert much effort to acquire the controlling block of shares of our industrial giant.

In short, sovereignty should serve as an instrument protecting the interests of the peoples living on the territory of Tatarstan. And it is appropriate to emphasize



here that the realization of this sovereignty in the economic aspect is in no way connected with the nationality attribute, it reflects the interests of the entire multinational people of the republic. We see the future of the republic as an equal subject and cofounder of the Union of SSR with a budget that is formed independently and also with the right to dispose of the land and its interior and the fixed capital on our territory. The Union treaty, in the elaboration of whose draft a delegation of Tatarstan participated also, will afford the republic an opportunity to occupy a worthy place in the renewed union.

[Morozov] A negative attitude toward the "sovereignty parade" has been encountered in the press repeatedly. What is the particular feature of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Tatar SSR and how does it differ from other such documents?

[Idiatullin] Our declaration pursues primarily the goal of eliminating the unequal position of dual subordination, which, as I have already said, we consider an anachronism of the model of form of government of the 1922 sample. And Tatarstan's sovereignty as a whole is geared to a strengthening of the Union of SSR on the principles of federalism.

Incidentally, the founder of this idea was the outstanding politician and Communist Mirsaid Sultan-Galiyev, a leader of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, who back in 1920 proposed that the USSR be built as a union of equal sovereign states, without division into union and autonomous. Unfortunately, his ideas were not realized, and he himself was subjected to punitive measures.

In the light of what has been said it is obvious that the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Tatar SSR, adopted on 30 August 1990, is the realization of the people's long-standing cherished aspirations. I would like to recall that the question of the Tatar Republic as a Union republic was raised not only in 1920 and 1922 but subsequently also—in 1936 and then in the 1960's and 1970's—but was not resolved in those times. Our "Declaration" was literally achieved through the suffering of all these years, and we are fully resolved to achieve our goal 70 years after the proclamation of the Tatar Republic.

[Morozov] It is no secret that the declaration touches on interethnic relations. Will not some problems arise in the republic in this connection?

[Idiatullin] On the contrary, the declaration was a form of interethnic accord in the republic and was adopted at a session of the Tatar SSR Supreme Soviet practically unanimously (with one abstention). And it was proclaimed on behalf of not an individual nation but the entire multinational people of the republic and for this reason serves as a guarantor of the rights of any nationality. Specifically, it declares Tatar and Russian official languages.

The uniqueness of our republic is that we have the experience of many centuries of the joint residence of many peoples and different cultures and creeds. We treasure this tradition as a most important political capital. I can state with all due responsibility that the Communists, whose representatives head Tatarstan, will not allow the adoption of a single decision infringing the rights and interests of any nation.

[Morozov] In the light of the change in the status of the republic, what is your view of the relations of Tatarstan and the RSFSR?

[Idiatullin] The press has had considerable success of late in the creation of contrived problems in connection with the sovereignty of the Tatar SSR. This is frequently coming from the mouths of leaders of the RSFSR parliament. The proposition of the alleged "secession" of Tatarstan from Russia, which, of course, is giving rise to an emotionally negative reception on the part of the Russian population in the republic and in the RSFSR, is being played to effect. The press has also quoted opinions to the effect that the sovereignty of Tatarstan will mean the installation of border posts and the creation of a customs service and other attributes of an independent state, up to and including the creation of an army and our own currency. Of course, this is great fantasy or deliberate disinformation on the part of heads flushed with political struggle. No one has any intention of severing relations with the RSFSR; on the contrary, we are for a strengthening and extension of these relations within the framework of a renewing union. And how could it be otherwise for we are, after all, bound not only by ties of the economic system and culture but also the ethnic factor: both Tatars (of whom there are in the country approximately 7 million) and Russians live intermingled throughout the territory of the USSR. For this reason the conclusion of bilateral agreements horizontally both with the RSFSR and with the other Union republics is of vital importance to us.

[Morozov] All regions are in the grip of a political struggle on an interethnic or interparty basis. What is the situation in Tatarstan in this respect?

[Idiatullin] Our political situation may be characterized as relatively stable, albeit complex. A political struggle in the press, at mass meetings and in parliament is underway with us also. But the voice of the Communists and the primary party organizations is quite impressive. Although not always, we are succeeding in finding a common language with both the national movement and other political forces. But the tasks are becoming more complicated with every passing day, and the responsibility of the leadership for the future of the republic, the stability of the economy and tranquillity on the streets is increasing. The establishment of the institution of a presidency would also be expedient under such conditions, I believe.

The present crisis situation requires prompt action on the part of all state structures. It is not so much comprehensive programs even as a good "team" capable of rapidly adopting competent decisions which is necessary under these conditions, possibly.

[Morozov] Revo Ramazanovich, a few words about the activity of the republic's Communists in this difficult political situation.

[Idiatullin] The process of infusing sovereignty with real content is reflected in the forms of our work in the status of the party organizations [sentence as published]. As sociological surveys, party meetings, discussions in the primary organizations and articles in the press show, the majority of Communists believes that the Tatar Republic party organization should be a component of the CPSU without becoming a part of the organizational structure of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. For the successful solution of problems connected with the present state of political, economic, and interethnic relations in the republic we deemed it essential to formulate a republic action program.

Simple, specific action comprehensible to all is needed. The adoption and realization of a state program of help for modern forms of agricultural management, say. It is necessary for this, as a priority measure, to accelerate the manufacture of a new tractor model developed by the efforts of KamAZ, which would be a specific help primarily to the tenant farmers and all those who work on the land.

Another important concern during the transition to market relations is preventing at the denationalization stage the seizure of property by shadow capital and seeking its transfer to the working people. This would be a guarantee that the restructuring of the republic's economy was being undertaken in their interests.

The question of the social protection of the working people is particularly acute under the new conditions. The party republic committee is orienting the communist leaders of enterprises and farms toward their exertion of every effort to prevent a reduction in the production of foodstuffs.

Also in the sphere of culture we have interesting plans and initiatives: a republic feature film studio is being created, our own academy of sciences is being founded, and so forth, not without the enterprise and participation of the republic committee. Problems of financing and the artistic level of culture under the conditions of its commercialization are what are most worrisome in this sphere.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize once again that the preservation and renewal of the Union mean for us the constitutional enshrinement of the new status of the republic. We consider this process of acquisition of the status of a Union republic and equal cofounder of the Union irreversible. I would like this position to be met with understanding by all.

### **Constitutional Aspects of Russia-Latvia Treaty Analyzed**

91UN1293A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
28 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by N. Mikhaleva, professor and doctor of juridical sciences: "Russia, Latvia and the Soviet Union: Together or Apart?"]

[Text] *In connection with the pending ratification by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of treaties with the Baltic republics and consideration of the draft of a new Union Treaty the editors of our newspaper turned to Professor N. Mikhaleva, doctor of juridical sciences, a well-known scholar of state structure and a specialist in the field of constitutional law. We asked her to give her expert conclusion on the "Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations Between the RSFSR and the Latvian Republic" which was signed by B. Yeltsin and A. Gorbunovs. The following is her reply.*

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The desire of republics to cooperate actively in the fields of economics, culture, the arts, health care, education, science, technology and other areas of human interaction is natural and proper. One could scarcely object, for instance, to two republics—Latvia and Russia—pooling their efforts to create a single comprehensive system to ensure ecological safety in accordance with international standards. It is good that the republics will begin keeping mutual accounts based on world prices; this will prevent anyone from claiming that one side is being subsidized by the other.

Horizontal ties between republics in regard to economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation have become the hallmark of our times. The 1st USSR Congress of People's Deputies approved the idea of developing contractual and constitutional ties between republics. The same stance is taken by the draft treaty on a Union of sovereign republics, which states that signatories to the treaty conduct their relations on a basis of cooperation, mutual assistance and voluntary compliance with their obligations under the Union Treaty and interrepublic agreements.

The practice of concluding interstate treaties and intergovernmental agreements regarding scientific-technical and cultural cooperation has become widespread. Naturally this activity should be carried out within the bounds of union and republic legislation. However, if one carefully examines the content of the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interrepublic Relations Between the RSFSR and Latvia then one must recognize that it exceeds the bounds of republic authority. It contains many standards which are incompatible with the status of a union republic and member of the USSR. Let us examine in greater detail the negative aspects of this legal act.



**1. The treaty is not of an intrastate but rather of an international legal nature. It ignores the fact that both republics are part of the USSR and proceeds upon the assumption that current all-Union legislation is not binding upon the signatories to the Treaty.**

In principle any union republic, as a subject of international contacts on the basis of Article 80 of the USSR Constitution, has a right to enter into relations with foreign states, conclude treaties with them, exchange diplomatic and consular representatives and participate in the activities of international organizations. The same right is possessed by the republics under the draft of the new Union Treaty (Paragraph 7, Section 1). However, the Latvian Republic and the RSFSR are not foreign states with regard to each other. In legal terms they possess the status of union republics within the USSR. Even though the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Decree of 4 May 1990 entitled "On Restoration of Latvian Republic Independence" invalidates the Latvian Sejm declaration of 21 September 1940 concerning Latvia's admission to the USSR, a USSR Presidential Ukase issued on 14 May 1990 declared the 4 May 1990 declaration invalid from the moment of its passage. Any acts by state organs and officials or private citizens undertaken on the basis of the aforementioned acts are regarded as illegal. Until the republic resolves the issue of secession from the USSR on the basis of procedures established by the USSR Law "On Procedures for Resolution of Issues Pertaining to Secession of a Union Republic From the USSR," adopted on 3 April 1990, it will continue to possess the status of a union republic within the USSR, with all the consequences consistent with that status.

Therefore any treaties and agreements concluded by Russia and Latvia should be based not only on international legal pacts, but also on intrastate union and republic legislation.

Efforts to base interrepublic relations solely upon the principles and standards of international law (see the Preamble and Article 1 of the treaty in question) in essence tend to transform the USSR into a regional international formation (community) and abolish the USSR as a unified state of multiethnic peoples.

The draft Treaty on a Union of Sovereign Republics as well as the USSR Constitution stipulate the possibility of the subjects of the Union establishing direct diplomatic, consular, commercial and other relations, exchanging diplomatic and consular legations, concluding international treaties with foreign states, and participating directly in the activities of international organizations so long as this does not infringe upon the interests of the signatories to the Union Treaty and their common interests and does not violate the USSR's international obligations (Article 7). However, the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations Between the RSFSR and the Latvian Republic does not even make

reference to the USSR, as if the latter no longer existed or as if both signatory republics had seceded from the USSR.

This stance is fundamentally at odds with the Declaration of Russian State Sovereignty adopted by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies on 12 June 1990; that declaration underscores the RSFSR's devotion to the idea of federalism and affirms Russia's status as an independent and autonomous state within the framework of the USSR. The declaration demonstrates respect by the peoples of the RSFSR for the rights of the other peoples comprising the USSR and confirms their resolve to establish a democratic rule-of-law state in Russia as a part of the USSR. Both the 1st Congress and 2nd (Special) Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies expressed support for preservation of the unity of the state as a union of sovereign republics and opposed division of the USSR, redistribution of its territory or disruption of age-old ties between peoples.

As long as we remain a single state there cannot exist within it 15 uncoordinated foreign policies determined by each of the Union's component republics at its own discretion. If that were the case a unified foreign policy of the Union state would quite simply become impossible. Therefore the draft Treaty on a Union of Sovereign Republics places under the exclusive authority of the USSR: implementation of foreign policy; representation in relations with foreign states and international organizations; conclusion of the USSR's international treaties; and coordination of the foreign policy activities of the Union and the republics. Though the republics are fully empowered members of the international community and subjects of federation, as parts of the federation they cannot usurp the rights of the whole. Anything else will be regarded as infringement upon the sovereignty of the USSR. Thus treaties of an international legal nature cannot be concluded between subjects of federation, which is the present status of the RSFSR and Latvia.

**2. Article 2 of the treaty in question is based on the concept of absolute sovereignty and completely unrestricted republic legislative, executive and judicial authority, even though the sovereignty of the member states of a federation, or of the federation itself, are not unlimited. In a federative state the full authority of its subjects is limited by the bounds of the union's jurisdiction.**

The mechanism for horizontal and vertical delineation of governmental functions is a very pressing problem for any state, particularly one with a complex federative structure. In this situation the pyramid of power has three levels: the USSR—the republics—organs of local self-government. The republics exercise sovereign rights within the limits of their authority, without infringing upon the Union's constitutional powers. They may not arbitrarily assume rights which have on a voluntary basis and at the will of all the Union's subjects been transferred to the Union. Let us examine several points in the treaty from this standpoint.

Thus, Article 9 defines a framework for cooperation in the areas of defense and state security, with consideration given to the interests of the international community and both sides' desire to strengthen peace in Northern Europe and develop cooperation within the framework of the all-European process.

Thereby powers in the areas of defense and state security are interpreted as the exclusive province of the republics, as a realm for bilateral republic cooperation. However, according to Paragraph 8, Article 73, and Paragraph 13, Article 113, of the USSR Constitution, the RSFSR Declaration of State Sovereignty issued on 12 June 1990 and a resolution adopted by the 1st RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies on 23 June 1990 and entitled "On Delineation of Functions Between Administrative Organs Within the Territory of the RSFSR (Basis for a New Union Treaty)" defense, the Armed Forces and the defense industry are placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the USSR and Union organs. Also placed under the USSR's exclusive jurisdiction in the draft Treaty on a Union of Sovereign Republics are organization of defense, command of the USSR Armed Forces, USSR border guards, internal troops and railway troops, declaration of war and conclusion of peace accords and administration of defense enterprises and organizations with regard to the development and production of arms and military equipment. Thus in this respect as well the two republics have exceeded the bounds of their constitutional authority.

It seems that this reveals not only military policy dilettantism on the part of the republic leadership and an attempt to mechanically apply the idea of regional cost accounting to the defense structure, but also a desire for autarky and deepening of confrontation within the USSR, up to and including the disintegration thereof. It is no coincidence that in the official draft Constitution of the Russian Federation developed under the guidance of B. N. Yeltsin Russia usurps for itself a number of powers connected with the formation of the Armed Forces, declaration of war and conclusion of peace accords, with the president of Russia becoming commander-in-chief of the republic's Armed Forces. True, we Russians still do not quite understand against whom the future commander-in-chief, also president of the republic, intends to wage war at the head of the RSFSR Armed Forces.

Another example.

**Article 6 of the treaty proposes establishment of a state border control system by agreement between the Latvian Republic and the RSFSR.**

However, according to current legislation that is the exclusive province of the USSR (see Paragraph 2, Article 73, and Paragraph 3, Article 108, of the USSR Constitution, and the USSR Law "On the USSR State Border" adopted on 24 November 1982). Incidentally, in the draft Treaty on a Union of Sovereign Republics the demarcation and protection of the USSR's state border

and changes in it by agreement with the appropriate republics are included under the exclusive powers of the USSR (Article 5).

Next example

**Article 16 of the treaty in question proposes that at some point in the future a system be worked out to govern use of trunk pipelines, railways, seaports and other similar facilities located in the republics.**

However, at the present time, according to article 73 and 131 of the USSR Constitution, that falls under Union jurisdiction. Prior to the signing of the Union Treaty matters of this nature were removed from union republics' jurisdiction. In the draft Treaty on a Union of Sovereign Republics, which has been agreed to by representatives of a majority of republics, administration of railway, air, sea and trunk pipeline transportation falls under the joint jurisdiction of the USSR and the republics. Therefore it is illegal to reach this type of agreement between republics, especially without participation by the USSR.

Just these few examples illustrate how the treaty in question between the RSFSR and Latvia usurps Union authority, something which is intolerable from the standpoint of a rule-of-law state.

As is clear from the text of the treaty both the Russian and the Latvian leaders hold separatist views, even though they continue to attempt to mask their true intentions.

**3. Article 3 of the treaty guarantees citizens of the USSR living within the territory of both republics the right to free choice of citizenship.**

But how, for example, can Russia help the 905,000 Russians (33.7 percent of Latvia's population) living in that republic obtain Latvian citizenship, if under the laws of the Latvian Republic acceptance of Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Poles and other so-called Russian speakers as Latvian citizens is guarded by a barriers of a many-year residency requirement, language examinations, political loyalty tests and the swearing of an oath of allegiance to the new bourgeois-nationalist order, which has taken up the fascist idea of priority of the native nation's interest over human interests and rights, along with the slogan "Latvia for Latvians!" What will happen to the huge number of Russians living in Latvia who have no intention of going anywhere?

In accordance with articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations Between the RSFSR and the Latvian Republic citizens of the USSR living in the Latvian Republic and wishing to choose RSFSR citizenship are automatically transformed into foreigners, with all the resulting consequences. It is they who will be the first to be affected by restrictions on political, economic and other rights. In accordance with the spirit of Article 4 of the treaty citizens of the USSR who do not wish to choose citizenship in one or the other

of the signatory republics are transformed into persons without citizenship, i.e. stateless individuals.

Unfortunately, the social and political situation which exists in the Baltic republics, systematic infringement on the rights of Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Poles and member of other non-native nationalities, and flagrant Russophobia necessitated the inclusion in the treaty of a special standard forbidding discrimination, i.e. infringement on the rights of the Russian-speaking population for any reason, and also establishing criminal and legal penalties for genocide; discriminatory laws placing the non-native population ("foreigners," "migrants" or "occupiers") in the role of second-class citizens and a kind of *Gastarbeiter*—an Eastern labor force—were repealed.

I deem it essential that there be established in the Latvian Republic an RSFSR representation which will maintain ties with countrymen in Russia, and that there should be similar representations from the Ukraine, Belorussia and other Slavic republics, and that a special organ should be created: the Committee on the Russian-Speaking Population of the Latvian Republic, to be formed on an equal basis of persons from Latvia and Russia. This committee could give expert assessments regarding the compatibility of new or existing legislative acts with international human rights agreements, hear and resolve complaints concerning violation of the Russian-speaking population's rights in Latvia, and make appeals to the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee and the USSR Committee on Human Rights.

In general, when resolving citizenship issues the republics should base their actions on the RSFSR Constitution (Article 31), the USSR Constitution (Article 33) and the USSR law of 23 May 1990 entitled "On USSR Citizenship," as well as the draft of a new Treaty on a Union of Sovereign Republics (Article 2). All those acts are based on recognition of a single Union citizenship, i.e. the principle under which a citizen of a republic comprising part of the USSR is simultaneously a USSR citizen and has equal rights, freedoms and duties within the territory of another republic.

**4. Article 5 of the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations Between the RSFSR and the Latvian Republic gives the go-ahead to Latvian authorities' migration policy, does not preclude cases of forced deportation of the Russian-speaking population and is very dangerous, because it could provide the impetus for that type of action.**

It is very foolish and irresponsible to assume that Russia could receive and provide normal living conditions for refugees from the Baltic republics when "zero hour" arrives and terror is launched there against communists, members of Marxist-oriented social organizations and other organizations, military personnel and members of their families. Of the 600,000 refugees from Armenia and Azerbaijan only 40,000 have been resettled, while the rest continue to hang on without protection wherever they can find a place. In the future we will face,

according to sociologists' projections, 15 million unemployed, demobilized soldiers returning from Western Europe, etc., etc. All this must be taken into consideration in social projections of social processes.

**5. Both republics have set themselves the goal of encouraging the creation of interstate Eurasian and all-European markets (Article 13).**

Of course, these ideas are good, but the most important thing right now is to lay the groundwork for interrepublic ties and meet the needs of our domestic Soviet market. For neither Latvia nor Russia is presently capable of becoming a full-fledged member of the world market. Readiness or unreadiness to become an independent subject of the world market is determined by the competitiveness of products, the ability to sell at least as much as one purchases, and the transportation capability to deliver goods. Experts from the International Currency Market, the World Bank and the European Reconstruction and Development Bank feel that no matter what the political situation in the USSR erection of barriers to economic transactions would be an extremely expensive undertaking. What is needed is a single all-Union exchange rate, a single lending and monetary policy and a common foreign tariff and appropriate distribution of taxation and expenditure responsibilities across various administrative levels. However, the advice of competent Western specialists is being ignored by republic leaders who are intoxicated with the euphoria of instantaneous privatization and denationalization.

From our standpoint the orientation of all economic programs toward capitalization of the economy and inadequate assessment of the effects of privatization in combination with the republics' economic separation will set them back many years, even Latvia and Russia with their fairly high level of economic potential.

**6. A number of articles in the treaty are vague and ambiguous in nature.**

Thus, it is planned that all matters pertaining to facilities classified as USSR property and located within the territory of the signatory republics will be regulated by special agreements reached by the signatories both between themselves and with authorized representatives of the USSR (Article 12). One could assume that when a USSR interest is involved a bilateral agreement will be reached between republics. But that is illegal. Resolving this sort of issue without consulting the property owner, behind the owner's back, is both improper and illegal, if the dispute affects the economic interests of the federation and its subjects with regard to facilities under Union jurisdiction.

**7. Article 8, which envisions a ban within the given territories on the operations of organizations and groups which undermine a republic's independence and sovereignty, would be legitimate under conditions of genuinely democratic government. But in a situation in which a regime of nationalistic totalitarian dictatorship is being**

established this article does not leave any opportunity for organized resistance to destructive actions by republic authorities aimed at destroying the Soviet constitutional order both in Latvia and in Russia.

Thus the question arises: why do there now exist in Latvia established and freely functioning mass politicized associations of anti-communist orientation, initially camouflaged as supporters of perestroika? Those forces have now moved from their "incubation period" to the formation of organizational structures with strict discipline and a far-flung full-time apparatus.

People are being intimidated with claims of a conspiracy of "revanchist forces" in the Kremlin, restoration of the "communist empire" and the threat of dictatorship. But was it the President of the USSR or the USSR Supreme Soviet that passed laws infringing on the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and the rights of military personnel, or depriving retired officers of the right to obtain housing in that republic? Was it the President of the USSR, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the CPSU Central Committee which allowed acts of vandalism directed against monuments to V. I. Lenin and the liberating troops to go unpunished, or which unleashed an unbridled campaign against communists in the spirit of Hitler's Reich, or which are undertaking acts of terrorism against military personnel and party officials?

These are all links in a chain: that of the degradation of democratic perestroika into counterrevolutionary bourgeois dictatorship. B. N. Yeltsin is already urging the Russian people to fight against the constitutional system and the CPSU. New "enemies of the people" have already been found; now they are being called "enemies of democracy"—the closest critically-thinking inner circle of the President in the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and soviet chairmen who combine their posts with work in CPSU organs. Who will be next?

Read carefully the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation. It forbids the establishment and functioning of party organizations within state organs, the Armed Forces and paramilitary units, in state agencies and at academic and indoctrinational institutions. That is how Russia might carry out forced de-partyization, or more precisely re-partyization, under the slogans of "Down with the CPSU!" and "Long live the Democratic Russia bloc!" We must realize that B. N. Yeltsin's smile could turn into the grimace of Stalinist terror.

**Thus, this treaty on the principles of interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Latvian Republic does not reflect the interests of the people of either Russia or Latvia. It attests to the separatist views of both republics' leaders and could, if ratified by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, become a destructive factor encouraging disintegration of the USSR.**

It is not surprising that it evoked a sharply negative reaction from the people and has been dubbed "the Baltic Munich," i.e. a betrayal of the Russian people's

interests. B. N. Yeltsin, who signed the treaty in question on behalf of Russia's peoples, ignored their will as expressed in the RSFSR Declaration of State Sovereignty of 12 June 1990, a resolution by the 1st RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies entitled "On Delineation of the Administrative Functions of Organizations Within the Territory of the RSFSR (Basis for a New Union Treaty)" of 23 June 1990, and a resolution by the 2nd (Special) RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies entitled "On the Results of an Exchange of Opinions on the Principles for Conclusion of a Union Treaty."

It is NAIVE to think that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman will go to the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet chairman with an initiative for the purpose bringing the treaty signed by them into accordance with the aforementioned RSFSR and USSR acts. Consequently there is only one solution: to put this matter on the agenda of the 3rd (Special) RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and annul [the treaty] as an unconstitutional act. I think that the Equality deputies' group and the public of Latvia and Russia should appeal to RSFSR people's deputies and request that they include the question of whether or not to denounce the treaty with the Baltic republic on the agenda of their upcoming congress. Of course, if reason, respect for law and a sense of responsibility for the fate of Russia and our countrymen in the Baltic republics prevail at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, then they must refuse to ratify this treaty as contrary to the RSFSR Constitution, the USSR Constitution, the RSFSR Declaration of State Sovereignty and resolutions adopted by the 1st RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and 2nd (Special) RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies.

### Western Republics

#### **Belorussian CP Secretary Blasts People's Front Program, Actions**

*91UN1376A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 1*

[Interview with Doctor of Legal Sciences V.G. Tikhinya, secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and people's deputy of the Belorussian SSR, by unidentified ZVYAZDA correspondent, reprinted from ZVYAZDA for 9 February 1991; place and date not given: "Political Intriguing and Common Sense"]

[Text] [Correspondent] The Second "Adradzhenne" Belorussian People's Front [BNF] Congress was held 23-24 March 1991. What main conclusions and decisions did the delegates to this congress reach?

[Tikhinya] I would like to mention first of all that the Second BNF Congress (as distinct from the first congress) was held not in "exile" but in Minsk. The congress made an evaluation of the present political situation in the republic and determined the main forms and methods of the BNF's struggle at the current stage. The report, which was delivered by Z. Poznyak, was larded



with unadorned anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. Calls to the CPSU in insulting form were heard, and criticism of the Communists was steeped in bile and hostility. The act of vandalism perpetrated by the BNF on 7 November 1990 in Minsk in V.I. Lenin Square was viewed by many congress delegates as a political victory for the front. No comment necessary, as they say....

BNF anticommunism, leavened by the social tension and unsolved problems, is not only crude and aggressive but also (alas) primitive. What, for example, is the value of statements of BNF supporters of the following type: "We must rip open the bellies of the Communists," "Communists to the gallows!" and so forth. The speech of the Communist Party of Belorussia representative was greeted at the Second BNF Congress with hooligan stunts. Our political opponents wish to listen to no one but themselves. The democracy preached by the leaders of the BNF is of a destructive nature. Our ailing economy cannot be cured and the people cannot be fed by mass meetings and scathing words. Many people already understand today who's who. Illusions about the fact that the BNF heads the democratic movement in our republic have today finally been dispelled.

The Second BNF Congress adopted new statutes and delivered a program statement. The words "for perestroika" were removed from the name of this organization. Z. Poznyak was elected chairman of the soym. V. Golubev, B. Zabolotskiy, and Yu. Khodyko, deputy chairmen.

As observed at the congress, the BNF has not become a mass movement of the Belorussian people, and the front has no great support on the part of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Gurevich, what do you see as the reasons for this?

[Tikhinya] Its leaders connect the fact that the BNF has not become a mass movement with the "intrigues of the party apparatus" and the political lack of consciousness of the Belorussian people and their low national self-awareness. Of course, this is lies and slander of their own people. The true reasons for the unpopularity of the BNF need to be sought elsewhere. Our wise, reasonable, and thrifty people long ago saw for themselves that the Belorussian People's Front is not a front for the people. There is no constructive principle in the activity of the BNF, and business here proceeds according to the principle: "The worse, the better."

The leaders of the BNF cynically call socialism the "road to slavery," openly and impudently speculate on the difficulties of the current moment, and have taken the path of instigation. Figuratively speaking, they are endeavoring to release two trains head-on on a single track! The BNF leadership would like to avail itself of the present truly serious situation to achieve its extremist ends. All this shows once again with whom we are dealing.

[Correspondent] How do you evaluate the BNF's actions in connection with the organization of the all-Union referendum?

[Tikhinya] It may now be stated with all certainty that the leaders of the BNF endeavored at any price, using the platform of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet included, to torpedo the organization of the all-Union referendum in our republic and intended accomplishing the "Lebanonization" of the USSR. I believe that history will not forgive them such a senseless policy. Having said "yes" to the Union at the referendum of 17 March 1991, the Belorussian people thereby said "no" to the BNF and its separatist policy. This was, it seems to me, one of the biggest mistakes made by the BNF of late.

The results of the referendum were, strictly speaking, testimony to our people's civic maturity. They were able to rise above today's difficulties and correctly determine their position on an issue of fateful significance for all of us.

I have to say that the referendum results have not brought the BNF leaders back to sobriety, unfortunately. They are today delaying and hampering the conclusion of the new Union treaty in every possible way and virtually pursuing an antipopular policy, which is, in my view, condemned to fail.

Let us respect the socialist choice, which our people made in 1917 and which it essentially confirmed in March 1991 in the course of the all-Union referendum. It is essential that we implement the idea of a humane and democratic society.

[Correspondent] A few words, please, about the BNF's "economic program."

[Tikhinya] As the results of the Second BNF Congress showed, the supporters of this political organization have, other than general streamlined phrases, no constructive program of economic recovery. Despite numerous promises, the leaders of the Belorussian People's Front have not shown the Belorussian people "the road to the Promised Land." Even yesterday they were campaigning for a controlled market and the equality of all forms of ownership. Today they are demanding an absolutely free market, the primacy of private enterprise in the economy and so forth. Other than criticism, the leaders of the BNF offer in the newspapers (NARODNAYA GAZETA, ZNAMYA YUNOSTI, LIT-ARATURA I MASTATSTVA and others) no **practicable** way out of the current serious economic situation.

It has to be recognized that the years of perestroika have afforded much in the way of freedom, democracy, and glasnost. At the same time they have not resolved and have even, moreover, caused a deterioration in the economic situation of millions of Soviet people. The economic demands of the working people of Minsk and other regions of our republic are justified in the majority of cases. Under the conditions of transition to the market it is essential to adopt urgent measures pertaining to the



social protection of the population. Overcoming mass-meeting passions, we must concentrate all our forces on questions of the economy. They are today of strategic significance. It is necessary to elaborate and implement as quickly as possible an anticrisis program, halt the decline in social production, and heal the wounds of the economy. Not enough has been done as yet. Only creative labor will save us from national catastrophe. We need to proceed emphatically toward a strengthening of order and discipline. Our people are demanding bread and order. The most democratic society presupposes a strong executive authority. Unfortunately, we do not have such an authority today. Here, if you will, lie many of our present troubles....

[Correspondent] What can you say in connection with the anti-Army protests of the BNF supporters?

[Tikhinya] I shall try to answer laconically. The Soviet Army has with us always been and is part of the people. For this reason insults leveled at it are essentially insults leveled at the people themselves.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Gurevich, representatives of a number of political parties which have taken shape in Belorussia recently took part in the Second BNF Congress. How do you evaluate this?

[Tikhinya] It may be said that political parties of an anticommunist thrust have united under the BNF roof today. Representatives of the Belorussian United Democratic Party, the National Democratic Party, the Belorussian Social Democratic Gromada, and the Belorussian Peasant Party were delegates to the Second BNF Congress. The "democrats" have decided to unite and consolidate their forces. In the name of what, one wonders. In my view, particular aims and tasks are being pursued: setting the people against the CPSU, having accused it of all mortal sins, loosening the state foundations and weakening the constitutional structures. The ultimate goal is the seizure of power and a change in the current social and political system. Can it not be understood by all who contemplate this that our Belorussian people will not follow such "friends of democracy." It is necessary to courageously look truth in the eye.

[Correspondent] What do you see today as the solution to the current critical situation in our society?

[Tikhinya] I have already partially answered this question, analyzing the BNF's so-called economic program. I would like in addition to mention the following. I would not want to be either a pessimist or some starry-eyed optimist. It is necessary to be a realist. We are today all living and working in a society weighed down by problems. Unless in the immediate future we extinguish the flames of political confrontation which are raging in our home, unpredictable consequences could ensue. We therefore call once again on our political opponents in the interests of the Belorussian people for civil peace and national concord. The crisis can only be overcome by common efforts. And let us not forget that we are all in one boat.

The leadership of the republic, about which much criticism is being heard currently, needs understanding and support. I believe that our people will maintain their good sense and fortitude at this difficult, worrying time.

### **Malofeyev Promises Action on Chernobyl Problems After Gomel Visit**

91UN1376B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 1

[Interview with A.A. Malofeyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, by BELTA correspondent V. Kotov; place and date not given: "People in Trouble Pull Together"]

[Text] As already reported, A.A. Malofeyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, was in Gomel Oblast last week. He visited worker and rural outfits, met with the scientific and artistic intelligentsia and student youth, took part in a meeting of the party and economic activists of Mozyrskiy Rayon, and talked with the leadership of the oblast.

But the first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee paid the main attention to a study of the social and everyday conditions of the people living in the strict control zone. In a number of localities of Narovlyanskiy, Braginskiy, and Khoynikskiy Rayons the leader of the Belorussian Communist Party familiarized himself in detail with the problems that have arisen here and answered people's numerous questions. Upon the conclusion of the visit BELTA correspondent V. Kotov asked A.A. Malofeyev to share his impressions.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, you know the Gomel area quite well: you started out on your career here and subsequently came to head the oblast party organization. What was the reason for so detailed a familiarization with the oblast, to which you gave many years?

[Malofeyev] The Gomel region represented on this occasion, if I may put it this way, a familiar stranger. The years that have elapsed since the accident at the Chernobyl AES have influenced appreciably the life and being of my fellow countrymen, largely changed the customary tenor of life, and charged to the maximum the moral and psychological atmosphere. Almost 1.5 million people live on land strewn with radioactive ashes. Considerable numbers of them are awaiting resettlement. There can be no talk of a full-fledged life in these zones. The waves of the problems that have gripped the whole country are also rolling up here. And, of course, things are doubly difficult for the local population.

Much is being done in the Gomel region to overcome the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, but, nonetheless, as I have once again seen for myself, people are wound up and agitated. Because there are many questions to which there are as yet no answers. Take, for

example, the rayon centers which, according to the concept that has been adopted, are to be resettled on account of the radioactive contamination. Individual approaches to each community separately are needed here. I believe that in April-May the republic Council of Ministers, in conjunction with scientists of the Ministry of Health and the leadership of Gomel Oblast, need to adopt the necessary decisions, which should make it absolutely clear who may reside in them and under what conditions.

We can no longer put up with the lag in the construction of housing for the resettlement of families from the contaminated zones. It is necessary to do everything to fulfill the planned program of construction in 1991, even at the price of a reduction in volume at other new construction projects of the republic. Gomel and Mogilev Oblasts need more appreciable assistance in implementation of the program for removal of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

[Correspondent] Our conversation has begun with economic matters. I would like to ask you in this connection: What is your attitude toward the calls that have been heard of late for removing the CPSU from influence on the economy. The idea is creeping in among party officials even that our business is political leadership and that others should be left to deal with economic matters. Nonetheless, observing your conversations, particularly in the affected regions, I noticed that it was economic, day-to-day questions which people were asking. At the same time, however, I have frequently been present at meetings of representatives of other parties and currents where it has been a question, as a rule, merely of political tasks and criticism of the system.

[Malofeyev] The political leadership cannot be abstracted from people's urgent requirements. If a political party tackles only its own internal problems and involves itself with its internal arrangement, no one needs it. The only thing such a political current can do is create additional difficulties in society. This is, in my opinion, axiomatic. Arguing is in this case pointless. Although there is confusion in people's minds on this score. The press also is "helping" here: Without having studied a problem thoroughly, it frequently presents it for the readers' judgment, employing superficial evaluations. People frequently take them as the truth, however.

The CPSU has now renounced the monopoly of power. But despite the fact that Article 6 of the Constitution does not accord it legislative rights, people are asking the party, as before: Why are things going badly, what's the reason? I believe it will continue to be like this. Therefore we do not have the right to avoid urgent practical questions. The more so in that other parties are in no hurry to deal with them. For them the main thing remains the aspiration to power. We now speak of a multiparty system, but in fact we have a confrontation of political forces, which is creating tension in society and engendering a wave of destruction. But a multiparty system implies something entirely different. It should

stimulate the development of democratic processes. This absurd situation is knocking society off its stride. For this reason the country's Supreme Soviet should think through and enact a law which affords the ruling party with a parliamentary majority the corresponding legislative basis. This is what is done in foreign countries. If another party comes forward as a result of the people's trust at elections, it also would have sufficient authority.

Of course, a political organization like the CPSU should not become involved in works-superintendent functions, apportioning quotas and materials. We have state and economic structures for this.

The Belorussian Communist Party does not intend to walk away from urgent questions troubling people. Among these primarily is the Chernobyl problem. I believe that it will influence the strategy and tactics of the Belorussian Communist Party, as also, incidentally, the activity of the republic Supreme Soviet and government, for a long time to come. The main thing is that it is necessary to fulfill, I stress, fulfill, the decisions adopted in the republic pertaining to the subject of Chernobyl. The question of the inadequate organization of medical services was raised very sharply at the meetings. Not all opportunities for this have been used by our ministry nor is there proper assistance from the Union ministry. In a number of the affected areas the supply of doctors is not even half the required level. In order to attract medical personnel to such zones, it is necessary to move toward the contract method. Considerable financial resources are needed for this. They must be found, and there can be no further delays here. We have to assume that the government will adopt such a decision.

Provision of the populace with food products leaves much to be desired, although the local diet is somewhat better than other areas. There are serious complaints about the shortage of fruit and vegetables everywhere. There is a shortage of children's food. We must find it and agree to exchange transactions. I consider it essential to appeal also to the republic's production outfits, which could set aside some foreign currency for the acquisition of high-calorie children's food overseas. After all, they are purchasing passenger automobiles and other commodities. We can and must show a little patience when it comes to these.

Other questions are arising also. How to protect the forests from fire, say. The Gomel region is a wooded area, and if fires begin, and they are no rarity here, the clean zones are polluted also. There is for this reason something for the pertinent ministries to think about here.

During my trip to the woodlands zone and, subsequently, at the party and economic activists' meeting in Mozyr agricultural specialists spoke with great concern about the needs of their sector. Production is declining here and the numbers of livestock are falling, which could in the immediate future impoverish our table considerably. The prices of the products supplied to the

countryside are growing unpredictably. The cost of construction materials has doubled. Attempts to undermine kolkhoz and sovkhoz production are being manifested. The private trader is being persistently counterposed to public farming. The sale of land is being propagandized. I believe that this is either delusion or evil intentions. If things go on this way, the people could be left without food. They have had a hard time of things as it is. We remember how in Khrushchev's time they did away with the private farmsteads, putting the emphasis only on the public sector. Now the other extreme.

The media should adopt a responsible attitude toward the countryside. Extremes and excesses are dangerous here. Articles saying that the countryside has been overfed are appearing frequently. And that we should invest no more resources in it and that the present form of management is producing nothing. I believe that these are the provocative statements of people who want to bring society to its knees and then dump everything on the system and the CPSU.

[Correspondent] The inhabitants of the Chernobyl zone have in five years seen many representative commissions and important republic and Union leaders. President M.S. Gorbachev himself was here recently. And now your visit: Might it be assumed that, after you have left, there will be some decisive changes in the zone?

[Malofeyev] During the meetings I said frankly that I am not a miracle-worker. I cannot erase the Chernobyl disaster at a stroke. But the Central Committee will contribute to the utmost to the fulfillment of the decisions adopted by the governments of the country and the republic and ensure political approaches which do not so much affirm what is bad and where as suggest solutions. We must make a political evaluation of those who are treating the fulfillment of their duties connected with the surmounting of the consequences of Chernobyl sluggishly or without sufficient vigor. The party structures locally must act accordingly also. And I said generally at the activist meeting in Mozyr: Enough of frightening people, we all need to help them restore their mental balance.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, availing myself of this opportunity, I have to ask you to say a few words also about the political situation in the republic as a whole.

[Malofeyev] The political situation is tense. Unless all reasonable forces unite, I mean by this those who want society to develop by the peaceful democratic path, the situation could lead to physical confrontation. In some regions of the country this is already a sorry reality. If some people wish to come to power—good luck to them! But let them do so by the parliamentary, democratic path, not by methods of blackmail and pressure. This today is only destroying society. We are therefore exerting efforts for the purpose of consolidating the healthy forces. After all, every sober-minded individual realizes that if the social and political situation continues

as it is now, no economic problems will be solved. We will very soon have pulled apart all that we have. A more sober outlook is approaching in society, and considerable numbers of people are beginning to understand to what dramatic consequences confrontation could lead. But there is a part of the population that is contemplative also. I fear that such passiveness is playing into the hands of extremists and political adventurers. For the sake of human accord everyone, regardless of approaches and views, needs to unite. Only thus will it be possible to master the Chernobyl disaster and any other disaster.

### Law on Changes in Moldovan Criminal Code

91UN13574 *Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian* 5 Apr 91 p 3

["Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic Law on Introducing Changes and Supplements to the Moldovan SSR Criminal and Criminal Processes Code"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic hereby resolves:

1. To introduce into the Moldovan SSR Criminal Code, ratified by Moldavian SSR Law dated 24 March 1961 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA MOLDAVSKOY SSR, 1961, No 10, p 41; 1962, No 5, p 8; 1965, No 12, p 56; VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA I PRAVITELSTVA MOLDAVSKOY SSR, 1972, No 8, p 107; 1981, No 11, p 94; 1982, No 12, p 124, 126; 1985, No 6, p 65; 1986, No 6, p 49; 1988, No 8, p 131; 1989, No 12, p 299) the following changes:

1. Chapter three is to be presented in the following edition:

#### "Chapter Three. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY.

##### "Article 119. Misappropriation of an Owner's Property Performed by Means of Theft

"Secret misappropriation of an owner's property (theft)

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to three years, or by correctional work for a period of up to two years, or by a fine in the amount of up to 3,000 rubles.

"Theft as a repeat offense or by premeditation with a group of persons, or inflicting significant loss upon the victim

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from two to seven years with confiscation of property or without, or by correctional work for a period of up to two years with confiscation of property or without, or by a fine in the amount of from 2,000 to 7,000 rubles.

"Theft accompanied by entry into a building or other storage facility or residence

"—is punishable by imprisonment of from three to eight years with confiscation of property or without, or by a fine of from 3,000 to 10,000 rubles.

"Theft performed by a particularly dangerous repeat offender or in large amounts

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from five to 15 years with confiscation of property.

**Note:** A repeat offense in Articles 119, 120, 122, and 123 is considered to be a crime performed by a person who has previously committed one of the crimes specified by these articles or by articles 74, 121, 123<sup>1</sup>, 224<sup>4</sup>, 225<sup>2</sup>, or 227<sup>1</sup> of the present Code.

**"Article 120. Misappropriation of an Owner's Property Performed by Means of Robbery**

"Open misappropriation of an owner's property (robbery)

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from two to five years, or by correctional work for a period of from one to two years, or by a fine of from 2,000 to 5,000 rubles.

"The same action accompanied by violence which is not threatening to the life or health of the victim, or with threat of application of such violence, or performed as a repeat offense or by premeditation by a group of persons, or inflicting significant loss upon the victim

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from three to eight years with confiscation of property or without, or by a fine of from 3,000 to 10,000 rubles.

"Robbery with entry into a building or some other storage facility or residence

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from five to 10 years with confiscation of property or without.

"Robbery performed by a particularly dangerous repeat offender or in large amount

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from eight to 15 years with confiscation of property.

**"Article 121. Brigandage with the Purpose of Misappropriation of an Owner's Property**

"Brigandage, or attack for the purpose of obtaining an owner's property, accompanied by violence endangering the life or health of the person subject to attack, or with threat or application of such violence

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from five to 10 years with confiscation of property or without.

"Brigandage performed:

"1) by premeditation of a group of persons;

"2) with the use of weapons or other objects used as weapons;

"3) with infliction of serious bodily injuries;

"4) by a particularly dangerous repeat offender;

"5) by a person who has previously committed brigandage or banditism;

"6) for the purpose of obtaining property in large amounts;

"7) with entry into a building or other storage facility or residence

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from eight to 15 years with confiscation of property.

**"Article 122. Misappropriation of an Owner's Property Performed by Means of Fraud**

"Obtaining an owner's property by means of fraud or abuse or trust (swindling)

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to three years, or by correctional work for a period of up to two years, or by a fine of from 1,000 to 3,000 rubles.

"Fraud performed as a repeat offense or by premeditation by a group of persons, or inflicting significant loss upon the victim

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from two to six years with confiscation of property or without it, or by correctional work for a period of from one to two years with confiscation of property or without it, or by a fine of from 2,000 to 5,000 rubles.

"Fraud which inflicts great loss upon the victim or which is performed by a particularly dangerous repeat offender

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from five to 10 years with confiscation of property, or by a fine of from 5,000 to 10,000 rubles.

**"Article 123. Misappropriation of an Owner's Property by Means of Stealing, Embezzlement or Abuse of Official Position**

"Stealing or embezzlement of an owner's property entrusted to the accused or in his charge, as well as misappropriation of an owner's property by means of an official's abuse of his position

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to five years, or by correctional work for a period of up to two years, or by a fine of from 2,000 to 5,000 rubles, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activity.

"The same action performed as a repeat offense or by premeditation by a group of persons

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from three to seven years with or without confiscation of property, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activity for a period of from two to five years, or by a fine of from 3,000 to 7,000 rubles with or without confiscation of property.

"Misappropriation specified by parts 1 and 2 of this article, performed in large amounts



"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from six to 15 years with confiscation of property, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activity for a period of from two to five years.

**"Article 123<sup>1</sup>. Misappropriation of an Owner's Property in Especially Large Amounts**

"Misappropriation of an owner's property performed in especially large amounts, regardless of the method of the misappropriation (articles 119-123)

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from 10 to 15 years, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activity for a period of from two to five years, or by the death penalty, with or without confiscation of property.

**"Article 124. Minor Misappropriation of an Owner's Property**

"Minor misappropriation of an owner's property by means of theft, stealing, embezzlement, misuse of official position or fraud, performed by a person to whom measures of administrative processes cannot be applied due to the circumstances of the matter or the individual

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to one year, or by correctional work for a period of up to two years, or by a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 rubles.

"The same action involving the dismantling of automobiles, tractors, agricultural and other equipment during transport by rail, water and other transport, as well as in places of permanent or temporary storage

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to two years, or by correctional work for the same period of time, or by a fine of from 200 to 2,000 rubles.

"The actions specified in parts 1 and 2 of this article performed by a person who was previously tried for minor misappropriation or who previously performed misappropriation of an owner's property specified in articles 119-123<sup>1</sup>, 225<sup>2</sup>, 227<sup>1</sup> of this Code

"—are punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to three years or by a fine of from 1,000 to 3,000 rubles.

**"Article 125. Extortion of an Owner's Property**

"The demand for transfer of an owner's property or right to it under threats of violence to him or his loved ones, announcement of embarrassing information about them, or threats of damage or destruction of the owner's property (extortion)

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to four years with or without confiscation of property, correctional work for a period of from one to two years with or without confiscation of property.

"The same actions performed as a repeat offense, or by premeditation with a group of persons, or under threat of

murder or serious bodily injuries, or in conjunction with violence not endangering life and health, or in conjunction with damage or destruction of property

"—are punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to seven years with confiscation of property.

"Actions specified by parts 1 or 2 of this article performed by an organized group, or by a particularly dangerous repeat offender, or with the use of weapons or other objects used as weapons, or in conjunction with violence endangering life and health, or entailing the imposition of great loss or other serious consequences

"—are punishable by imprisonment for a period of from five to nine years with confiscation of property.

"Extortion accompanied by kidnapping or threat of kidnapping of the owner, his relatives or loved ones

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from 10 to 15 years or by the death penalty with confiscation of property.

**"Article 126. Imposing Property Loss by Means of Fraud or Abuse of Trust**

"Imposing property loss upon its owner by means of fraud or abuse of trust in the absence of indications of kidnapping

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to one year, or by correctional work for the same period, or by a fine of up to 1,000 rubles, or by deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activity, or by dismissal from one's position.

"The same action performed as a repeat offense

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from one to three years, or by correctional work for a period of up to two years, or by a fine of up to 3,000 rubles.

**"Article 127. Intentional Destruction or Damage to an Owner's Property**

"Intentional destruction or damage to an owner's property performed by means of arsen or some other socially dangerous method, or entailing loss of human life, or imposing great loss or other severe consequences

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from five to 15 years.

**"Article 128. Negligent Destruction or Damage to an Owner's Property**

"Negligent destruction or damage to an owner's property performed as a result of negligent use of fire or by some other socially dangerous method which entails loss of human life or other severe consequences

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to five years, or by correctional work for a period of up to two years, or by a fine of from 2,000 to 5,000 rubles.

**"Article 129. Criminally Negligent Use or Storage of Agricultural Equipment"**

"Criminally negligent use or storage of automobiles, tractors and other agricultural machinery belonging to sovkhozes or other state organizations, as well as to kolkhozes, which leads to their breakdown or destruction, as well as the dismantling of this machinery

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to two years, or by correctional work for the same period, or by a fine of up to 2,000 rubles.

"The same actions performed as a repeat offense or inflicting great loss

"—are punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to four years or by a fine of from 2,000 to 5,000 rubles.

**"Article 130. Criminally Negligent Attitude Toward Guarding an Owner's Property"**

"Criminally negligent attitude toward one's responsibilities by a person who has been charged with guarding an owner's property, which leads to misappropriation, damage, breakdown or destruction of this property in large proportion, in the absence of indications of an official crime

"—is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to three years or by correctional work for a period of up to two years.

**"Article 131. Crimes Against the Property of Other States, as Well as Against the Property of Their Physical or Legal Persons"**

"Crimes against the property of other states, as well as against the property of their physical or legal persons, performed in regard to property located on the territory of the Moldovan SSR

"—are punishable in accordance with the articles of the present chapter."

2. Chapter 5 (Articles 145-154) should be deleted.

3. Article 163 should be deleted.

4. In part 2 of Article 7<sup>1</sup>, the words "misappropriation of state or public property in large or especially large amounts (part 4 of Article 119, part 3 of Article 122, part 3 of Article 123 and Article 123<sup>1</sup>), robbery under aggravated circumstances (part 2, 3, and 4 of Article 119, parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 146), brigandage (Articles 121 and 147) performed under aggravated circumstances, intentional destruction or damage of state or public property or private property of citizens (part 2 of Article 127 and part 2 of Article 151)" should be replaced with the words "misappropriation of an owner's property in large or especially large amounts (part 4 of Article 119, part 2 and 3 of Article 122, part 3 of Article 123 and Article 123<sup>1</sup>), robbery under aggravated circumstances (part 2, 3 and 4 of Article 120), brigandage for the purpose of

misappropriating an owner's property (Article 121), intentional destruction or damage to an owner's property (Article 127)".

5. In part 1 of Article 24:

—in point 1 the words "misappropriation of state or public property in especially large amounts (Article 123<sup>1</sup>), brigandage for the purpose of obtaining state or public property or personal property of citizens under aggravated circumstances (part 2 of Article 121, parts 2 and 3 of Article 147)" should be replaced with the words "misappropriation of an owner's property in especially large amounts (Article 123<sup>1</sup>), brigandage for the purpose of misappropriating an owner's property under aggravated circumstances (part 2 of Article 121);

—in point 2 the words "misappropriation of state or public property under aggravated circumstances (parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 119, parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 120, parts 2 and 3 of Article 122, parts 2 and 3 of Article 123, Article 123<sup>1</sup>), brigandage for the purpose of obtaining state or public property or personal property of citizens (Articles 121 and 147), theft of personal property of citizens performed under aggravated circumstances (parts 2 and 3 of Article 145), theft under aggravated circumstances (parts 2 and 3 of Article 146), fraud under aggravated circumstances (part 2 of Article 149)" should be replaced with the words "misappropriation of an owner's property under aggravated circumstances (parts 2, 3 and 4 of Article 119, parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 120, parts 2 and 3 of Article 122, parts 2 and 3 of Article 123, and Article 123<sup>1</sup>), brigandage for the purpose of misappropriating an owner's property (Article 121)".

6. Part 3 of Article 27 should be presented in the following edition:

"For persons who have been certified as being disabled, instead of correctional work the court may substitute a fine computed at 50 rubles of the fine for 1 month of correctional work, and for crimes which are not mercenary—based on the same computation, but for a sum of no more than 75 rubles, or public reprimand".

7. Article 29 should be presented in the following edition:

**"Article 29. Fines"**

"A fine is a monetary penalty imposed by the court in cases and within the limits established by the present Code.

"The amount of the fine is set depending on the severity of the performed crime, with consideration for the property status of the guilty party within the limits of from 50 to 1,000 rubles, and for mercenary crimes—up to 10,000 rubles. In exceptional cases specified by Moldovan SSR legislative statutes, higher fines may be set for certain crimes

"In the case of a person's malicious non-payment of the fine imposed as the primary punishment, the court may substitute imprisonment in place of the unpaid sum of the fine, computing one month of imprisonment for 150 rubles of the fine, but for a term no greater than the maximal period established by the present Code for those crimes of which the person was found guilty; it may also substitute correctional work without imprisonment, computing one month of correctional work for 50 rubles of the fine, but for a period of no greater than two years.

"A fine may not be substituted for imprisonment".

8. Article 38 should be supplemented with point 14, with the following content:

"14) the presence of uncompensated loss in the matter and the refusal of the guilty party to eliminate the harm done".

9. In part 6 of Article 51, the words "misappropriation of state or public property in especially large amounts" should be replaced with the words "misappropriation of the owner's property in especially large amounts".

10. In point 3 of Article 51<sup>1</sup>, the words "brigandage for the purpose of misappropriation of state or public property or personal property of citizens under aggravated circumstances (part 2 of Article 121, parts 2 and 3 of Article 147); misappropriation of state or public property" should be replaced with the words "brigandage for the purpose of misappropriation of an owner's property under aggravated circumstances (part 2 of Article 121); misappropriation of an owner's property".

11. In point 2, part 6 of Article 52, the words "brigandage for the purpose of obtaining state, public or private property of citizens under aggravated circumstances (part 2 of Article 121, part 2 and 3 of Article 147)" should be replaced with the words "brigandage for the purpose of misappropriation of an owner's property under aggravated circumstances (part 2 of Article 121)".

II. The following changes and supplements should be introduced into the Moldovan SSR Criminal Process Code, ratified by the Moldavian SSR Law dated 24 March 1961 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA MOLDAVSKOY SSR, 1961, No 10, p 42; VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA I PRAVITELSTVA MOLDAVSKOY SSR, 1986, No 6, p 49; 1987, No 11, p 143, 146, 149; 1989, No 4, p 73; No 7, p 156; No 9, p 230; 1990, No 6-7, p 127):

1. Article 26 after the numbers "123<sup>1</sup>" should be supplemented with the words and numbers "part 4 of Article 125".

2. In part 3 of Article 78, the words and numbers "by part 2 of Article 127, parts 2 and 3 of Article 145, parts 2 and 3 of Article 146, Article 147, part 3 of Article 149, and Article 151" should be replaced with the words and numbers "by parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 125, and Article 127".

3. In Article 107:

—in part 1, the words and numbers "150, part 1 of Article 151, and Article 153" should be deleted;

—part 3 after the number "117" should be supplemented with the number "125";

—in part 4, after the number "130", the words and numbers "145-149, part 2 of Article 151, and Article 152" should be deleted.

III. The present law becomes effective on the day of its publication.

Mircha Snegur, president,  
Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova  
Kishinev, 15 February 1991

### **Moldovan Independence, Union Treaty Role Debated**

91UN1360A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by V. Tsurkan, chief of the Legal Department, Moldovan CP Central Committee: "The Union Treaty and a Unified Moldovan SSR: Yes or No?"]

[Text] **Political passions and disputes surrounding the Nationwide Referendum have not yet cooled; but life, following its own inexorable laws, has placed before the population of the republic a new task, closely associated with the preceding one—to be or not to be Moldova in a revitalized Union?**

This is not a new problem; it has always hovered over our incandescent political atmosphere. At the same time, without belittling the significance of the question which was put in the Nationwide Referendum, one must nevertheless frankly state that it was of a deliberative nature. At the very same time, the significance of the political and legal consequences of the answer to the second question is of decisive significance for the future of the republic and all the people of Moldova.

As everyone knows, attitudes in the republic toward the problem of remaining in or withdrawing from the Union vary. And that is understandable. A significant part of the current contradictions, which are paralyzing the organs of power at all levels, has its origin both in the notorious distortions in the development of our federated union of republics, which led to its rebirth in a unitarian conglomerate of subjects who in fact have no rights, and in the lack of relevance of the 1922 Treaty for the formation of the USSR to contemporary conditions.

The 1922 Treaty was in fact subjected to Stalin's distortions; that is, in putting it into practice, little remained of Lenin's ideas. Frankly speaking, everything was displaced here—if only formally: failure to observe the procedure for entering the Union, the present condition of the economy, the socio-domestic dissatisfaction of the people, the arousal of national self-awareness, unrealized political and personal ambitions, and so on.

These things explain the variety of citizen attitudes toward the first draft of the Union Treaty which was published for discussion at the end of November, 1990.

One portion of the populace, which wants Moldova to withdraw from the Union and hopes for future unification with Rumania, is categorically opposed to concluding a new Union Treaty. They therefore unequivocally rejected the first draft, and did not even try to find something in it that was positive and necessary for a revitalized Union. Proponents of this position—primarily the Moldovan People's Front in the person of its representatives and sympathizers in the organs of state power and administration and the mass information media, were attempting to depict the USSR as "an evil empire and the enemy of Moldova, which is for self-serving reasons once again trying to occupy the republic and rob it of its sovereignty and independence."

There were also those who held, just as unequivocally, that the draft was ideal, and were prepared to sign it. Finally, the majority of the populace considered it necessary to carefully study the text and submit suggestions for improving it. The Moldovan Communist Party also took this position, guided by the principle that the preservation and revitalization of the Union is vitally necessary for our nation.

Unfortunately, the parliament did not display any especial desire to take a constructive part in this work. Under various pretexts, it delayed sending a delegation of authorized representatives to join representatives of other republics in further work on the draft Treaty.

As a result we have placed ourselves in an awkward situation. On the one hand we do not have the moral right to criticize the newly completed draft, which was published in early March 1991, nor to plead that it fails to consider any of our proposals. At the very same time, the majority of the population, in spite of the pressure and the treatment that took place during the Nationwide Referendum, was in favor of revitalizing the Union and the republics which belong to it. In this connection, we must not put off careful study of the second version of the draft, neither at the parliamentary level, nor at the level of the working collectives.

Naturally, before sitting down to formulate proposals and comments, we must thoroughly analyze how the second version of the draft differs from the first, and what is the nature and significance of the changes made.

Comparative analysis of the drafts of the Union Treaty published in the press allows one to conclude that the authorized representatives of the republic have accomplished a great deal of work on improving the contents of the text of the first version of the draft. More than two-thirds of its articles have been subjected to principal changes, aimed at making the contents of the draft more democratic, and at imparting real substance to republic sovereignty. The following are particularly significant in that respect:

At the very beginning, the preamble defines the members of the Union as sovereign states, and not sovereign republics as in the first version. The truth is, this change is more socio-psychological than legal in nature. The fact of the matter is that quite often, while arguing the unacceptability of the first draft of the Treaty, the proponents of this position have asserted that the concept of "state" and "republic" are unequal, and that only a state can be sovereign.

Incidentally, from the legal point of view, a republic is a form of organization of state government; that is, it too is a state, with a parliamentary or presidential form of government. And naturally, there can be no variance in the amount of sovereignty at all. Therefore, both of these concepts are used later on in the text.

It is considered important that clauses be added to the preamble, that the Treaty members acknowledge the right of nations and peoples to self-determination, and also proceed from the declarations proclaimed by the republics on state sovereignty. This addendum will largely permit removing various kinds of doubt in the part on acknowledging the sovereignty of the republics.

A number of significant changes were introduced in Section I, "Basic Principles." Specifically, the first paragraph of the second principle stipulates that the republics which form the Union do not simply acknowledge, as stated in the first draft, but reserve—that is, guarantee—the right to independently resolve all questions of their own development.

Significant amendments were introduced to the 5th Principle. It was stressed that the republics which comprise the Union shall possess the entire complement of state power, and shall independently determine not only their administrative-territorial but also their national-state structure. At this time, as everyone knows, these decisions are subject to confirmation by the highest organs of state power of the USSR. In addition to popular representation, the will of the people is considered the basic element of democracy and the fundamental principle of the republic's activity.

Article 1 of the section on "Organization of the Union" is augmented by paragraphs 4 and 5, which present the substance of the principle of voluntary membership in the USSR. It points out that the Union is open for membership to other sovereign states which acknowledge the Treaty. At the same time, it establishes that the Treaty members have the right to freely withdraw from the Union, in accordance with procedures established by the Treaty members.

Thus, a specific answer is given to the demagogic arguments of the Treaty's opponents, who rejected the first draft and declared that one could not speak about sovereignty and voluntary union if the text does not stipulate the right to withdraw freely.

There is a new paragraph 2 to Article 3, according to which republics belonging to the Union recognize the



borders between them that exist at the moment the treaty is signed. Considering the well-known desires of representatives of a number of movements and socio-political organizations, one can assume that this innovation may give rise to dissatisfaction from both the "right" and the "left." However, one must bear in mind here that the given paragraph is entirely in accord with the final documents of the 1975 Helsinki Conference and the Geneva Meetings of 1989 on questions of security and cooperation in Europe, with respect to acknowledging the inviolability of the state borders established in Europe after World War II. On the other hand, paragraph 3 of this article envisages the possibility of amending the borders, but only by agreement between the republics.

As one would have expected, Article 5, the pivotal point of the entire Treaty, was subjected to the most significant changes. As a result a range of powers which the Treaty members propose transferring or apportioning to the USSR have been narrowed and formulated more concretely. At the same time a list of questions which the Union may only resolve jointly with the republics has been expanded and made more precise.

Thus, the question of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union as well as the republics belonging to it, a subject many of our people's deputies insisted upon, was delegated to the USSR, as were questions of guaranteeing state security, organization and leadership of the USSR Armed Forces, leadership of defense enterprises with respect to creating and producing weapons and military equipment; implementing national foreign policy and foreign economic activities; space exploration; nationwide communication and computer science systems; and certain coordinating functions.

Certain terms, such as "adoption, establishment, determination, resolution, monitoring and direction," used in formulating the joint powers of the Union and the republics, have drawn attention to themselves. This is of principal importance, and signifies that the Union will be adopting the founding resolutions jointly with the republic.

In comparison with the first draft, a number of new problems among the joint questions should be singled out, such as: adopting the USSR Constitution, introducing amendments and addenda to it, and guaranteeing the rights and liberties of the citizens of the Union (Previously, these pertained to the jurisdiction of the Union); resolving questions associated with the garrisoning and activities of troops and military facilities on the territory of the republics; establishing a uniform procedure for the draft and for completing military service; offering assistance to foreign states, and concluding agreements on international loans and credit; guaranteeing to provide a minimum standard of living, and so on.

The definition in the last paragraph of Article 5 of a mechanism for resolving disputed questions on the exercise of powers among the Union and the Treaty members, is an important addition.

The contents of Article 6 were not subjected to change, which is of itself very important—since, when the Treaty is signed, paragraph 2 will permit taking into consideration the specific features of a republic and stipulates either the delegation of certain additional powers to the Union, or the conclusion of an agreement on the transfer by the Union, to one or several republics, of the exercise of certain of their (Union) powers on their territory, with the consent of the remaining members.

It is well known that the first draft of Article 7, "Property," produced a great many comments, suggestions and objections. I believe that the new significantly revised version will answer many of these questions.

Specifically, having affirmed in paragraph 2 of this article that the republics are the owners of the land, the minerals and other natural resources on their territory, as well as the state property (which is in accordance with the Declaration on State Sovereignty), the conception and the essential nature of Union property is at the same time interpreted in a new way. Whereas in the first draft it was defined as "the property necessary for carrying out the powers of the USSR," it is now interpreted differently: "property which on the basis of the treaty is allotted to the Union as its own for carrying out the powers invested in it." Later on it is stressed that the use of the land, minerals and other natural resources for implementing the powers of the Union shall be carried out within the limits of the laws of the republics. Thus, in the given situation as well, the principle is affirmed that the USSR and all elements of its legal status shall derive from the will of the sovereign republics which are signatories to the Treaty.

Other sections of the draft were subjected to significant changes as well. Two alternative versions were proposed for structuring the USSR Supreme Soviet. Provision was made on the procedure for electing the president of the USSR, and his forming a Cabinet of Ministers, which stipulates that it shall act in accordance with the powers of the Union, shall be subordinate to the president of the USSR, and shall also be responsible to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The role of the USSR Constitutional Court has been redefined. The court shall examine questions of the constitutionality of the legislative acts of the USSR and the republics, Ukazes of the president of the USSR and the republic presidents, and normative acts of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, in accordance with the Union Treaty and USSR Constitution. The Court shall also resolve disputes between the Union and the republics and between the republics, on the constitutionality of their legislative acts.

Article 19, "The USSR Procuracy," was reexamined as well. This article stipulates that the general procurators

(republic procurators) shall be named by the highest legislative organs in the republic, and shall be official members of the collegium of USSR Procurators. In their capacity of oversight of execution of the laws of the Union, they shall be accountable to both the republic highest legislative organs and to the USSR General Procurator. As expected, the new version of the draft Treaty, instead of the term "state language," employs another—"the official language;" thus, there is not even a hint at encroaching upon the republics' state language.

Thus, these basic changes, which were introduced to the first draft by the authorized representatives of the republics, have significantly improved it and made it acceptable.

If one were to carry out a cursory comparison of this document with the draft conception of the Union Treaty of Sovereign States prepared by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, one would note a great many principles and provisions which coincide—in the area of foreign economic and foreign policy activities, defense and military policy; in the humanitarian sphere, and so on.

But certain provisions in the Conception are in conflict. Thus, at the beginning the opinion is expressed that, "...a new Union Treaty is unquestionably needed," but then it asserts that, "...It is necessary to reject attempts to preserve the Union at any cost. Moreover, preservation of a superstate in general is not a benefit. Division of the empire into a number of sovereign states is not a negative but an objectively positive process. Only small states are effective..." As they say, no comment is necessary here. Such a position has more in common with the period of feudal disconnection than with the modern stage of development of inter-state ties in Europe itself.

The conception that a future Union can exist on a confederative basis only seems ossified and dogmatic, and at the same time an exclusively theoretical conception—without a single Constitution or other elements of a common state, a single market, and so on. The basis for this conception is the categorical assertion that otherwise encroachment or limitation of the sovereignty of the republics will occur, and that sovereignty is either complete, or it does not exist at all.

Incidentally, one must not fail to note that there are no surviving examples in the world of a purely federative or confederated union of states in the form that this conception of the science asserts. Life has shown the necessity of flexible unions; otherwise any union, if it is indeed a union on the basis of concrete principles and exists for the sake of certain goals, and is not simply a community of states which exists truly independently of any kind of agreements on the Planet Earth, will turn into an amorphous, unstable formation with no obligations to anyone. As a result—it will be short-lived and inherently unstable.

And finally, it is time to acknowledge that neither absolute freedom nor absolute sovereignty exist anywhere in nature. But the essence of the published draft Union Treaty lies in the fact that attributing to the USSR the status of a state does not signify encroachment on a republic's sovereignty. Voluntarily delegating specific powers to the Union, the republics at the same time realize their own sovereignty. On the other hand, the USSR as a state with all the attributes of a state is the product of the republics and depends upon their will. This is the essence of the revitalizing of the Union. Not to understand this is—dangerous; not to desire this is—ruinous.

### Moldovan Support for Union Treaty

#### Moldovan People's Deputy Comments

91UN1286.1 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 16 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by V. Mikhaylov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Is True Moldovan Sovereignty Attainable Without a Union Treaty?"]

[Excerpts] What kind of new Union treaty will we have? How many and which republics will sign it? When will this take place? Soon we will know the answers to these questions. But for the time being we have in front of us a new draft treaty text, one that appeared in the press four months after publication of the first version. Each of us is trying to determine from it whether we can share the optimism of the "Paris Charter for a New Europe" (Paris, 21 November 1990): "The era of confrontation and division in Europe has ended." Or will we be fated to assert: "The era of confrontation and division in Europe has begun"?

As we recall, preparation of the first version was accompanied by consultations with republic representatives on a multilateral and bilateral basis. Participating in this complex process at that time were experts from Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine, and 15 autonomous republics. This was a working group consisting of more than 200 specialists—legal experts, political experts, economists, etc.

The new document emerged from drafts which had been introduced by a number of republics. In this regard, only eight of 15 Union republics participated in the coordination and development of this document. Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Estonia did not participate in its preparation, and representatives of Azerbaijan were present only as observers. The final protocol was signed by representatives of 26 republics. The USSR Council of the Federation coordinated the approval of individual points in dispute (one version remained, for instance, of 10 alternative versions submitted), and on 6 March adopted a resolution on promulgating the draft and delivering it to the Supreme Soviets of the republics—so that a determination could

be made in the localities over the course of a month as to how the Union treaty would be examined and signed. Soon the Council of the Federation will appoint the time for convening the Congress of Representatives at which the Union treaty will be signed.

What do we notice right away when we compare the second version with the first? Many reproachful comments are taken care of. There is no longer any basis for the accusation that republic declarations on state sovereignty are being ignored, for one of the treaty principles directly asserts that new relations of the republics in the USSR will be structured "proceeding from proclaimed republic declarations on state sovereignty." It is postulated that the republics forming the Union "themselves retain the right to resolve independently all questions of their development..." All entities of the treaty are endowed with "equal rights and bear equal responsibilities."

Many leaders of republics have stated that they desire to become authoritative members of the international community. Republics "have the right to establish direct diplomatic, consular, trade, and other ties with foreign states." A point is included with respect to the right of free secession from the USSR. There is no mention of the state Russian language which frightens many.

I would like to focus attention on another fact. The title mentions a "Union of Sovereign States," but we see used in the text the abbreviated form "Union of SSR's," which is nowhere further decoded. This provides evidence of the fact that it is not ideological dogma which lies at the basis of the treaty but rather interests common to mankind and national interests. No one drives home the point of "socialist" or "soviet" union, and the like. The question of naming remains open. The parties may consult, argue, reach agreement. Incidentally, if the Moldova SSR delegation had played an active role in preparing the draft, still other misunderstandings and divergences of view would undoubtedly have been removed.

[passage omitted]

In connection with discussion of the text of a new treaty, we must say a few words about the "Concept of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on a Treaty of Sovereign States in the Light of the Declaration 'On the Sovereignty of the Moldovan SSR' and on the Draft of the New Union Treaty," presented by V. Pushkash, deputy chairman of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, at the fifth session of the republic parliament. This concept is oriented on a confederative basis for mutual relations among the states. But the legal nature of the Union treaty is in no way void of confederative traits. The principles imbued in the draft are oriented on creating something midway between federation and confederation. For example, nowhere in the world is there a federative state which consists of sovereign component states. This is

being proposed in our version. Nowhere else are federation entities afforded the right to secede from it. Such a provision is contained in the published draft.

[passage omitted]

It seems to me that Moldova, ignoring the new Union treaty, is unambiguously emphasizing its intent to secede from the USSR in the near future. But it will not manage to leave without "a fight." The "Russian-speaking" population will rear up on its hind legs. Loss of the Dnestr region is quite possible. As a result, five or six years of prolonged, exhaustive birth-giving labor may wind up in a miscarriage.

What can we expect to see as a result of the trends observed today? Further ruptures of economic ties, apparently. The conclusion of bilateral treaties (many of which are not even ratified as yet) cannot halt this process. Only the authority of the center has corrected matters in the republic somewhat with respect to contracted deliveries for this year. And what about the future? We are losing sources of energy, raw materials, etc. Taking into account the fact that the Dnestr region will make every effort to resist secession from the USSR, i.e., the fact that not just external republic ties will be severed (transition to world prices, etc.), but intrarepublic ties as well, we can only expect a full collapse of the republic's industry. Of course, we can appeal to the hardness of the Moldavian peasant. But he too, we must presume, will be loyal to the slogan "Freedom above kerosene," at least until such time as he is completely denied this "kerosene."

Of course, there is the hope for assistance from the United States and rich Western countries. Moldova is a small country and a small amount would suffice for it. But it is well known that private firms would never invest even small amounts in regions where there is no political stability. And it is precisely this that no one can promise for Moldova. Assistance along state-to-state lines would be blocked by "the center" based on the fact that the Moldovan SSR has not yet seceded from the USSR, and that any such "assistance" would constitute interference in another state's affairs. They will probably listen to Moscow. What is left? To go hat in hand to Romania.

But economic considerations are not the main thing. The most frightening aspect awaiting us is the compound growth of a destabilized sociopolitical environment. The separatism of the Dnestr region and the South will instantaneously delineate their new outlines. A massive egress of the non-Moldovan population out of the republic will begin, accompanied by increased litigation with respect to every kind of compensation. Relations with other republics will be exacerbated. Somewhere in Yedinet'skiy Rayon we may expect to see concentrations of volunteers on the one hand, and Cossack fighters on the other. Possible attempts will be made to handle the growing economic and political chaos through the introduction of presidential rule. Vast appropriations and

manpower resources will be required to suppress bastions of discontent, separatism, and tension. Moldavian young people will put away their books and notebooks, leaving in cohorts to serve in police and carabinieri units, etc. The economy will suffer another blow, and the population will find itself in a militarist stupor. And all the same, they will not be able to deal with all the confusion under their own power. And again there will be one way out—to seek help from the fraternal people beyond the Prut and draw up an appropriate mortgage arrangement.

### Scholar's Remarks

91UN1286B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 26 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Moldovan SSR People's Deputy A. Safonov: "What Do the Coming Days Have in Store for Us?"]

[Text] The political struggle of various forces around the signing of a Union treaty continues to flare up more and more. March 17th, the day of the all-Union referendum, has become an extremely important benchmark on the path towards conclusively deciding the fate of our great state.

Looking at what is taking place, you involuntarily catch yourself thinking how strong our country is in spite of everything—if over the past few years, despite the furious efforts of "democrats" and an absolute failure to act on the part of the central authority, it has remained alive to this day.

When a draft Union treaty appeared in November 1990, it was immediately adamantly opposed by those who find the Union clearly not to their liking. Their argument: the draft, allegedly, is drawn up by the "center," which "does not have the legal right" (how about that!) to present such documents for universal popular discussion. But their main attack is directed against the federative structuring of the country proposed in the draft. From this, it is felt, proceeds the decision foisted upon the Moldovan Supreme Soviet on terminating the republic's participation in development of the draft Union treaty. That was the time of the uneasy October, when certain people sought self-glory in the "Komrat campaign" and justified nonparticipation in working out the treaty by virtue of territorial split of the republic. It became clear that this was just a pretext when the decision on Moldovan SSR nonparticipation was rescinded. But even after this the Moldovan delegation did not participate in the general effort. Whom can we accuse here if not ourselves?

And now the March newspapers publish a new, reworked draft Union treaty, towards which eight Union republics are favorably disposed. An article-by-article analysis of the new draft requires separate discussion, but I would like to single out the main feature providing continuity with the previous, November draft—the federative structuring of the USSR. And this requires our utmost support.

Judging from everything, the leaders of most republics are clearly asserting the necessity of signing the new Union treaty as quickly as possible. Kazakh SSR President N.A. Nazarbayev, who gave an extraordinarily interesting interview recently over Central Television, is making a tremendous effort in this regard. We must also mention the article by L.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, in the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (7 March 1991). Leonid Makarovich states with good reason that "the center is delaying without justification, time is being lost." He bitterly recalls the fact that 95 percent of the Ukrainian SSR economy was seized by central ministries. "And we went to them as supplicants. Now we must accurately stipulate in the treaty what is ours, and what goes to the Union."

This is a well thought out approach. And I will be direct in saying that it is entirely unlike the statements often made by Moldovan Prime Minister M. Druk. Appearing before the republic parliament, M. Druk expressed the supposition that his descendants would place flowers on his grave, since their grandfather dreamed all his conscious life "of secession from the empire." I am afraid that seceding from "the empire" is far more simple a matter than setting things right in the economy. And what a state it is in... I quote L.M. Kravchuk: "We are given the advice—let us separate, get ourselves calmed down, then reunite. We are not about to embark on such an adventure. We have already cut off all economic ties to the point where people in Switzerland, which I visited recently, are wondering in amazement: such a mighty country—and on its knees with arms outstretched... We cannot permit what happened in Moldova or the Transcaucasus, for example, to happen here."

We probably should clearly understand that we will not be able to exist by ourselves, here in the republic. Either the Union, or Romania—there is no further simplification of the issue. Just short of a million Romanians are demanding Moldavian citizenship while retaining Romanian citizenship. Demands will most certainly be made for "the return of property" (why on earth is Deputy I. Bratu, of Streshen pogrom "fame," going to such lengths in this regard?). And what will remain then? Flowers on a grave for one person, or belt-tightening for everyone?

But wait a minute, opponents will say. Moldova supports the Union! Supports the concept of a Union of sovereign states. But an analysis of some presentations refutes all of this, unfortunately. As a deputy, I wish to state my disagreement in principle with such statements as "The Moldovan Republic has no legal obligations to the present USSR," "Our country—the 'former Union,'" They talk about "a fellowship of sovereign states deprived of such state attributes as common territory, common citizenship, common legal system, etc." In essence this is a program of chaos and disintegration. Here is an example. When discussion took place in the parliament concerning the concept of "a fellowship of sovereign states," attention was drawn to the point in the draft text which states that the republics are to have their



own armies, and that they have the right to declare war and conclude peace! The only thing one can say here is—forgive them, Lord, they know not what they do! Is it possible we have not yet seen sufficient bloodshed? Or do we not feel in our hearts the loss of the victims of Osh and Fergana? Or has the Tskhinvali alarm bell fallen silent? Ethnic feuds have taken away and continue to take away thousands of lives throughout the country. But for some this is not enough. The proposed "fellowship of sovereign states" will simply not be able to exist, if only because of the endless territorial claims republics are making against one another. Is this understood by those who are singing the concept of this "fellowship"?

I am convinced that—yes, they understand. But their task here consists of tearing apart the USSR and erecting over its blood-splattered fragments appanage principalities with regimes of totalitarian, national dictatorships. Is this not what Zviad Gamsakhurdia, for example, is engaged in? Ask the Ossetian people about this...

But most frightening of all to many current leaders is their own people, who may suddenly say things to the contrary... To avert this, leaders have denied the right of direct will of the people—participation in the 17 March referendum. In a referendum of the USSR, we note, from which the Moldova SSR has by no means seceded. And how many questions would have been taken care of had there not been this "Referendum—No!"?

Nonetheless, in spite of all this, I have faith that the country will not perish. I believe the chaos will pass. Too strong, too powerful are the bonds between peoples, even peoples drawn into fratricidal conflicts. Times of troubles have more than once tormented our state, but the dark clouds dissipated. Sooner or later the sun came out, giving way to a quiet, decent, and peaceful life.

## **Moldovan Party on Democratic Platform Address**

### **Party Comment on Address**

91UN1399A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Moldovan CP Central Committee Bureau"]

[Text] **The Moldovan CP Central Committee Bureau has considered the matter of "On a Declaration by the Coordinating Council of the Moldovan CP Democratic Platform."**

The document approved notes that the declaration made by the Democratic Platform Coordinating Council assesses the position and work of the Moldovan Communist Party in the present period in a distorted and politically incorrect fashion. Under circumstances of renewal and reform of the party this declaration is a flagrant attempt by those who are displeased by unity in the party ranks and want to steer the party out of its left-centrist position toward the right, in the direction of

isolation, to undermine it from within in order to realize certain groups' political interests.

The bureau condemned these communists' actions as an effort to split the Moldovan Communist Party and as a flagrant violation of the Party Charter; it was deemed necessary to appeal to the republic's communists in regard to this matter.

It is suggested that our republic's party organizations and individual communists respond vigorously to the groundless accusations which have been levelled at the Moldovan Communist Party and not avoid the polemical debate initiated by Democratic Platform supporters, clarifying the inadmissibility of a split in the party ranks at a period when the party has changed its role and place in society and has firmly embarked upon a path of internal renewal.

It is recommended that the mass media give broad coverage to restructuring processes within the Moldovan Communist Party, portray the work of party organizations in an objective manner and reflect the entire spectrum of opinions and platforms in intraparty affairs, using specific examples to illustrate that real successes are possible only if party forces are unified and if communists are united in their actions and responsibility for the fate of their republic and its people.

### **Party Appeal to Republic Communists**

91UN1399B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 pp 1-2

[*"Appeal From the Moldovan CP Central Committee Bureau to Republic Communists in Connection With the Moldovan CP Democratic Platform Declaration"*]

[Text] Esteemed comrades!

On 28 March 1991 the mass media published a Declaration of the Moldovan CP Democratic Platform Coordinating Council. It expressed dissatisfaction with the current political course of the Moldovan Communist Party and made unfounded accusations of dogmatism, an absence of democracy, suppression of dissent within the party, pursuit of *nomenklatura*-oriented goals, the Moldovan Communist Party's readiness to restore the pre-perestroika system, and unquestioning submission to the center, which is depicted as the focus of evil and reaction. The slogan of uniting all democratic forces within the republic Communist Party and establishing a parallel Moldovan Communist Party was put forth. There are plans to hold a republic organizational conference on 8 April.

While sympathizing with and sharing the concern of Democratic Platform supporters over the as yet too slow rate of party reform, assertion of the party masses' authority, the party's lag behind the social and political processes taking place in society, actions which are not always adequate to social expectations and the dissatisfaction of a certain segment of communists with the pace of democratic transformations within the Moldovan

Communist Party, the Central Committee Bureau nonetheless rejects the accusations levelled against the party. One would have to not see or not wish to see the changes which are taking place within the Moldovan Communist Party and its new place and role in a society in the process of renewal.

The 17th Moldovan CP Congress, the republic party conference and the renewal programs and other documents adopted by them as well as the practical measures presently being carried out clearly attest to the fact that the Moldovan Communist Party is taking on a new quality, the democratic traits of a modern political organization, the main objectives of which will be to protect the interests of working people, bring about economic, political, social and spiritual transformations in our republic, achieve state sovereignty for Moldova and overcome the crisis in our society.

The Moldovan Communist Party has set a course toward absolute achievement of political and organizational independence. Convincing proof of that is the independent Moldovan CP Charter approved by the 1st Republic Conference, as well as other standardizing acts and efforts to prepare a draft Moldovan CP Program. This makes it possible to fully realize our own political goals and interests and communists' aspirations for party sovereignty at the present stage within the framework of the CPSU. Today there exist virtually no objective obstacles to realization of Moldovan Communist Party autonomy.

Affirming the principles of intraparty democracy, the Moldovan CP Central Committee has entered into direct and ongoing contacts with members of the Democratic Platform Coordinating Council and has expressed understanding for communists who have put forward alternative views on paths to party renewal. They have been offered the party mass media so that they elaborate their positions, as well as an opportunity to participate in the work of the 17th Party Congress, the republic party conference and Moldovan CP Central Committee plenums, plus other conditions required to carry out their activities. Many of their valuable proposals have been taken into consideration during policy making and the formation of elective organs, as well as in the Moldovan Communist Party's practical work.

However, the Moldovan CP Central Committee Bureau deems it a matter of fundamental importance to state that a portion of the proposals which have been put forward is unacceptable. Acquiescence to the demand of Democratic Platform supporters that factions with their own clear-cut organizational and staff structure be recognized would mean squandering political energy on resolving continuously emerging, endless conflicts between factions; the party would become focused solely on itself. This would inevitably lead to a weakening of its political potential, alienation from the masses and transformation of the party into a collection of divergent sects.

Differences of opinion on the principles of party organizational structure and the functions of that structure, in particular the question of whether to replace the principle of democratic centralism with democratic unity, as well as disputes over the parliamentary and vanguard party types and the party's vertical and horizontal structures, are now an insurmountable barrier between Democratic Platform and the Moldovan Communist Party if they are regarded as processes rather than momentary acts, processes which possess their own logic of development and space and time characteristics. Marx's saying that "truth is born as a heresy and dies as a prejudice" is quite apt in this situation. One must take into consideration psychological factors, prevailing dogmas and stereotypes, the level of the mass consciousness, the condition of society and the nature and correlation of political forces. Furthermore, the Moldovan CP Central Committee and party committees have an obligation to realize the will of the party masses as expressed in the decisions of the republic party conference and the Charter approved by it.

The idea of the party engaging in mass public repentance is copied from the lexicon of political forces which make to effort to conceal their goal of putting the communist party on the sidelines of social and political affairs. They stubbornly refuse to see the tremendous efforts made by the Communist Party to restore historical justice, rehabilitate persons who suffered unjustly and conduct an objective review of historical assessments of the past, something which has been reflected in a number of Moldovan Communist Party documents issued recently. Repentance is more than just loudly beating one's chest and pouring ashes on one's head. Only the people can judge the party. As for personal political responsibility, the party has condemned and rid itself of a considerable number of compromised officials. Leaders who committed crimes should answer for those crimes before a court.

The Democratic Platform declaration greatly exaggerates the party property issue. As a supporter of the creation of a rule-of-law state the Central Committee assumes that all issues pertaining to the ownership, use and disposition or expropriation of party property can be resolved solely on the basis of current legislation and the Party Charter.

One cannot help but notice that the goals and tasks proclaimed in the declaration echo the statements of political position made in the Moldovan CP Charter. However, the assessments given of the party's work and its programmatic and tactical goals are intentionally distorted in nature and in terms of their content often echo anti-communist appeals to outlaw the party. This clearly indicates a convergence, though perhaps not always a conscious one, with anti-communist, destructive forces.

We once again declare that the communists of our republic favor a sovereign Moldova. In our interpretation republic sovereignty should serve the people of the

republic, not the reverse. The Moldovan Communist Party concept is based on the assumption that the people's sovereignty and happiness cannot be achieved by severing all existing economic, political and cultural ties with the republics, but rather through effective utilization of those ties in the people's best interests. Therefore we favor a renewed Union, a Union of Sovereign States. We favor a new Union Treaty which will correspond to the aspirations and will of the Moldavian people.

The leaders of Democratic Platform are well aware that the republic Communist Party does not preach "dogmatized," i.e. Stalinized, communism. The decisions of the 17th Moldovan CP Congress and the republic party conference demonstrate that the Moldovan Communist Party favors a socially oriented market economy with diverse forms of property, including private property, and that it favors a multiparty system and political and ideological pluralism.

The Moldovan Communist Party has set a course toward interethnic and civil harmony and preservation of the republic's territorial integrity and has proposed and continues to propose a number of specific measures for resolving the current social and political crisis. To state today that communists are exacerbating interethnic conflicts is to distort the real state of affairs.

The goal of Democratic Platform is quite clear, and it is to destroy the Communist Party and play on ethnic sentiments. But let us stop and think: who stands to gain from a split in the party? Does not others' experience convince us of the incorrectness of that path?

Let us appeal to the supporters of Democratic Platform to carefully weigh the consequences of the steps which they are taking. The path you have taken leads to a political dead end and to deeper confrontation; it carries us farther away from realization of the goal of creating a humane socialist society. We are firmly convinced that within the party today there exist the conditions necessary for dialogue, pluralism of opinion and realization of communists' political interests and the creative potential of the individual.

The Moldovan CP Central Committee Bureau urges party organizations and individual communists to preserve party unity, realize the fateful nature of splitting our ranks and achieve greater democratization of party relations, transforming the Communist Party into a voluntary association of like thinkers. That is possible solely through unification of party forces, unity of action and responsibility on the part of each communist for the fate of the republic and its people.

Esteemed comrades!

By making public our position in connection with the Declaration of the Moldovan CP Democratic Platform we are counting on your political maturity and sense of reason. In this difficult situation one must not give free rein to momentary, situational moods; political realism

and an active stance on the part of every communist are more important than ever before.

We are convinced that party organizations will not permit a split in the Moldovan Communist Party. The unity of the Moldovan Communist Party is an important factor in stabilization of the sociopolitical and economic situation and attainment of civil tranquility and harmony in our republic.

#### Address by Democratic Platform

91UN1399C Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 2

["Declaration by Participants in a Moldovan CP Democratic Platform Coordinating Council Session"]

[Text] We, the participants in a Moldovan CP Democratic Platform Coordinating Council session, declare that the most sacred right of the people is in our opinion the right to freely decide and direct one's own fate. We are well aware of our responsibility to the Moldavian people. Soberly assessing events at this crucial stage, at a time when the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova are being subjected to great trials, we resolutely dissociate ourselves from the actions of the Moldovan Communist Party leadership taken in support of the Center's imperial policy aimed at preserving the USSR.

We resolved to take this step after numerous attempts to change the reorient the Moldovan Communist Party's political course in the direction of the people's interests and democratize the party from within, and to turn it into a civilized, parliamentary organization.

Our conscience is clear; we have done everything we can to bring about evolutionary change in the party, by means of articles in the press, meetings with political leaders, speeches at Moldovan CP Central Committee plenums (including speeches on the issue of the Union Treaty), presentation of an alternative draft Charter at the republic party conference and participation by our representative in the work of the 17th Moldovan CP Congress. Unfortunately our efforts were completely fruitless. We have become convinced that:

—the Moldovan Communist Party categorically refuses to reject dogmatic communism, the practical implementation of which over a 73-year period has resulted not in harmony and abundance, as its classical authors promised, but instead in tens of millions of human lives lost, in complete degradation of spirituality and morals, in ecological disasters, grinding poverty and bloody interethnic clashes;

—in relations with communists of a democratic orientation the Moldovan Communist Party resorts to fabrications and lies and use methods of moral and psychological pressure in an effort to preserve the appearance of ideological unity in its ranks and to preserve its vanguard role, with a complete absence of

the characteristic traits of civilized parties (the presence of factions, protection for the rights of minorities, etc.);

—the Moldovan Communist Party is a faithful executor of the Center's policy and is carrying out an anti-national policy; it tolerates the actions of leaders who organize economic sabotage and separatist acts, and is in no hurry to condemn the criminal policy of the Lithuanian and Latvian communist parties (those on a CPSU platform);

—the Moldovan Communist Party regards perestroika as the latest demagogic campaign and has not developed a scientifically-based concept for it, turning it into a meaningless action akin to the infamous Theses;

—the Moldovan Communist Party suppresses any attempt (including within the bounds of the Charter) to create opposition structures within the party, destroying in its infancy any manifestation of pluralism or any ideological alternative, continuing to recognize only instructions "from above." Thus the Moldovan Communist Party is doomed to become an anti-people caste pursuing purely *nomenklatura*-oriented goals;

—at any moment the Moldovan Communist Party is prepared to go on the offensive in order to restore the old regime, i.e. to deprive the human personality of the most elementary rights and society of any prospect of cultural or economic prosperity. Recently the party has resorted more and more often to the "tried and true" methods of struggle "against the opportunists" via the apparatus, which has once again begun to expand. Virtually the entire editorial staff of the newspaper KUVYNTUL, which was composed of talented journalists with democratic views, has been fired.

This is the truth. Truth which we have found out and discovered not second-hand, but rather through constant conflicts over the course of the past year with our party colleagues—communists with conservative views, functionaries and apparatchiks, the ideological leaders of the Moldovan Communist Party at all levels, including the highest level.

As a political movement the Moldovan CP Democratic Platform emerged within the party organization of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences in April 1990. That event was inspired by the Democratic Party Movement at the Union level, a movement founded by individuals such as B. Yeltsin, G. Popov, A. Sobchak, Yu. Afanasyev et al., those who created the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. The Moldovan CP Democratic Platform officially announced its existence in July 1990 at a republic conference. The democratic wing of the party demanded:

—recognition of guilt before the people and the mistakes and crimes committed by the Communist Party;

—return to the people of property illegally expropriated by the Communist Party;

—transformation of the Moldovan Communist Party into a republic party independent of its relationship to the CPSU;

—transformation of the Moldovan Communist Party into a parliamentary party which would work for social justice and full sovereignty for the Republic of Moldova;

—renunciation of the communist future, which is incompatible with the economic strategy of transition to market relationships and equality among all forms of property, including private property, and decisive rejection of any and all manifestations of "war communism." The ideological party should be based on the common human values of Marxism, which retain their timeliness even today, on the experiences of the working class struggle and the present-day social-democratic movement in Western Europe for social justice, and on the ideas and concepts of humanism.

Since all our efforts aimed at transforming the Moldovan Communist Party into a Democratic Party of a parliamentary type were unsuccessful and its leaders remain indifferent to alternative proposals with regard to economic reform, concepts for a Union Treaty, the republic Communist Party Charter and assessments of the anti-constitutional actions of communist parties in the Baltic republics (those on a CPSU platform), we deem it essential to begin discussion among Democratic Platform supporters for the purpose of creating an independent Moldovan Communist Party.

Since by its anti-people actions the Moldovan Communist Party is opposing the real sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova we, the participants in this session of the Moldovan CP Democratic Platform Coordination Council, appeal to all communists and to all those who as a sign of protest have quit the party, to workers, farmers, engineering and technical personnel and members of the intelligentsia who do not support the CPSU's conservative, reactionary policy. The CPSU bears full responsibility for our country's economic chaos and for extreme exacerbation of interethnic relations. We appeal to Moldavians and Russians, Gagauz and Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Jews and members of all the other nationalities living in the Republic of Moldova who realize that the CPSU's policy does not reflect the vital interests of a single one of those nationalities. We urge everyone to join in preparations for the creation of an independent Moldovan Communist Party which:

—will break with its totalitarian and Stalinist past;

—will reject the infamous principle of democratic centralism and modifications thereof, and will recognize factions with their own finances and press organs;



- will struggle to eliminate the administrative-command system and bring about a transition to a market economy and equal rights for all forms of property;
- will strive for balance between social protection for working people and society's economic efficiency;
- will do everything in its power to bring about a solution to the ecological crisis in which our republic finds itself;
- will conduct a policy aimed at bringing harmony to interethnic relations;
- will work to accelerate the development of science, equipment and technology and to bring about a revival of the people's culture, language, national traditions and spirituality;
- will struggle to protect human rights and freedom of conscience and religious confession;
- will view real attainment of the Republic of Moldova's sovereignty and independence as its highest goal.

We urge all communists of patriotic and democratic views to begin establishing groups to assist Democratic Platform and to nominate their own delegates to the second republic conference of Democratic Platform supporters, which will be held on 8 April 1991.

For information call 23-40-15.

*Kishinev, 23 March 1991*

### **Role of Moldovan Democratic Platform Detailed**

91UN1361A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 1

[MOLDOVA-PRES Report: "The KPM: Is Schism Inevitable?"]

[Text] What do the supporters of the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party (DP KPM) want; and what is the position of the Moldovan CP Central Committee with respect to this platform, and specifically with respect to the 23 March 1991 statement of the participants in the Democratic Platform's Coordinating Council? The readers know of these things from preceding articles on the pages of our newspaper (SM, 3 April). But hardly anyone knows that on 12 March 1991, the MOLDOVA-PRES Information Agency distributed a statement which the Democratic Platform Coordinating Council passed to it, announcing withdrawal from the Moldovan Communist Party. The statement was signed by USSR People's Deputy A. Grezhderu, Democratic Platform Coordinating Council chairman; and by Candidate of Philological Sciences A. Gavrilov, Senior Instructor A. Muntyanu of the polytechnical institute, Candidate of Agricultural Sciences V. Afanasyev, and Candidate of Economic Sciences P. Kozhukhar.

In essence, both the declaration and the statement come down to the same thing—a break with the Moldovan

Communist Party and creation of an independent (from the CPSU one must assume) Communist Party of Moldova. Let us recall a few lines from the statement: "Soberly analyzing the events at this crucial stage, when the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova are being seriously tried, we decisively dissociate ourselves from the activities of the leadership of the Moldovan Communist Party, which are directed toward the support of the imperial policy of the Center in the question of preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

Let us examine the extent to which the accusations against the Moldovan Communist Party leadership—namely, supporting the "imperial policy of the Center"—have any basis in fact. It is true that the Moldovan Communist Party is in favor of the USSR, but it is not at all in favor of the "imperial policy of the Center," nor is it in favor of the diktat of the Center which had flourished in years past; it is for true sovereignty and for the genuine independence of Moldova as a member of a revitalized Union of sovereign republics. The lofty words about the Moldovan Communist Party's support of the "imperial policy of the Center," are nothing more than a cover-up for the author's declaration of their schismatic and liquidationist designs.

### **When and How Did the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party Arise?**

The Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party officially declared itself in July 1990; it held its first republic-wide conference last October, and is now preparing for a second one. At that conference it plans to proclaim an independent Communist Party of Moldova. What does this mean? Will there be two Communist Parties of Moldova? The question is not an idle one.

Is the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party original? Is it really independent, and will there be an independent parallel Communist Party? In essence, the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party takes its ideas from the Democratic Platform of the CPSU. The latter first proposed a program of reforms in the basic spheres of social life in its program declaration and draft regulations. In the discussions at that time (the first months of 1990), one would quite often hear that in terms of their ideological positions and their platform goals, the platforms of the CPSU Central Committee and the Democrats were very similar, and in a number of cases coincided. Incidentally, even then an extremely important aspect was stressed: there is little that is constructive on either side; they state their goals, but as far as the means for implementing them are concerned, they are mostly talk.

Time, however, has passed, and many values have been subjected to re-evaluation, and each time the ideological aims of the Democratic Platform have increasingly evolved away from the ideology of the CPSU. Since the 28th CPSU Congress the leaders of the Democratic Platform have openly set out to organize the chaos in the

life of the party: the coordinating council announced the creation of "new sovereign parties," and that signifies the break-up of the CPSU, no more, no less.

But when the Republican Party of the Russian Federation [RPRF] was formed in November 1990, it was founded upon the principle of a "Democratic Platform outside the CPSU." With this "outside" everything is clear: having declared itself a "non-communist" and "post-communist" party of the center-left, the RPRF has essentially from the very beginning concentrated its efforts on opposition to the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party and the policies they are conducting. And once again, the call was heard—to bring the matter to court. And this time not just the party apparat, but the entire CPSU.

And so in a year and a half, the Democratic Platform has evolved rapidly: after starting off as an active upholder of party democracy, the Democratic Platform has steadily shifted from "isolated" and "distinguishing" views to diametrically-opposed, it has come to actively oppose the CPSU and has closed ranks with the anti-communist forces.

Let us return, however, to our business; or more aptly to the aforementioned declaration of the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party. As the reader has already ascertained, ordinary judgements and harsh, at times scathing, phrases predominate, as well as various accusations against the CPSU and Moldovan Communist Party, though not backed up with facts. That is the fashion today: it is considered the proper tone, and one encounters it in abundance in many printed publications.

The assertion that the members of the Democratic Platform of the Coordinating Council profoundly sense their "responsibility to the Moldovan people" arouses a certain amount of disbelief. The logic here is simple: accordingly, the Moldovan Communist Party leadership does not recognize that responsibility. By the way, that is not new either.

It is also difficult to agree with the assertion that the supporters of the Democratic Platform have made numerous attempts to "change the direction of the political policy of the Moldovan Communist Party in favor of the interests of the people, to democratize the party from within, and to change it into a civilized parliamentary organization. It is difficult, because the results of sociological research conducted by the Institute of Socio-Political Research at the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee, and numerous meetings with communists in various party organizations in the republic, testify to the contrary—hardly anyone knows of the existence of the Democratic Platform in the Moldovan Communist Party, or at least did not until now.

The next aspect of the declaration cannot but attract attention to itself: "The Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party sprang up as a political

movement in the party organization of the Moldovan SSR Academy of Sciences in April 1990. This event was inspired by the democratic movement in the party at the Union level, the sources of which were such personalities as B. Yeltsin, G. Popov, A. Sobchak, Yu. Afanasyev, and others, who made up the 'Democratic Platform of the CPSU.'" The fact that certain members of the academy of sciences' party organization showed great interest in the ideas of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU does not raise any doubts of itself, but neither can it serve as the basis for the assertion that the entire party organization was equally interested. True, the preposition "in" sweeps aside any doubts whatsoever on this account; but who pays attention to such small details? What is important is to loudly proclaim the connections of the party organization of the republic's flagship of science with the birth of a new political movement—the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party. We no longer speak of the fact that a Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party "delegate" to the 2nd Congress of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU, N.S. Illarionov, a senior scientific fellow at the Moldovan SSR Academy of Sciences, soon left the party and the territory of Moldova as well.

As far as inspiration is concerned, people who had at first joined the Democratic Platform soon discerned its true nature. We base our argument on the remarks of A.A. Prigarin (of the "Communists for Perestroika" organization, which broke with the Moscow Party Club): "We are not joining the Democratic Platform, and not because we are afraid of creating factions within the party, but because the faction which has been created in the form of the Democratic Platform has not set itself any social and economic tasks, and merely limits itself to the tasks of 'democratizing the party and society!'" But for the sake of what? Well, today we shall see what for.

Since the subject has turned to factions, the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party's assertion cannot go unnoticed: that the Moldovan Communist Party is suppressing any attempt (including those permitted by the Rules) to create opposition structures within the party, and that it is stifling any display of pluralism. But opposition is one thing, and today not one single party, once single government, one single parliament, can avoid it. Opposition is even useful—one must not miss any opportunities; one must always be on the alert. But a faction such as the Democratic Platform calls for is another thing: the Democratic Platform plans to set up an independent Communist Party of Moldova, which "rejects democratic centralism and modifications of the same, and recognizes factions with their own media and press organs."

This proposition is not original. It was also taken from the Democratic Platform of the CPSU, which believes that factions "can become the basis for the rise of several political parties proposing various models of socialism." Moreover, is this pluralism? On the whole, in such a case, should one speak of ideological pluralism, or about the freedom for a minority to express its opinion? More

likely it is a question here of factions from one's internal organization; hence, a multi-party situation within the framework of the CPSU, or in our case—within the Moldovan Communist Party.

I think one would search the world in vain to find a party with the slightest degree of self-respect, which would permit itself such a luxury—a multi-party system within its own membership. For you see, that would mean certain death in the political struggle. Is that really so hard to understand? Is that not just what the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party is trying to do, now that the famous Article 6 of the Constitution is no longer in effect; and now that the party has announced in the documents of its 17th Congress and the republic party conference, that it will use exclusively political means, and free democratic competition in the struggle with other political currents for power?

It was not without curiosity that the part of the declaration was received which calls upon everyone (including former communists) "to join in the preparatory work for the creation of an independent Communist party of Moldova, which..." (Following that is a brief exposition of the program tasks, extracted from...documents of the CPSU and Moldovan Communist Party). There is no point in quoting them anew; we shall refer the readers to the materials of the 17th Moldovan Communist Party Congress and the republic party conference. Does it truly not follow from them, that the Moldovan Communist Party is breaking its ties with the totalitarian and Stalinist past; that the Moldovan Communist Party is fighting for the elimination of the command-administrative system, for transition to a market economy, and a way out of the economic crisis; for the observation of human rights, freedom of conscience and religion, and harmonization of inter-ethnic relations; for a rebirth of the culture, language, national traditions, and spirituality of the people; and for genuinely achieving the sovereignty and independence of Moldova?

#### **Objective and Subjective Prerequisites for the Activities of the Leaders and Certain Members of the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party**

Under conditions of rapid politization of social life, pluralization of public opinion and differentiation of social interests, the CPSU and Moldovan Communist Party are acting in the capacity of "donor" in the formation of the new political structure in the country and in the republic. But leaving the party may be a natural thing (an independent, conscious decision, based on personal choice), and it may be "inspired" under the pressure of the state structures, public opinion, the results of deception, and so on. Analysis of the actions of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU and Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party indicate that these movements are indeed practicing the second method.

And thus, the prerequisites.

1. The Communist Party of Moldova contains a quite extensive conservative faction, which is having a difficult time accepting the social changes, and is taking a cautious approach toward the innovative processes in the party. Reaction to this faction comes from the most radically-oriented communists, who are dissatisfied with their "sluggishness" and "retrograde" action, and are trying to realize themselves within the framework of a different organizational structure. There are among them honest, but confused people.

2. The Moldovan Communist Party includes people who hang on like leeches. At the present time they have opportunity to make a political career in the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party.

3. Both within the Moldovan Communist Party and without there are groups of past and present functionaries who have been unable to realize their political ambitions.

4. The Moldovan Communist Party includes forces who remain in party ranks for the sole purpose of causing the greatest possible split among its members, and as time goes on, to carry off as many people as possible with them.

#### **Possible Consequences of the Actions of the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party**

1. The establishment of an "Independent Communist Party of Moldova" is proclaimed as a landmark in the preparatory work of the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party. But the anticommunist orientation of the Democratic Platform of the as a whole and the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party in particular causes one to doubt the sincerity of the given thesis. More than likely a plot has been hatched within the ruling structure of the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party, and is being put into practice, to prepare the Communist Party of Moldova to take the path of the Lithuanian CP.

It is well known that Brazauskas' "independent" party, which has deviated from the CPSU and the schisms in the ranks of the Lithuanian CP, has not only itself turned into an insignificant political force, but has also badly weakened the Lithuanian Communist Party in terms of the CPSU platform; for it has wasted its efforts and has forced the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) to spend its energies on futile arguments (about property and so on). But worst of all is the fact that as a result of the schism, two-thirds of the former membership has left the party, since the rank-and-file communists were unable to choose either of the alternatives.

2. The declaration calls upon "all communists with patriotic and democratic views to create support groups for the democratic platform." The adjective "patriotic" clearly provides the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party another target. Considering that the Democratic Platform considers "genuine achievement of sovereignty and independence" its highest goal,

one must suppose that they propose to divide up the Moldovan Communist Party by national sectors. And when an independent Moldovan Communist Party is established, then no doubt changing the name of the party will follow (a more appropriate signboard will be chosen), as was the case with Brazauskas' party.

3. It is most likely, that as a result of such events, a similar response is anticipated from the party organizations of the Dnestr Basin and the South (provoking a schism). Democratic Platform supporters are counting on the Moldovan Communist Party splitting up into splinter groups according to national origins. From there it is not far to national salvation committees and so on.

4. From the very beginning the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party has called for "voluntarily returning to the people and the state the vast fortune of the CPSU." The Democratic Platform would hardly raise the question of "division" of property (although that cannot be ruled out—their goal is to tie up party activities with internal squabbles and to siphon off strength from parliamentary work and so on). However, the importance of that point would be actively puffed up in a campaign demanding "acknowledgment of the responsibility of the Communist Party for the stagnation and the economic crisis, and renewing their own activities under conditions of complete equality with the new parties." In this manner, the idea of "equal starting positions" would be foisted off on the communists and public opinion; that is, in fact the ideology of leveling would be realized in the political sphere (so long as the party with many years of experience divides itself and becomes the "equal" of a party that has just appeared).

5. There is no doubt that the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party is oriented toward the intelligentsia, in order to cause the intellectual base of the party to leave the Moldovan Communist Party (especially in the villages).

6. One of the principal goals of the Democratic Platform is to neutralize, undermine and bring down the healthy forces in the Moldovan Communist Party. In order to do this, it is necessary to force the party to constantly repent, to assume the guilt for all the sins of the past, and so on. Basically the representatives of the Democratic Platform were the initiators of the spread of that very theme in the activities of the CPSU (while they were in the party). As soon as they (Yu. Afanashev and others) left, they openly mounted an anticommunist platform, devoting all their energies to that work.

7. Proclaiming their "rejection of the communist future," and eroding their ideological basis to the maximum, the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party is trying to ideologically disarm the party members: the retreat from Marxism-Leninism will be rapid, total and boundless, even though social-democratic values have not yet taken root in our environment. The result will be an ideological vacuum against which it will be possible to turn the people in any direction.

8. The Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party can become a convenient "umbrella" under which one can bring together all those who did not succeed or were unable to transfer their accounts from the Moldovan Communist Party.

#### **The Objective Role of the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party**

A reasonable question is: who stands to gain the most from the activities of the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party?

Aside from the fact that there are within the Democratic Platform of the Moldovan Communist Party quite a few honest and proper communists who are subjectively striving to reform the party in order to strengthen its power and role in society—the objective role of the Democratic Platform will lead to the dismemberment of a unified organism, subsequently to the narrowing of its social base, and thus to weakening its political strength. And while the Democratic Platform shamefully calls itself a "non-communist," and "post-communist" force, in actual fact it stands in the same ranks with the anti-communist forces which exist today. At a difficult time for the party, forces have appeared which have stabbed it in the back.

#### **Legislation Concerning Ukrainian Council of Ministers**

##### **Chairman Renamed Prime Minister**

91UN1422A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
23 Apr 91 p 1

"[Law of the Ukrainian SSR On the Introduction of Changes to Paragraph 4 of Article 108 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR]"

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

To introduce the following changes to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution:

In paragraph 4 of Article 108, replace the words "chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers" with the words "prime minister of the Ukrainian SSR."

L. Kravchuk, chairman,  
Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet,  
Kiev, 18 April 1991.

##### **Cabinet of Ministers Designated**

91UN1422B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
23 Apr 91 p 1

"[Law of the Ukrainian SSR On the Formation of a Ukrainian SSR Cabinet of Ministers]"

[Text] With the goal of improving the structure of state administration of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

Article 1. To form a Ukrainian SSR Cabinet of Ministers composed of the prime minister, the first vice prime



minister, the vice prime minister, the state secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers, state ministers, and Ukrainian SSR ministers.

Article 2. The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers retains its powers prior to approval of the personnel of the Ukrainian SSR Cabinet of Ministers.

L. Kravchuk, chairman,  
Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet,  
Kiev, 18 April 1991.

#### Prime Minister Named

91UN1422C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
23 Apr 91 p 1

["Law of the Ukrainian SSR On the Appointment of a Prime Minister of the Ukrainian SSR"]

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees: To appoint Comrade Vitold Pavlovich Fokin prime minister of the Ukrainian SSR.

To charge Comrade V.P. Fokin with presenting to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet proposals concerning personnel of the Ukrainian SSR Cabinet of Ministers.

L. Kravchuk, chairman,  
Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet,  
Kiev, 18 April 1991.

#### State Structure Approved

91UN1422D Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
23 Apr 91 p 1

["Law of the Ukrainian SSR On the Structure of State Administration of the Ukrainian SSR"]

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To approve the structure of the state administration of the Ukrainian SSR that has been presented to the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers.

2. To determine a list of ministries of the Ukrainian SSR after the examination by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet of the issue of the Ministries of Internal Affairs, State Security, Information, Education, and Trade, as well as of a National Bank of the Ukraine and a state organ for questions of foreign economic activity.

L. Kravchuk, chairman,  
Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet,  
Kiev, 18 April 1991.

#### Ukrainian CP Secretaries Downplay Divergence of Views

91UN1406A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 16 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by O. Pobihay and Ye. Yampolsky: "A Current Moment: One Year For Two"]

[Text] The last time the secretaries of the gorkoms and rayon committees of the Ukrainian Communist Party all

gathered together was one year ago. That meeting was most memorable, so to say, for its examination of relations and for the active search for those responsible for our problems. So here we are at a new gathering. It takes place under conditions when sociopolitical temperatures are even higher. Under these conditions, how will the collective meeting of party leaders from this most important chain within the structure of the Ukrainian Communist Party proceed?

#### Strikes, Prices, and Dismissals

The phrase "a current moment", which has returned to our lexicon from times distant and alarming for the party, today best characterizes the impermanence and changeability of conditions in the society. Events and problems connected with them pile up so quickly, that their evaluations are being corrected almost continuously.

Yesterday, the tragedy of the situation was sharpened primarily by the miner's strikes, and today, after the total (no other way to say it) increase in prices, it became even more dangerous. All the participants in the meeting spoke of this at the plenary session with consternation, as well as in the exchange of ideas during the section sessions.

The First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee S. Hurenko began his speech with an analysis of the situation. So that we can truly realize that our national economy is certainly on the brink of catastrophe, we present a few concrete figures from his speech.

In March alone the miners of the republic were short by 3.4 million metric tons of coal, of this 2.6 million metric tons as a direct result of the strike. Coke converters were short by 390 thousand metric tons of coke, as a result of which ten blast furnaces stopped operating... Energy producers were forced to close down six power stations...

The list of direct and irreversible losses can, unfortunately, go on. They were brought up not just by representatives from the mining regions. Various ways of getting out of today's crisis were proposed - all the way up to the immediate dismissal of the country's officials, government, and the party.

However, there were much greater numbers of proponents who stressed the necessity to more boldly expose the representatives of those forces who turned what were truly general socioeconomic problems of the miners "into a coin for exchange in their political game".

No doubt, the strikes sharpened the problem of raising the party's role in the workers' movement. That is why the proposal of V. Orlov, professor at the Institute for Political and Social Administration, to raise this question at one of the next plenary session of the Ukrainian

CP Central Committee was supported by many of the participants in the conference.

Having declared themselves to be the party to protect the social welfare of the workers, the Communists, clearly, could not but react to the so-called reform of prices. The scale of this reaction, in practice, showed itself to be very wide. Of course, this could even be felt at the meeting of the secretaries. Some of those who spoke showed greater tendencies to support the more radical proposals of the Kiev gorkom's plenum. Others proposed setting up a flexible system of compensation, based on social class, for the various losses incurred by raising the prices of food products and consumer goods, and setting up strict controls for the implementation of pricing policy.

But all were in agreement that no matter how the policies are enforced, they themselves will not stabilize the consumer market. The primary requirement for this is the actual increase in production of goods. It is in this, and not in the sphere of distribution, that the problems of raising the standard of living of the people will be decided.

Many of the speakers, especially from the western districts, in particular Ya. Sukhyi (city of Ternopol), and O. Havrylyuk from the Lvov region, stressed that the socio-political situation in the republic today is to a great extent dictated by the results of the all-union referendum and the republic poll.

We cannot today ignore the fact, S. Hurenko emphasized, that the opposition essentially itself voted against, and encouraged others as well to vote against the Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty.

In all its importance, the referendum, he continued, was not an end in itself. It will make possible the goal - the signing of the Union Treaty, and closely allied with this is the creation of the draft of a new Constitution for the Ukrainian SSR. It would be a great mistake to consider this as the concern only of the peoples deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

#### **A Majority or a Fraction**

The Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet I. Kravchuk answered the participant's questions for a whole two academic hours without a break. This type of relationship with the audience was selected, as they say, by mutual agreement. And if at first there was a tangible wariness in the hall, towards the end of the meeting the atmosphere was more indicative of "mutual understanding".

To a great extent, the tension eased when Leonid Makarovych openly expressed his attitude toward the strategic goals of the party.

"Nowhere and not in any way did I ever abandon them. The Ukrainian Communist Party is for socialist choice, and I am not walking away from this."

As confirmation of this he reminded those present that the resolution on the economic and political sovereignty of the Ukraine, in whose development he personally and directly participated, was ratified by the Ukrainian CP Central Committee before the declaration of state sovereignty was proclaimed and the law of economic independence was passed.

The character and tone of some questions addressed to the Supreme Soviet's chairman, besides everything else, again emphasized that the influence of various rumors inspired by political opponents regarding the existence of conflict within the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo is felt even within the party environment.

"There is no conflict, there are no disagreements on principles either", said L. Kravchuk. "There are various opinions. This is normal. If we were to be in agreement on everything - that would be the absolute end. We have examples of this in the not too distant past, when many party workers were frightened when they heard - that's not how Leonid Illich said it".

As it should be, in meetings with the Supreme Council chairman the question was often raised about the role and status of Communists in the soviets, their relationship with their own party and with the opposition. Citing worldwide experience he emphasized that under multi-party conditions one should not forget the known practice of creating party sections in the parliaments, whose members support the carrying out of the general directives of the party, and not just of its leadership.

Within the republic's parliament no such section or faction exists, this is known. The so-called majority, whose number also includes communist deputies, has not been very successful in coordinating its efforts. The speakers in the discussion also mentioned this, especially the first secretary of the Luhansk gorkom, Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy V. Tykhonov. His speech was critical of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, which in his opinion does a poor job of coordinating the efforts of the communist deputies and does not manifest legislative initiative.

Other examples were also cited during the discussions. H. Kravtsov, first secretary of the Kostyantyn gorkom, for example, told of the effectiveness in creating a party group within the city soviet and its influence on the work of the session and the situation in the city. V. Opryshko, first secretary of the Rovno gorkom told of his experience, where cooperation with the city soviet's economic leaders helped pass various resolutions in the city soviet, where communists are in the minority.

In the opinion of those present, this exchange of actual experiences - is a testament to the value of such meetings. We can add from ourselves, that this in itself easily differentiated this meeting from the previous discussions of the first secretaries.

### The Search For Leaders

"We need a present-day Lonzhyumo!" [as transliterated] interjected one of the discussion participants. Recall: this French city gained glory at this century's zenith with its Bolshevik party school.

"I welcome the question as it is stated", retorted V. Pazenok, assistant rector of the Kiev Institute of Political Science and Social Administration. He continued: "Today there is a pressing need for political scientists."

Actually, the local party cadres feel this need most of all. It is true that until recently the very name of this field of study seemed exotic. But the stormy politization of the masses, or more correctly the excesses of society due to the spontaneity of this process, placed the need for education in orchestrating a political campaign, if you will, on the daily agenda.

The assistant rector affirmed that the Institute is ready today to take upon itself the task of educating today's specialists. The prospect is attractive, but in reply to this announcement several of the gorkom and raykom secretaries asked almost in unison:

"Where will the funds come from?"

Truly, the budget of that raykom could not cover it before and is not ready for such extravagances today. And we cannot expect subsidies in dollars from overseas patrons. An examination of possible sources is needed, entrepreneurship in the better sense of the word.

There was talk of combining efforts and costs, to possibly create interest in the results of this educational approach in the working society, especially in those businesses whose operations are stable. After all they, as much as the party committees, are not unconcerned with the possible outcome of the upcoming elections of government officials.

The facts bear out the experiences of the first cooperative efforts with education under the new principles. Brigades of educators went out into the Near-Carpathian region to search for potential leaders. In the Konotop regional CP committee, by reassigning part of member dues, a fund has been created. The fund was used to send 20 secretaries of party organizations to a short course at the Institute of Political Science and Social Administration.

Exchange of experiences, basic organizations, meetings based on interests - these and other familiar items mentioned during the discussions as important, are necessary. Of course, a new generation has emerged in the party's forefront: in the last year almost half of the secretary posts in the gorkoms and raykoms have changed hands. It is unfortunate that under the banner of the fight against formalism and autocracy we hurriedly set aside many completely usable methods, without finding suitable substitutes.

But under these new conditions we are gathering especially valuable practical experience. V. Sydorenko, first secretary of the Khmelnytsk gorkom told of the creation of an association which made it possible to publish a city newspaper and to satisfy other ideological needs. O. Surin, first secretary of the Kiev gorkom (the city of Kharkov), told of a fund created to assist in solving various matters of importance to residents in the region.

### The Bloc Principle

One of the values of having a political party is the feeling of partnership, the ability to work as a bloc. Under conditions of harsh opposition of political forces, Communists found it necessary to work in a new way in community organizations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the general victory in the referendum was brought about by the united efforts of the Communist Party with the unions, Komsomol, the councils of war and work veterans, women, the Worker's Union, the Peasant's Union, and other mass organizations.

A. Kovalevskyy, chairman of the Soviet Federation of Independent Unions and the first secretary of the LKSMU (MDS) Komsomol Central Committee S. Vovchenko spoke before the first secretaries. They addressed the issue of passing resolutions with realistic accomplishable tasks, with priority goals such as rejuvenating politics.

Although we have decided not to intervene directly in economics, we should not lose the experienced influence of Communists in this field. This strong conviction was expressed by the first secretary of the Kherson gorkom, I. Nayda. There is a need, considering the complexity of socioeconomic conditions, to create anti-crisis staffs and groups, to maintain closer contacts with the councils of enterprise directors.

Partnerships, cooperative action, intelligent compromise in the interest of the population (without hurting the political positions) - all this requires certain psychological changes. We have not always been able to achieve this.

K. Masyk, first deputy director of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, read a note handed to him, leaned back, then said, addressing the audience:

"Of course, I will answer this question. But I would ask the authors (who signed themselves - a group of secretaries) to come see me during the break: I wish to meet them face to face."

What is it that moved Kostyantyn Ivanovych? The note asked: when will we stop embracing the ardent Rukh member Comrade Yavorivskyy?

"I am a Communist", Masyk said, "and do not intend to change my convictions. But it is necessary for me to take part in the process of combating the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Volodymyr Yavorivskyy is doing much in this matter. Our political views differ."

Recidivists of the old style, truly, show up even among representatives in this category of individuals, who should be prepared for work under new conditions, the first secretaries of party committees. We believe that it is imperative to discuss this aloud, despite all the complexities of inter-party conflict. The Communists will learn nothing from those super-democrats, who so willingly expose all and everyone, but yet tightly conceal their own internal party affairs.

The individual CPU committee leaders forget (and this was shown in the proceedings of the conference - seminar), that the party and its organs of leadership have stopped resorting to rumors, to "calling someone up on the carpet". Someone was not pleased with some concrete statement of the minister. So right away they send a note up to the presidium: "Why don't you put him on the spot, express your distrust?"

Some other participants were not pleased that the heads of the Supreme Soviet and the republic's government recently attended the Moleben celebrated on the occasion of rebuilding the Cathedral of the Assumption. How can this be, they say; after all, Communists and religion do not mix. As if it were unbelievable that they would come to the people, to profess before them their admiration for the concern with this pearl of world culture.

And after all is it possible to seriously work with the population, and yet ignore the interests of a great majority of the people - the believers.

I. Antonovych, secretary of the RSFSR CP Central Committee, spoke eloquently of working with people in his introductory speech.

Maintenance of contacts with the Communist Parties of the other republics, especially the RSFSR, are, without a doubt, a necessary direction of work. The rules of party friendship help the Communists in the western regions of the Ukraine in their struggle to stay alive politically. "Solidarity inside out", which is revealed by the agitators from other republics regarding the striking Donbas miners should be countered with true solidarity of the Communist Parties of the Soviet republics - the supporters of internationalism.

This is one more lesson done by the collective soviet of secretaries.

### **Ukraine's Kravchuk on Gorbachev, Yeltsin**

*LD0604222691 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 5 Apr 91*

[Text] The VECHIRNIY KYIV [EVENING KIEV] independent newspaper presented a month and a half ago a blitz-referendum, "President or Hetman?" to its readers with the purpose of exchanging opinions regarding some issues related to the state system of our republic and the possible form of government in it. The results of this peculiar sociological research have been summed up. Five answers were proposed to the question

of what name should one give to our future state. Here is how the thoughts of readers of the newspaper varied. Forty-two percent were for the Republic of the Ukraine; 31.5 percent were for the Ukrainian Democratic Republic; 2.1 percent were for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; 8.2 percent were for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; 16.2 percent were for other variants. As regards the form of government, more than 46 percent expressed themselves for hetman to be the first person; 30 percent preferred president. More than 23 percent support the parliamentary system of government.

The discussions in Ukrainian society, related to the role of the present leading political figures in our country, are simultaneously becoming increasingly heated in connection with the debates regarding the system of government in the Ukraine, particularly regarding intensification of the conflict between Gorbachev, the Union president, and Yeltsin, the leader of Russia. Suggestions are also cropping up that Leonid Kravchuk, the leader of the Ukraine, could become a mediator between the Union president and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia. Here is what Leonid Kravchuk himself thinks about this:

[Begin Kravchuk recording] Gorbachev will go down in history as the person who started perestroika, whatever happens. And Boris Yeltsin was among those who started perestroika too. Then they wanted to debar him from this, it seems to me undeservedly. He has resentment. Nietzsche said that resentment is a very dangerous thing in politics. This resentment is growing. It seems to me that Gorbachev made a number of political steps which he should not have done with respect to Yeltsin. But now the matter has already gone far.

I support all that is progressive and good in Yeltsin, and openly criticize him for what I consider negative. And I also support Gorbachev in foreign policy, in his desire to have the Union and in his desire not to turn from the path of democracy. But I also criticize him for the mistakes that he made. They are grown-up and honest people, and they have a normal relationship with me. And Boris Yeltsin often says: one must seek advice. Someone must make a step forward anyway, because 300 million people stand behind them. If this is not done by someone, then neither of them will be considered a politician in history. This struggle would be less dangerous if society were not on such a level of economic and social decline. [end recording]

### **Ukrainian Rules for Preserving Public Order**

*91UN13794 Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINI in Ukrainian 29 Mar 91 pp 1, 3*

[“Rules on the Use of Special Means in the Preservation of Public Order in the Ukrainian SSR” followed by commentary by Lieutenant General of the Militia A. Vasylyshyn, Ukrainian SSR minister of internal affairs]

[Text] **THE RESULT OF OBJECTIVE NECESSITY**



With decree No. 49 of 27 February 1991, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers approved the Rules on the Use of Special Means in the Preservation of Public Order in the Ukrainian SSR.

In conjunction with the fact that the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On Urgent Measures To Consolidate Legality and Law and Order in the Republic" stipulates that the population be informed of this document, we offer below the full text of the aforementioned Rules and a commentary on them by the Ukrainian SSR minister of internal affairs.

#### **1. Organizational and Legal Bases for the Use of Special Measures**

1. These rules define the procedure for the use of special means by personnel of the militia and other employees of organs and institutions of internal affairs and servicemen of the internal forces who are enlisted in the preservation of public order and public security and the prevention of crime (henceforth—"employees of the militia"), and a list of special means is provided.

2. The legal basis of the use of special means is the Ukrainian SSR law "On the Militia" and the 29 November 1990 Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On Urgent Measures To Consolidate Legality and Law and Order in the Republic."

3. Special means are used in circumstances where all other forms of preventive restraint of violators of the law have been applied and have not given the desired results:

a) to defend citizens and provide for the self-defense of employees of the militia from attack and other actions that create a threat to their life or health;

b) to halt mass disorders and group violations of public order;

c) to repulse an attack on buildings, dwellings, structures, and vehicles independent of who owns them or to free them when they are seized;

d) to detain and deliver to the militia or other official premises people who have committed a violation of the law and to move and confine people who have been detained and arrested or put under guard if the aforementioned people offer resistance to employees of the militia or if there are grounds to believe that they may escape or cause harm to those around them or to themselves;

e) to halt mass seizure of land or other actions which may lead to a clash between groups of the population, as well as actions which paralyze the operations of transportation or the daily activities of population centers or which infringe on the public peace and people's life and health;

f) to halt resistance to an employee of the militia and to other people who are carrying out official or public duties in defense of public order and prevention of crime;

g) to liberate hostages.

4. The use of special means, with the exception of the need to repulse a sudden attack on an employee of the militia and to free hostages, must be preceded by a warning concerning the intention to use them.

The warning must be made aloud or, across a significant distance or when addressing a large group of people, using a loudspeaker apparatus to amplify the words, and in each instance it is desirable for the warning to be made in the native language of the people against whom this means is to be used, as well as in Ukrainian and Russian no less than two times, granting sufficient time for the violation to be halted.

5. The form of the special means, the time that they are to be first used, and the intensity of their use are determined by taking into consideration the circumstances that exist, the nature of the violation, and the person of the violator.

6. The decision to use special means is made by an official who is responsible for the preservation of public order or by the leader of a specific operation. Employees of the militia who function on an individual basis make such decisions independently. Upon the use of these means, they inform their direct superior of the aforementioned in written form: When, where, against whom, and under circumstances the special means were used and the consequences of their use.

Upon injury or death which takes place as a consequence of the use of special means, an employee of the militia is obligated to inform his direct superior immediately and in written form so that the procurator may be notified.

The head of an organ or institution of internal affairs or the commander of a unit of internal forces informs his superior leader. When necessary, the leaders of the organs of local power are informed.

7. In each instance of the use of special means, employees of the militia are to ensure in the shortest possible time that the victim is given the necessary aid, notifying doctors and medical establishments which means were used in each specific instance.

8. The use of special means is prohibited:

a) on women with clear signs of pregnancy, persons of advanced age or with outward signs of disability, and youths, excluding instances of group attack committed by them that genuinely threaten the life and health of people or employees of the militia or of armed attack or armed resistance;

b) in lodgings and on plots of land reserved for diplomatic, consular, or other representatives of foreign states with the exception of occasions when a request is received from the head of a diplomatic or other appropriate representation for the use of the indicated means against violators of the law;

c) in structures or factories connected with the production of explosive or flammable substances and in children's and medical establishments.

9. After the use of special means, an examination of the lodgings and locality is carried out with the goal of discovering victims, possible fires, and damage to life-support facilities, as well as to collect special means which were not expended; where necessary, decontamination is carried out.

10. Heads of organs and institutions of internal affairs and commanders of combined units and units of internal forces must make a systematic effort to ensure the legality of the use of special means and take criminal action in accordance with valid legislation against people who have used them inappropriately; organize education of personnel on the use of special means and the training of qualified specialists and instructors for an approved program; issue personnel special means only after each is tested on the rules and procedure for their use.

Responsibility for the organization of efforts to ensure the legality of the use of special means in the preservation of public order lies with the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

11. The rules for the use, technical support, maintenance, registration, writing off, and destruction of special means, the necessary safety measures for its use, and the organizational procedure and program for instructing personnel is established by the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

## II. List of Special Means

12. The special means which are used in the preservation of public order are:

a) means for individual protection:

- helmets (steel army helmets, the "Sfera," and the plastic protective helmet)
- body armor
- deflective and armored shields

b) means for aggressive defense:

- rubber truncheons
- handcuffs
- gas hand grenades, as well as rounds with gas grenades ("Cheremukha-1," "Cheremukha-4," "Cheremukha-5," "Cheremukha-6," "Cheremukha-7," "Cheremukha-10," "Cheremukha-12," "Siren-1," "Siren-2," and "Siren-3");

c) means for supporting special operations:

- the "Oblako" backpack apparatus
- "Zarya" sound and flash grenades as well as "Plamya" sound and flash devices

—"Volna-r" rubber bullets

—water cannon

—armored vehicles and other transport equipment

—the "Yezh-M" device for halting vehicle traffic;

d) devices for opening structures seized by violators of the law:

—"Klyuch" and "Impuls" small-scale explosive devices.

Service dogs may also be used in the preservation of public order.

## III. Particulars in the Use of Means of Active Defense and Support of Special Operations

13. When using handcuffs, a periodic examination (no less often than every two hours) of the tightness of the cuffs is required

14. It is prohibited to strike the head, neck, collarbone area, stomach, or genitals with the rubber truncheon.

15. Delayed action sound and flash devices ("Zarya" sound and flash grenades and "Plamya" sound and flash devices) are used at a distance of no less than two meters from people

16. Water cannon are used for dispersing participants in mass disorders when the air temperature is no less than zero degrees centigrade.

17. When tear-producing agents are used, it is forbidden to shoot directly at violators, to throw or fire grenades into crowds, or to use the agents a second time within the affected zone while the original agents are still active.

"Cheremukha-1," "Cheremukha-4," "Cheremukha-12," and "Siren-3," as well as the "Oblako" are only used in open areas

18. It is prohibited to use the "Yezh-M" device for halting vehicle traffic, including cargo vehicles, that are transporting people; vehicle traffic belonging to diplomatic, consular, and other representations of foreign states; motorcycles, motorized carriages, motor scooters, and mopeds; or on roads through mountains or fields where visibility is restricted, railroad crossings, bridges, viaducts, overpasses, and in tunnels.

19. Nonpenetrating rubber bullets are fired with the aid of a special rifle at a distance of no less than 40 meters from people and only at the lower portion of the leg.

20. It is prohibited to use the "Klyuch" and "Impuls" small-scale explosive devices for opening structures seized by violators of the law where hostages are being held

21. In the preservation of public order service dogs are used that have undergone the appropriate training course, are considered suitable for service use, and are assigned to official canine subunits. The right to use

service dogs belongs to those employees of the militia who serve with them. Service dogs are used on long or short leashes or without a leash, and with or without muzzles depending on the specific situation that exists.

22. Modifications of the special means mentioned in subparagraphs "b," "c," and "d" of Paragraph 12 of these Rules in conjunction with the alteration of their construction and operational parameters which do not entail changes in tactical and technical features are carried out by order of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the event of the development of new special means for aggressive defense and for supporting special operations which are not indicated in these rules, they are to be added to the list by the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers at the petition of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the recommendation of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Public Health and the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy.

**Commentary by Lieutenant General of the Militia A. V. Vasylyshyn, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs**

Adoption of the "Rules on the Use of Special Means in the Preservation of Public Order" is the result of objective necessity. After all, crime has increased significantly in recent times. Many crimes are accompanied by violence and brutality and are characterized by increased aggressiveness by the criminals. In 1990, 2,823 murders and attempted murders and 6,600 serious bodily injuries were committed. Almost one-fifth of the crimes took place in public places. Criminals are increasingly confronting forces of law and order. Last year criminals killed 23 of our employees and wounded 294.

In order to successfully discharge the duties entrusted to them under such conditions, the militia and other subunits of the organs of internal affairs must have appropriate means of defense and compulsion, which are used in instances and according to procedure stipulated by legislation. The right to use them is one of the guarantees of the effectiveness of the organs of internal affairs in the preservation of public order and the prevention of crime.

The recently adopted Ukrainian SSR law "On the Militia" established the conditions and bounds for the use of measures of physical restraint, special means, and firearms. Article 15 of that law regulates the actions of employees of the militia with regard to the use of special means and outlines instances in which they may be used. In addition, the 29 November 1990 Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On Urgent Measures To Bolster Legality and Law and Order in the Republic" gave organs of internal affairs and internal forces the right under certain situations to actively counteract violators of the law, including through the use of permissible special means.

I should point out that the special means listed in the government's decree or similar ones are used by law enforcement forces in all countries of the world. This problem has been repeatedly examined in the UN General Assembly. The "Code of Conduct of Officials in the

Maintenance of Law and Order" was adopted in 1979, and its provisions permit them in times of extreme need to use force.

Last year the Eighth Congress of the United Nations on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Criminals approved the "Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Officials Who Are Responsible for the Preservation of Law and Order." In particular, this document recommends that governments and law enforcement organs of all countries adopt legislative provisions on these issues and develop the largest possible arsenal of special means, narrowing the sphere of use of those that can lead to death or injury. The document allots significant attention to means of self-defense of law enforcement employees, rules on the use of force and firearms, guidelines to ensure that officials do not exceed their authority, and measures that reduce to a minimum the possibility of causing injury to people.

The "Rules on the Use of Special Means in the Preservation of Public Order" in the Ukrainian SSR fully correspond to the principles that have been approved by the international community. They have been coordinated with the Ministry of Public Health and the Procuracy of the Ukrainian SSR. Their basic goal is a humane one—to preserve the health and life of employees of organs of internal affairs, servicemen of the internal forces, and citizens, as well as of violators of the law. The timely and skillful use of special means permits one to avoid casualties and to avoid the need to resort to extreme measures—the use of firearms.

I believe that the publication in the mass media of these Rules will contribute to prevention of crime and serve as a caution to people who do not take into consideration the requirements of the law.

In turn, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic and its appropriate structural links will strictly monitor observance of the Rules by employees of the organs of internal affairs in order to forestall violations of the law and the injury of innocent people.

**Ukrainian Majority Leader on Parliament, CP**

91UN1386.4 Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 13 Apr 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with A.A. Moroz, leader of the Ukrainian parliamentary majority, conducted by Irina Pogorelova, parliamentary correspondent of KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, under the rubric "End of the Week": "My Appearance in Parliament Is Unusual"]

[Text] *It cannot be said of him that his name is "on everyone's lips." My journalist colleagues who are infrequent visitors to parliament were inquiring only recently: "Moroz—who is he? Point him out." He almost never mounts the podium, and his soft voice is only heard at the microphone infrequently. His name is hardly ever encountered in the editorial mailbag. And the "parliamentary majority" concept (with its rooted "aggressive-obedient"*

*epithet) was, generally, for a long time associated with the name of an entirely different person. Yet from the very outset Aleksandr Aleksandrovich has officially headed the "group of 239." Preparing for the interview, I ran through versions of a psychological portrait of my interviewee. The "quiet Bolshevik," by analogy with the "quiet American." The Leninist type of modest fighter as simple as the truth? Or simply a neophyte politician who does not, in the opinion of some people, abuse the public's attention on account of a gift for speaking which is more modest than that of the writer deputies? In short, I faced a meeting with a "Mr.," or more precisely, "Comrade," X. And here it is*

[Pogorelova] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, you are the leader of the majority. But what is this—the parliamentary majority—a group of deputies, a faction? And how did you become head of it?

[Moroz] The majority is not a "group"; there are with us, as in the opposition also, people with different views. There is no intrinsic disciplinary code here, and for this reason we cannot speak of a faction.

The majority is a structure in the Supreme Soviet which emerged in connection with the need for the assumption of responsibility for parliament's decisions. Previously the opposition had officially declared repeatedly that it was divesting itself of such responsibility. I headed the action group, which began with an appeal to the deputies. Some 306 or 307 persons were registered at that time. I personally, to be honest, never took any interest in this list. What was important was something else—an opportunity had emerged for conferring before plenary meetings on the problems being discussed.

An active-member core—of six persons—was formed. It met in the hall literally prior to the start of a meeting, and some of those present proposed that I head this structure. Thus, as most often is the case in public activity, I became majority chairman on the move.

[Pogorelova] Are you proud of this role?

[Moroz] The most tangible subjective feeling is fatigue connected with organizational difficulties. I would like to see less thrashing about to no purpose, and our work is necessary.

[Pogorelova] The majority of the "group of 239" is composed of members of the Communist Party. Do you have to fulfill the instructions of the Central Committee or is this absolutely ruled out?

[Moroz] Absolutely. At certain times I would like to see the Central Committee working a little harder.

[Pogorelova] It is well known that your sympathizers are unhappy with the work of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Why?

[Moroz] The Presidium has not yet found its feet. Nor has the status of this structure been fully determined. In the intervals between plenary meetings its decisions should have legislative force, but this is not yet the case,

which is taking its toll on the efficiency of parliament's activity. In addition, work on bills is at times conducted "on the run." It is essential that there be between the chairman and parliament a link organizing the preliminary work on them and that it "prepare the cuisine" of legislation.

[Pogorelova] A similar working group was formed for preparation of the new Union treaty. But it was you who proposed that the question of its formation be removed from the agenda.

[Moroz] What I have said prior to this concerned new bills. Such work on the Union treaty, however, had already been performed. It is necessary now that each deputy have his say, and this is possible only in the commissions.

[Pogorelova] Do you support the idea of a professional parliament?

[Moroz] Under our conditions parliament should only be professional or almost professional. This is my conviction. But we cannot disregard the fact that our people are not ready to work in a professional parliament. Many were elected without consideration of this prospect, otherwise they would not have agreed to come.

The next elections should be held with an orientation toward a professional parliament and on the basis of a new election law.

[Pogorelova] But the present deputies have to enact this law. Will they agree to this, will there not be a vicious circle?

[Moroz] There is a compromise version. Not having the opportunity to leave their former position, some deputies will work on a temporary duty assignment, so to speak, for a year, say.

[Pogorelova] And how did you become a deputy?

[Moroz] It sometimes seems to me that my appearance in parliament is somewhat unusual. I am convinced that before me there had not once been such an apparatus employee in the Supreme Soviet. I am not exaggerating my own role but I believe that my example is also a feature of the change in the social and political situation in society.

An opportunity for everyone to speak about himself and meet with people has emerged for the first time.

[Pogorelova] Do you agree with the fact that functionaries are now becoming politicians?

[Moroz] To be honest, I am offended by the word functionary, as are, perhaps, more than just me.

[Pogorelova] Excuse the generalization....

[Moroz] Not all that proper a generalization. The media have recently been sinning with this word. A bus conductor could be a functionary, if he is a bureaucratic sort



of person. And an employee of a ministry apparatus might not be a functionary, if he performs his work conscientiously.

As far as the differences between the activity of a politician and an apparatus employee is concerned.... First and foremost, I, as a politician, measure my actions and intentions against all the processes currently developing in our society, attempt to influence these processes and acquire an opportunity to influence them. The apparatus employee, however, operates indirectly, via many structures.

But nowhere in society, evidently, is there such a danger as there is in apparatus structures of making a person merely an executant. A person is at times forced to constrain himself, finding himself within the framework of particular duties. His potential presupposes, say, a large scale of responsibility, but he does not in terms of his position possess such a scale. A certain adaptation then occurs, and the potential is lost....

[Pogorelova] So it is, perhaps, the bipolar system contained in the idea of democracy which is the salvation for such people?

[Moroz] Well, first, even in an ultrademocratic movement, within it, there could be an apparatus with absolutely the same strictly centralist characteristics. And, second, bipolarity is good when these poles are nonantagonistic. The tragic aspect of the present situation is precisely the fact that they are such, unfortunately. However much we might like to close our eyes to this, it is a fact. One newspaper, published by forces calling themselves democratic, was being distributed here yesterday.... How much hatred it contained toward me! I feel this hatred! This cannot leave me indifferent.

We are calling on one another for consolidation. And I am prepared to do all that I can in this field. I agree to join forces with the devil, if you'll excuse the expression, just as long as things are moved forward. But if I am told: "You are a member of a fascist organization," if one thing is said here, but elsewhere, something else (to rectify the situation "not by harness but by the sword"....), I have my doubts as to whether such people, having taken full power, would dispose of it for the good. How would my fate and that of other people who have lived an honest life be determined in that case? This cannot fail to disturb me. And this is preventing consolidation.

[Pogorelova] But do you, in turn, not harbor a similar dislike of these people? And is there not a pendulum, which is swinging us from extreme to extreme, operating here? What, in your view, should the Communists be doing to ensure an end to the fight against the enemy with his weapons?

[Moroz] You would have a hard job citing examples of how the Communists, the present Communists, are swinging this pendulum. Not at all. And the now traditional references to our history, not that distant, are most

likely dictated by the need to push off from an extreme point in order to "justify" the opposite position. This is, indeed, a dangerous trend

And, generally.... We are all today experts in "correcting" the actions of Mazepa or Bogdan Khmelnytskyi and we are all good today at going back to even more remote times.

A booklet which could not have been read earlier recently caught my eye. It was by Lesnyak-Rudnitskiy (a historian, if I am not mistaken), who lived abroad permanently. At the end of the 1960's, he expressed at a conference of journalists in New York a thought that I found striking and that no one is developing today. Some because this is not to their advantage, others, because they are not impressed by or do not understand the importance of this idea. Thus analyzing the situation in the Ukraine following the 1917 revolution, he concluded that three types of statehood were developing in parallel: the UNR [Ukrainian People's Republic] was based on the so-called middle class, the intelligentsia, in particular; the hetmanate, which had a social base in the strong boss, the peasant, and the monarchist; and the Bolshevik republic, whose nutrient medium were labor outfits, worker outfits primarily. And he says that we should not make an absolute of, say, the UNR because it also was stratified by contradictions, including the fact that the hetmanate grew out of it. This author cannot be "censured" for communist predilections, and the book was in special storage, unfortunately, and has only now appeared in scientific libraries. Why should this subject not be developed by those who like to investigate the essence of historical processes here in the Ukraine? There would be less speculation on history: They were good times, allegedly, intentions were excellent, and let us lay a bridge from the Central Rada to the present day, and all that lies between them—which is criminal—needs to be crossed out. And now, it is said, we will be citizens of that republic. We should study history, not to rummage around in it, but lest we make mistakes in the future.

[Pogorelova] But in the apportionment of forces just quoted there was the Soviet Ukraine, which occupied the whole territory and left no room either for the hetmanate or the UNR. So if we are speaking about a balance of forces, should we not move up and leave room for others? Do you not allow, incidentally, that those accused of speculating on history aspire not so much to the full seizure of power as to its even distribution? The expression "the democrats are straining for power..." altogether sounds very abusive (from the president included). But neither did the ruling party formerly obtain power on a blue-bordered platter. And it is not about to yield its place.

[Moroz] There are several levels to this question. I had begun to say that processes were developing objectively. Today history is being presented thus: Russian Bolsheviks came and seized the Ukraine....

[Pogorelova] But this is an extreme viewpoint.... Not many people share it, incidentally.

[Moroz] No, you should not say this. Those who have ears to hear, let them hear. But today I, being part of the structure of power, came to it democratically and I believe that the majority has come to be here likewise. We have thus acquired an opportunity to express people's interests. It is this which is democracy in action.

As to the ruling party. Clichéd thinking consists of the party still being considered the ruling party. Excuse me, but there are ruling parties and ruling parties. A party that substitutes for the structures of statehood and the structures of administration, which was the case with us up to January 1985, say, is one thing. A party whose members are the majority in the structures of power is quite another. The Communist Party today is essentially relieved of its command authority.

[Pogorelova] Please tell us, then, in more detail about your own experience.

[Moroz] For just over three years, I was first secretary of one of the republic's biggest raykoms [rayon committees] (it has more than 300 party organizations in outfits connected with the oblast). How was it possible to govern, that is, put into the hands of the state the functions of a party? By the appointment, assignment, and training of personnel. This was the party's prerogative. There are also other power functions—fund-forming, use of capital investments.... There was none of this in "my" committee, which was very complex and distinctive. Government was exercised only via the personnel.

As of 1987, this function was no more either. Tell me, can the party govern directly now? It cannot. I got into arguments with certain enterprise managers here. They would complain in the former spirit. But I would ask: "And how many times has the raykom summoned you on production matters? What, did the raykom appoint engineers or deputies for you?" "Hell, no," they replied. "So why are you speaking as you spoke four or five years ago? After all, the party abandoned all that with which it is, as before, being blamed at the January (1987) plenum."

[Pogorelova] Why, then, is the slogan concerning the party's switch to the offensive being heard once again?

[Moroz] This is a restructuring in party work and a search for new forms.

An extremely agonizing process for many of the party's rank and file. They are seeking their own character in the present situation, their own role among their comrades at work.... Nor is it any less complex for the secretaries of the primary party organizations and for the officials of party committee staffs. Permanent political work in the workforce and at the place of residence, briefings, evaluation of the situation, and so forth. In this direction the

party will, I am convinced, be in a position to objectively make its presence known and influence changes in society.

[Pogorelova] A question which, judging by our mail, is always of particularly sharp interest to many people: Communist ideology was created to defend the working people, the poor, and the oppressed. The slogan "Communists, in the Lead" originally meant a right to difficulties and suffering. How has it happened—and by no means only in the historical but in the personal aspect also—that the people with this ideology, the Communists, have found themselves subject to corruption and the abuse of power?

[Moroz] You straight away made a broad generalization but then made a proviso—the personal aspect....

If we are speaking specifically, we need to apply the criminal code to abuses of power. And it is of no concern to me whether this person is a Communist or not. As Vysotskiy-Zheglov said: the thief should be in prison. But generalizations cannot be made in this soil. When I am asked such a question—as I was during the election campaign—I reply: show me this corrupt individual, such-and-such a person....

[Pogorelova] Well, what is your attitude toward benefits and privileges for Communists?

[Moroz] Which, specifically?

[Pogorelova] Well, special parliamentary commissions for benefits and privileges have been formed. They know which ones.

[Moroz] Yes, and I have long advocated this: There should be no privileges. But if in my constituency such a question arises at a meeting, I say: The raykom secretary is sitting here. Name his privileges, and he will be deprived of them.

Please understand, we are experts in organizing witch hunts. How many times during the election campaign did I have to "wipe myself" (not, please excuse me, an expression for the press) of "spit" in connection with the wage increase on the eve of the elections. I am today convinced that this was done specially. I will not develop a painful subject.

But how to explain to people and, finally, the family what it means in one's 30th year of work, as a partocrat (as we have been christened), with a family of seven dependents, to obtain in Kiev wages of R310 and to barely be able to make ends meet? This for the first secretary of a large raykom....

I understand that everyone should be paid for his work. But is it a crime to pay more, having first reduced the administrative staff?

[Pogorelova] Do you, who do not yourself enjoy privileges and do not abuse power, not see alongside you party comrades who are not averse to this?

[Moroz] Such examples may be found in every segment of society. There have been and are such in the party apparatus, they are well known. Where this was possible, where it had an effect, I fought this. But if we take the ratio, the vast majority of the party apparatus is composed of decent people. They are specialists.

Today it is being said that they have rushed into commerce, they have engaged in business and are rushing there.... So might it be that if yesterday's functionary is engaging successfully in commerce, this characterizes a person's capabilities? Why have we suddenly begun to rap him over the knuckles (only in words as yet)? Could it be that this activity of theirs means that there were in the party structures people useful to society....

[Pogorelova] And how would you comment on the recently adopted Property Act? And, specifically, the question of party property, surrounding which there has been such lively debate

[Moroz] We prepared an objective law. I cannot speak about the fact that this will be beneficial to some people, and to some, not. It will be beneficial to the wise man, disadvantageous to the fool. It is always disadvantageous to the fool, incidentally, although there are instances where it is the other way around also—always beneficial to him. So the laws in the sphere of reform of the economy which we have been debating should create the conditions for realization of the capabilities of each individual

Now about party property. I am accustomed to examining everything specifically. We have gone, say, to a rayon, to my constituency—Tarasheha. Let us see what the raykom has in the way of property. A building valued at approximately R30,000—a hut. And that's all. Let us take it—because we have to nationalize. But the rayon has 3,000 Communists, and there are activists, who need to meet regularly. There is a staff of 10 persons working full-time

This year (as, I believe, everyone knows) the Ukrainian Communist Party is living on subsidies. There is not enough money to make ends meet.

This is a broad topic and concerns various party organizations. But if we are speaking about parties' production activity, I proceed here from the prerogatives of a legal entity. If the committee is a legal entity, and for exercise of the functions connected with the program and rules it has to have a garage of, say, 15 vehicles, including a truck, "mobile unit".... Plus a mechanic and fitter in the garage, all this is a production unit. It has been created by this committee and is operating—what is illegitimate about this?

[Pogorelova] Consequently, other parties, proceeding from this proposition, should have the same opportunities.

[Moroz] Undoubtedly.

[Pogorelova] But they do not have these starting opportunities. Nor is there anywhere they can obtain them. Or am I wrong?

[Moroz] Just you see with what the Communists here, in parliament, and elsewhere, are furnished. And with what our opponents. And then we will speak about starting opportunities.

[Pogorelova] Why, then, have they not supported the clause concerning the parties' production activity?

[Moroz] I believe that this is merely a form of political struggle. Today this is in the political sense advantageous, and a certain demonstration may be staged. And no more than that.

But our discussion has turned into a party debate to some extent. And I am not now, after all, a party official.

[Pogorelova] I agree. Let us then try to get away from business altogether. Tell us, please, about your family.

[Moroz] How to tell you briefly. I have a fine unhappy family. I will not go into details. It is simply that there is on the one hand everything for this family to be happy and, on the other, everything that cannot make it one.

Up to a certain time my wife was a worker. For more than 10 years she was at a machine tool, never did other work. And two daughters, now grown up and married. Two grandsons. The boys Vladislav and Yaroslav.

[Pogorelova] And you are able to devote some time to them?

[Moroz] Yes, they see me.... They see me on television.... This is a painful topic.... It is difficult for many people today. My eldest daughter has a family—both are young specialists. My son-in-law is a gifted musician and teaches music. My daughter graduated from the same faculty with him. And now with her children—they cannot be put in kindergarten because of the state of their health—works in spurts, for a part-time wage. She has a cramped room, her budget... is below what you would think possible....

And the younger lives together with her husband with us. She is a student at the pedagogical school.... It is pleasant to boast of one's children, and I also will permit myself this: My daughter is doing her practical training in school and has already been offered a permanent job....

[Pogorelova] Do you find in your children the fruits of your education?

[Moroz] You see, the tragedy of families in which the father or mother is honestly engaged in public work is that they are unduly cheated of the attention of this member of the family or the other. My attention, in this case. And the impact on upbringing depends only on personal example to some extent. It sounds idyllic, but I

often dreamed of getting home at 1900 and talking with my children—how are things in school, what did you see, what did you read?

I have a passion for books, not collecting, but I have accumulated a multitude of books, which I now view with melancholy—I feel that I will never read them. I have Tolstoy right before my eyes—you can read any page and see there simply a fellow conversationalist. Dreiser—I have some nostalgic attraction to him. I read a great deal of him as a young man.... I will not have the time. Ever. There is not enough time for fiction generally. Current affairs consumes me and jams things up: I have to know, after all, what people are talking about. I am forced to absorb all this "literature," of which, if you filter it through yourself, nothing useful remains. Then, letters. I attempt to reply to at least the most important questions, if the letter contains a return address, of course. Many simply wish to preach. And many people, neither reading nor hearing what I say, merely send curses. It is very distressing and painful....

[Pogorelova] Would it not, then, be better to leave everything and really involve yourself with books and your children and grandchildren? A person always has a choice here, after all. You, though, have condemned yourself forever, as it were, to struggle, to work....

[Moroz] A person will remain normal as long as he is capable of returning to the lowest rung from which he started. I do not fear this since I consider myself a normal person. But I have, in addition, an honest attitude toward work. I cannot be otherwise. I realize that I drove myself to this state. But my father was a carpenter. A fine specialist—in 1917 even, not then 17 years old, he had a carpenter-pattern maker certificate first quality, as they wrote then. He obtained this certificate in Tsaritsyn, where the family had fled the war from Western Ukraine.

His whole life he was endlessly doing something for people, and all for free. After all, in the village there was always someone who needed a door and furniture, something repaired and, at times, some work done for stumps uprooted for fuel. This was how it was right until his death.... This simple attitude toward work.

So, it seems to me, I am also a carpenter, only in a different workshop....

I could not be otherwise. Were I doing different work—research, say—and I had good prerequisites for this, at 17 I had a serious work on an engineering subject (physical metallurgy) published: I was a student at 16 and was head of the student scientific society—I would have given myself to it wholly and would, I hope, have achieved results. And, I am convinced, had I worked as a combine operator, I would not have been among the worst either.

[Pogorelova] So you constantly faced a choice and had an opportunity to choose your profession and career?

[Moroz] I have always had, rather, just one choice: I have given myself fully to the area of work which came within my field of vision. And have found some new approaches. It has always been creativity.

There is, of course, some reasonable limit of self-input.... But I will hardly be able to restructure myself now. I could become a carpenter once again (I have been noticing in recent years that this is still firmly implanted in me somewhere), but there also I would be some kind of "madman."

[Pogorelova] So it is not only a sense of duty that drives you. There is satisfaction from self-expression also?

[Moroz] Yes, of course.

[Pogorelova] Thanks very much for the interview.

### Ineffective Ukrainian Parliament Analyzed

91UN14254 Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 2

[Report by parliamentary correspondent Sergey Tikhov: "Without Flavoring, or, What Price the Bubbles?"]

[Text] Forgive me, dear reader, if I also start out with... prices.... But I shall only be talking about those whose "advent" we have been tensely awaiting and the size of whose increase has been discussed in detail in many published pieces. The exorbitant increases (too gentle a word!) are not just those listed in the tables that have been published, but also the increases for service, charity, a good word, political mistakes....

I beg your forgiveness for such a varied list. However, of all the examples of pillage in the convulsions of the dying System, I personally grudge the trivial things. Trivia in the direct "monetary" meaning of the word. I am talking about the labels that have been hastily attached to the automatic drink-dispensing machines this spring stating "five kopeks without flavoring." It is interesting, is it not, that ordinary, rusty-colored piped water should have become more expensive? Or is it that they have to pay a kopek more to those who service the vending machines? In truth, like a drop of water the kopek problem reflects the malevolent poverty of the economic and political system in which what is heard most loudly is: "All for the good of the individual!" and which has this individual most "in mind."

Stop! Perhaps the fivefold increase in the price of a commonplace drink of water is in the rare carbon dioxide bubbles in the glass, "bulbashki" as we call them here in the Ukraine?

On the first day after the renewal of work at the third session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, something occurred in the hall that would have been even impossible to think of a year ago! Of course, this kind of exclamation after six years of perestroika sounds like an ordinary newspaper cliché. But imagine what someone sitting in the visitors' gallery would have experienced



who, if he closed his eyes, would have been unable to decide who was speaking—a "member of the legislative body" or the representative of one of the numbered blocs. Is this not the long-awaited consensus that we have been so zealously pursuing the whole year? No, there is no sense of deep satisfaction. What is happening in the hall is not at all the result of mutual concessions but the consequence of the fatigue and impasse in which the Supreme Soviet finds itself. It is like a couple who finally are reconciled after a long-standing quarrel, not out of some pang of love but because all the crockery is broken and they must somehow go on living.

Whence, you ask, this feeling? Well, certainly not because from above, the hall with its rows of empty chairs is reminiscent of the bald patches on the field at a rural fair after the kolkhoz herds have been walking about on them. The angry attacks on the Center and its inflexible measures are, of course, justified, but they are hopelessly late and unable to change anything. Is it worth being outraged now that the price increases have exceeded even the draconian level promised? For even without this, it was clear earlier that new extortions would be wrung from people already on the brink of catastrophe.

But the saddest thoughts of all come when one thinks: Could it have been otherwise? Let us get by without the "flavoring." And then this conclusion becomes obvious: The Ukrainian parliament has produced such a number of "bubbles" and taken a certain credit of trust "out of the air", and now it has nothing with which to pay the people. The laws and decrees passed despite the long altercations, and particularly the Declaration on Sovereignty, are in and of themselves unworkable documents. But the people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR have become hostages both of the Center and its genetic neglect of the republics, and of their own habit of regarding the Declaration in the same way that they regard other declarations.

Now Supreme Soviet Chairman L.M. Kravchuk has said that halfway sovereignty cannot exist, and he has proposed that a decree be drawn up and adopted to give the Declaration on Sovereignty the status of a constitutional law. But no mention has yet been made of specific ways to achieve sovereignty itself. A great deal of time has been wasted: No specific program for the transition to the market has been adopted, there is no law on privatization, and the land question has not been resolved.

I personally do not entertain the slightest doubt that this decree will be passed. But who will be assigned to insure that some do not invent "for the soul" some kind of three-quarter sovereignty, and that others do not think it is absolute and immediate?

We should not blame the deputies for everything. The situation was foreordained at least because, with variations, it has been repeated in many other republic parliaments. But again, let us do without the "flavoring." The weakness of the Supreme Soviet lies in the weakness

of its factions. All democrats, without exception, are weak after the long years of total suppression of any kind of different thinking. They are ill-matched and poorly organized, and an electoral law has been foisted on them that essentially does not recognize the multiparty system and has put them in an unequal position. And the communists are weak for the same reason. Because by imposing their own will every time on a weak opponent, they are displaying not strength, not at all, but that same weakness. At first glance it is possible to break out of this vicious circle, or, more accurately, try to break out, by holding new multiparty elections. But only at first glance. A second glance shows that new elections, with the dispensation of fine promises and self-advertising—inevitable even in the most democratic of countries—against the backdrop of empty store shelves, terrible prices, and stony backwardness, could lead to an explosion.

Fate has given the Ukrainian parliament a final chance, and this is not some political art. It is the people.

Compared with what I saw at the Moscow meetings, the marches in Kiev on 16 and 17 March at the building of the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI editorial offices seemed like a peaceful get-together. Yes, calm reasonableness is one of the cornerstones of the Ukrainian national character. And thank God!

But recently, it seems to me, this has not been to some people's liking. It is difficult, otherwise, to explain a number of facts. It is difficult, otherwise, to understand why the "laboratory experiment" called the "Yeltsin effect" is being repeated with such pedantic zeal in the Ukraine. And if this is not so, then tell me why Stepan Khmara was arrested for a second time. And in such a "romantic" way—on the steps of an aircraft in Donetsk. And without any kind of convincing explanation, and without making known his place of detention. As a result, the Donbass miners, who initially were guarded in their attitude toward Stepan Ilkovich, wrote the demand "Free Khmara" on the strike banners, which were then seen throughout the length and breadth of the Union. Which also provoked the rejection of those who (we shall not inquire into the rights or wrongs of it) up to then had been rather afraid of the deputy from Chervonograd in Lvov Oblast.

Divide and rule? Well, they may divide, but as for ruling...

### **Kiev Student Strike Alleged To Be Fraud**

91UN1381A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 28 Mar 91, 29 Mar 91, 2 Apr 91

[Article by I. Dmytrenko under the rubric "Autumn's Events in Kiev: Scanning the Pages of Investigative Matters": "'Hetmen,' Supernumeraries, and Fees"]

[28 Mar 91 p 4]

**[Text] I. Pseudo-Students Were Recruited at Market-places**

Certainly everyone remembers the events, dramatic and filled with political tension, of October and November 1990. Especially and particularly the outrageous incident in the underground crossing at the square of the October Revolution when Colonel of the Militia Grygoryev was attacked and robbed. As millions of television viewers were able to confirm with their own eyes, S. Khmara, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, organized it, directed the actions of his entourage, and himself took direct part in these illegal actions.

The television viewers (and our readers) also noted the figure, quite indistinct at that time, of the female "victim" whom Colonel Grygoryev supposedly attacked. As events progressed she underwent some strange transformations. For example, in front of the television camera, right there in the underground crossing, she explained her appearance by the fact that a sudden stomach hemorrhage began and that she was compelled to lie down for a bit on a cot which turned up there, though no one knows how or why. Later, when the parliament required an explanation from S. Khmara concerning his participation in the attack on Grygoryev, he stated with enthusiasm from the podium of the meeting that this woman was a victim of arbitrariness. And then as an irresistible argument he cited an extract from her testimony registered in the militia's records: That this "victim" was a German citizen who was studying in Lvov and that she took part in the student "hunger strike." This, he said, is the kind of respectable person and democrat that the "attacker" Grygoryev dared to offend! Later, when this version did not stand up and, instead, reliable documented information was received to the effect that Lyubov Zhirna (the name of this woman) was a woman with a quite checkered past and had only recently been released from jail and was unemployed—S. Khmara changed his tone and his tactics. Instead of an aggressive attack from the position of a typical "defender of truth" and "champion of democracy," he took the stance of an injured party and now began to assert that L. Zhirna provoked that conflict in the underground crossing at... the instigation of the KGB(?). As a result, having profited in front of the parliament just yesterday from the testimony of a "citizen of the FRG" who was a "victim of arbitrariness" on the part of the law enforcement organs, today he is displaying her as... an "agent of the KGB."

Here we have "transformations" almost in the style of a detective novel. Unfortunately, these are not the first or the last. Well, who in fact is this L. Zhirna?

At the time of the television broadcast of the live report from the underground crossing, workers at the Dneprodzerzhinsk women's correctional labor colony recognized her. She was punished there for numerous larcenies, theft, and even robbery. She was released in 1987 (by a general pardon).

However, that was not her first offense. Back in 1980 she was punished for larceny. After having twice taken the wrong path, anyone else would have come to the appropriate conclusion. Anyone but L. Zhirna. As a confirmed idler, one might say, after her release from the colony she did not give up her habits. In short, her "trademark" was the same. Having ascertained where some old woman with a certain degree of affluence lived, she would penetrate into the woman's home under the guise of a visiting nurse and give her a strong sedative instead of medicine; and when the old woman fell asleep she robbed the house at her leisure, collecting up money, jewelry, and valuable items. This was her "quiet" racket, one that was especially abominable because it victimized vulnerable people under the mark of benevolence.

How did such a person, absolutely remote from politics, end up at the center of political events in Kiev during the period of October-November 1990? She had her reasons. As people say in such instances, a leopard does not change its spots... Especially concerning her participation in the student "hunger strike." On this occasion L. Zhirna herself testifies: **"It happened in Kherson. I heard at a market from the locals that people were agitating for a hunger strike there and that they were offering 200 rubles [R] for participants. I went up to the lead group (of agitators); there were about 10 of them. I myself called the senior person the 'hetman.' I came to an agreement with him and drove to Kiev in their car, to the square of the October Revolution, where the hunger strikers already were. I picked out a tent for myself near the edge, but the 'hetman' told me that the students would be at the edge and he indicated a tent in the center of the camp, where I established myself..."**

It is worth paying attention to this characteristic detail: They would not let the pseudo-student take a tent on the edge. This is understandable: She might give herself away under direct questioning—where does she study, in which department... **As a result, everything was thought out: In the foreground were the students, and to fill out the numbers there were supernumeraries "hired" in various cities of the republic.** In addition, the "hetman" constantly ensured that they earned their pay and their daily bread. In what way? L. Zhirna is also candid about this subject: **"In the morning the 'hetman' came to me and said that it was necessary to earn my money. I asked what my work was to be. The 'hetman' explained that it was necessary to call as many people as possible to the place where the hunger strike was being conducted. They gave me money for the trips. I rode in a bus which drove around the city and I told people, 'Come look at the hunger strikers.' Many agreed. When I drove them to the camp, I informed the 'hetman' of it. I drove out almost every day that I was at the camp and invited people to see the hunger strikers. That was the duty that the 'hetman' demanded of me. Once I even led a foreign delegation to the camp. One of its members, an elderly man who spoke Russian well, told a hunger striker, 'You could use a good spanking...'"**

As we see, there were some sober opinions concerning the "hunger strike" as well. And how true is the testimony of L. Zhirna? After all, she is quite prone to all kinds of adventures, lies, and exaggerations. I also had my doubts at first. But she was warned that she would be held responsible for giving deliberately false testimony in accordance with certain articles of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code. As a result, she had to take into consideration the fact that it was simply inconvenient for her to add new crimes to what she has already done. This means that she was compelled to tell the truth. This is what she went on to say:

**"After the end of the hunger strike the 'hetman' called me. He calculated costs for food and living expenses and said that I was to be paid R25. I said that our agreement was for R200, and that if I did not get it I would announce how they 'fasted.' I grabbed a megaphone and cried out, 'People!' But he grabbed back the megaphone and immediately gave me R200. While I was leaving the camp the 'hetman' caught up with me and said, 'You will lie down under the tanks.' I answered, 'What kind of fool do you think I am?' But he calmed me down. I asked what that would be worth. He said R200. I agreed, after which he handed me the designated sum of money."**

This money also had to be earned. This is why on 7 November 1990 L. Zhirna found herself in the underground crossing at the square of the October Revolution. There circumstances connected her with Colonel Grygoryev who, to his misfortune, reprimanded her. Everyone is familiar with the outcome...

But what tanks was the "hetman" talking about as he recruited L. Zhirna for one more action? Why was it necessary to lie under them? In time what is secret will become known. For now, it is clear that the organizers of the protest against the military parade on 7 November intended to cover the pavement of the Khreshchatik with the bodies of just such paid "kamikazes." And they themselves would have called out, "Shame!" But who in reality deserved the shame?!

(Continuation in the next issue.)

[29 Mar 91 p 2]

[Text] II. How They "Fasted"...

Indeed, how did they do it? I will cite the testimony of the participants themselves: It is more visible from the inside. Here is what L. Zhirna says: "As soon as evening came, the life of the camp (the location of the fasting students—I.D.) was different. Almost everyone there ate and drank. They brought me milk, bread, sweet tea, and hot sandwiches. I personally saw how people of gypsy background, who had arrived from Mykolayev and were in the camp as hunger strikers, were drinking vodka."

"From the tents I also heard sounds that gave me the impression of an active sex life. All the more because various girls were visiting the hunger strikers and remaining the night. Also, one of the gypsy girls said that

it was necessary afterward to examine the hunger strikers not for symptoms of starvation but for symptoms of venereal disease"...

Forgive me, respected readers, for these piquant details, but this is what it says in the official document that is the record of the investigation. I must add that other direct participants in this action also talked about the doubtful level of morality and the heightened sexual passions among a certain portion of the "hunger strikers." Incidentally, in order to shield them from possible retribution and persecution, I will not give their full names. Here, for example, is what Olena K., a student at one of Kiev's technical institutes, testifies: "Discipline in the tent city was not at the level that one would wish. I know that sexual acts took place there during the nights. I saw how the young boys visited the tents of the girls. Incidentally, from the participants themselves I heard how they shared their impressions of their sexual relations. The boys who slept with the girls told me this." In particular, Olena named Kostyantyn Sh. from Mykolayev, who was on guard at the camp. Further on she adds, "I do not know whether anyone drank at the camp, but more than once I saw that the boys from the guard were a little tipsy." And that is not all. "In addition, I should add that there were people in the camp who used drugs," says Olena K., completing her testimony. "I know this because when we were looking for a record player we arrived at the tent of the anarchists, over which hung a black banner with a red star... One of them asked, 'Is there another joint?' Someone else answered that there was, and at this point they asked if we would like to smoke hashish as well. We refused. And the tent had that characteristic odor which I know well, because at one time I hung around with drug users."

Olena, although not immediately, nonetheless deliberately joined hunger strikers (from a feeling of solidarity); but she did not like many of the arrangements existing at the camp. At first she could not understand how she could reconcile the high words about "a free Ukraine" and "democratic freedoms" by day, in public, with the debauchery at night. Or how fasting by some took place alongside drinking and drug use by other people, who for the most part were casual strangers without stable employment. Even though officially they all had the same statue—students on a hunger strike.

Olena K. was not the only one to have such doubts. The testimony of Kiev resident Valeriy G. is also characteristic. He visited the camp of the "hunger strikers" accidentally, although he also had his own interest: He will have to go into the military soon and he would like to serve his military obligation in the Ukraine, a desire which is identical with the demands of the students. It is worth paying attention to two details in his testimony.

First, the acknowledgement that "I ended up at the camp of the fasting students by accident".... And second, the mechanism by which he joined that crowd. Valeriy arrived at the camp together with a certain Sashko whom he had just met. They asked the commander of the guard

whether they could take part in the security detail. The latter answered that the job was open to anyone. Both were given permanent passes and Valeriy was issued a cotton suit while Sashko was given cotton trousers and a two-man tent. "Later he took that tent for his own. That is, when the camp dispersed they allowed everyone keep whatever they had been given. I kept the cotton suit, and Sashko kept the pants and the tent."

From this one draws at least the following conclusion. No, the donations that were collected in three-liter tins put out for that purpose would not have provided for a thousandth of what was needed to buy these warm suits and tents and then give away all of it "just because," and to feed hundreds of people for two weeks and then pay them a daily salary and funds for the trip. This means that there was something else—powerful deliberate financing for a political action planned in advance. From what sources? We already know a little. The rest will certainly come out with time...

Even then, during the days of the "hunger strike," the obvious contrast between the declarations of the coordinators of the action and the realities of the many who took part prompted one to have second thoughts. I have already talked about Olena K. Sober and direct observation of the life of the camp forced Valeriy G. to reexamine his views and opinions as well. "At first I believed that all this was a struggle for an idea. But I could not understand much of it. For example, they told me to walk around and invite people to join this action. In addition, they promised me good food and warm clothing as a gift for this. I could not understand how to connect the one with the other—that is, the organization of a so-called hunger strike and the conditions concerning food, clothing, etc.

"That is, I mean to say that there were certainly people in the camp who were fighting for something. But the majority that I saw and knew were casual people who do not care at all for any ideas. Their only reason to be in the camp was simply for a night's lodging or to sleep with someone. Girls arrived practically every night at the camp. From the conversations in the morning concerning who was with whom and what they did, I understood that they did not come to struggle for any idea... In addition, they were all given food and clothing. And for those from other cities there was money for the trip home and food. I believe that this pleased people as well and drew them to the camp."

It was such a bitter disappointment. Because his ideals were formed when he heard the "high" words. But his disillusionment increased when he himself saw what was really behind those words. Disenchantment at such a young age is not easy. But it is all the more necessary for that reason: One develops a certain immunity to the noisy phrases so prevalent among today's politicians, who speculate with all their might on the aspirations of our people for true democracy.

Certainly Andriy M. also matured after what he saw and lived through in the camp of the "hunger strikers." In search of adventure and knowledge of "adult" life, the youth came from Ochakov via Odessa to Kiev with another such "romantic," Slavko. The process of his acquaintance with Kiev led him to the camp of the "hunger strikers." There one of the organizers noticed the ragged-looking boys and asked them if they would like to help the students. They asked what they would have to do. The other gave them to understand that it is necessary to talk with some people "from a position of strength." He promised them a great amount of money for this. The boys surmised what was going on: "I said that this smacked of Article 141 of the Penal Code and that it did not suit me," wrote Andriy in his explanation.

What happened? In fact the boys were enlisted. The organizers did not succeed in making them into enforcers using their fists to settle scores—instead they were sent to sell blue and yellow banners with the picture of Bandera. They also collected signatures for the students' demands. The more signatures they got, the larger the "honorarium" they collected; but those who sent them out promised that they would get at the very least R30 per day. As you see, their generosity was notable... Nor were they stingy with regard to such a service as carrying placards with the demands of the "hunger strikers." For example, they entrusted Andriy with a huge placard "where there was something written in Ukrainian"... As for what exactly, "for" or "against" whom, the boy was not interested. They gave him the commission, and he performed it: He needed to earn the promised money. And in fact for standing with this signboard until dark Andriy was handed R50. Just like their other such supernumeraries, who did not care what they were holding. But they were paid well. Such blind simplicity! How skillfully the directors of the action and their assistants manipulated things, themselves remaining on the sidelines...

However, even those who did not trouble to look closely into the essence of the dramatic situation of those days and the political significance of the "hunger strike" nonetheless began to understand that something was amiss. Even Andriy sensed this. At the same time he began to notice things around him. He especially remembered the following: "At one point a man in a greenish-silver Mercedes drove up to the camp. He talked with some of them, stopped into a tent, and later drove off with one of the students. About an hour or two later the same car approached, and students got out of it carrying some kind of package. Later it brought several more sacks. After that they gave us stewed meat in a can and condensed milk. There was vodka and liquor in hot water bottles. In general, there was plenty of food"...

We have already surmised what kinds of sources financed the "hunger strike." From the instance cited above, it is clear that these sources included the "gentlemen" in their Mercedes automobiles...



As we have seen, people came to the camp in different ways. They "hooked" Oleg K., a worker at one of the Kiev factories, by the fact that he was morally ready for protest. Why? As an Afgantsy [Afghanistan veteran] he had been infuriated by the intention of the Kiev City Executive Committee to transfer three buildings to foreigners for hard currency. As a result he found himself in the camp of the "hunger strikers" together with several other Afgantsy who were friends of his. Oleg said, "The chief of security of the camp talked with us; they called him Taras. He told us that the camp was a mess and that people were beginning to pilfer from one another, and he asked us to set up our own security and help him impose order. We agreed, and we did not demand any payment for our work. We walked about the camp at night and ensured that no one stole or allowed in outsiders and that none of the boys slept with the girls in the tents.

"When I arrived there I was outraged by the fact that this was no camp but something more like a house of profligacy. Among the 'hunger strikers' I also saw drunks. In the underground crossings I had the opportunity to see young people with bandages on their heads with the inscription 'I am fasting,' but they were walking about and eating and drinking something. I got the impression that among the residents of the camp there were some who were genuinely fasting, but there were also many among them that were simply 'hanging on'...

I would especially like to point out to our readers the following testimony of the former soldier: "I remember an episode on the last day of the 'hunger strike.' Some fellow came up to us and said that an explosive had been brought into the camp and that it was in an attache case. We searched the entire camp, and in one of the tents we found that attache case. In it we discovered an explosive device of Italian manufacture with a mechanical arming device. We took it out and gave it to the militia. If it had exploded, no one would have been left alive on the square"...

This clearly smacks of a frightful provocation. Perhaps someone needed a great amount of blood. Another consideration suggests itself: Near the Supreme Soviet was a gasoline truck, and in the camp of the "hunger strikers" there was an explosive device. It is an ominous arrangement... Fortunately, no explosion took place. But what if the Afgantsy had not demonstrated efficiency, persistence, and professional skill? What if they had not neutralized the hellish weapon? It would have been heard all over Kiev, but the repercussions would have been heard all over the world! It is indeed worth thinking at great length about that.

(More to come.)

[2 Apr 91 p 4]

[Text] III. An Elevated Fee for the "Artists"...

Our readers already know who the "hunger strikers" are and how they "fasted" from the preceding articles, where each fact that is cited is the incontrovertible testimony of

participants and witnesses. Even the organizers and immediate coordinators of the "hunger strike" were compelled to acknowledge that much of what genuinely occurred and ensued was not at all what had been planned and desired. Taras Korpalo, the commander of the camp, spoke briefly and graphically (albeit crudely) about this when he was approached by the Afgantsy who wished to help: "Our camp is a mess"... Properly speaking, what else could they expect when they accepted anyone and everyone into their midst? However, they needed to create the impression of a "mass protest"! Hence the lack of discrimination, which Taras explained this way at the investigation: "A dilemma arose: To refuse an honest person would mean offending him, but to accept anyone meant possible unforeseen difficulties"...

And so the problem is that they accepted "anyone." O. Doniy, one of the organizers and leaders of the "hunger strike," says, "During the hunger strike no one was barred from joining the students." Further on he says, "More than 20 cities were represented in the camp, and not only Ukrainian but of other republics as well."

Doniy states that aside from the USS (the Ukrainian Student Union—Kiev) and the SB (the Brotherhood of Students—Lvov), no other organizations or parties were involved in the organization of the hunger strike. But further on he acknowledges, "Other people—youths, people's deputies, and representatives of various parties and public organizations—joined the students at various times during the hunger strike..."

You read all this and think, what is most prevalent here? The bragging and posturing of someone "privy" to politics and the aspiration to portray what is desired as reality, or that which is popularly called the devil's handiwork? Indeed, if anyone could take part in the action, was it really a student action?

As for "representatives of more than 20 cities," it is possible—who can say otherwise? Because the agitators who did the recruiting were certainly sent to more cities than just Kherson...

Doniy clearly wishes to convince someone that aside from the USS and the SB no other political forces were involved in the "hunger strike." Well then, why were "representatives of various parties and public organizations" constantly at the camp? Especially S. Khmara, who is not only a Ukrainian SSR people's deputy but also the deputy chairman of the URP (the Ukrainian Republican Party). He often visited the camp, spent the night there, and held long conversations with the leaders of the "hunger strikers." And certainly not about the weather... And at that time representatives of the URP in the parliament were constantly using the specter of the "hunger strike" to aggravate political tensions, nervousness, and instability in the Supreme Soviet. And they succeeded to a certain extent. From this it becomes clearer who genuinely was involved in the hunger strike.

in the stirring up of political confusion around it, and, of course, in those final goals which its organizers and their sponsors were pursuing.

Speaking graphically, the "hunger strike" was supposed to work as a detonator for a turn of events in accordance with the "Romanian variant." However the peaceful progress of this action did not present an occasion for the opposition's transition to decisive actions. If only something unforeseen had happened or there had been victims... And such "victims" appeared. One after another!

The confessions of L. Zhirna contain one very revealing piece of testimony: "One day in the middle of the period of the hunger strike at about 2100 they took one of the hunger strikers to intensive care. That morning I had seen him running around the camp, and in the evening he fell down. The 'first aid' service took him to the hospital... His name is Rudenko. He also said something to the effect that his father is a 'commie' and that the two of them do not get along..."

"During the night he ran into the tent in a hospital gown. Because my tent stood beside his, I heard how Rudenko told the 'hetman' that the maneuver in intensive care would cost not R200 but R1,000. I do not know whether they gave him the money. But the next day he bought himself jeans, a Turkish sweater, and sneakers."

"He did not return to the hospital, and they sent him a certificate from there. He was outraged that the certificate did not list fasting as the cause but stress..."

This piece of testimony was diligently verified. In particular, the mother of Rudenko related that Andriy came home and was completely dressed in a new "outfit." The mother asked where he had gotten it, because she knew that he does not work anywhere and she does not know where he lives and who pays for it. Andriy refused to answer and quickly left. His parents do not know where he is now. That is the type of son they have... Incidentally, at one time A. Rudenko studied at the Vinnitsa polytechnic institute, but he was expelled from the educational institution for bad grades. Now this is his way of settling scores with the authorities and society, which is a characteristic feature in the moral portrait of many of these new "fighters for democracy."

Following this first "victim," another five of the "hunger strikers" ended up in the hospital one after another. But—wonder of wonders!—hardly having arrived at the hospital, the very next morning they were already demanding that they be discharged. I acquainted myself with the official medical report, signed by the chief doctor K. Palamarchuk. It indicates that, for example, on 15 October V. Chernenko was delivered to intensive care with a diagnosis of metabolic depression. The following day, at his insistence, he was discharged in a completely normal state. That same day A. Rudenko visited there with the same diagnosis. I say "visited" because he did not even wait for the morning—he ran away and spent that very night in his tent. R. Blashkevych did not remain as an inpatient either: They

brought him in on 17 October and on the 18th he was already home. And also at his own insistence.

Most likely this is enough, because it is quite clear that their "serious condition" was not the consequence of "fasting" but of a fairly crude simulation carried out for pay. As you recall, for his "maneuver in intensive care" A. Rudenko, according to L. Zhirna, demanded R1,000. The common participants, I remind you, were promised R200 apiece. But the "artists" who were able to fake a loss of consciousness from "fasting" earned a much higher fee. After all, they were handing a trump to those who were betting on playing the "student card." And indeed, the menacing and panicky statements of some deputies from the opposition were heard in the parliament with new force: "Our children are dying there!" We now know how they were in fact dying. But at that time the majority of the members of parliament did not know it. To this very moment they do not know how ingeniously they were deceived in those days of intense political opposition.

If we are to call things by their names, then a logical conclusion emerges unambiguously just from the aforementioned testimonies of the very participants in the so-called student "hunger strike." This conclusion is that it was a carefully planned and skillfully directed act of political pressure on the parliament. In addition, it was pressure of an especially cynical nature because it crudely exploited the parental feelings of the people's deputy and feelings of humanism and charity. And in the end the members of parliament bowed to that psychological pressure.

Against this background it became possible on 17 October 1990 to adopt the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Decree "On an Examination of the Demands of the Students Who Have Been Conducting a Hunger Strike in the City of Kiev Since 2 October 1990." Since then the opposition has more than once raised the question of the fulfillment of the decree. This demand is being sounded even more insistently today.

Legal practice shows that the confession of a suspect cannot be considered reliable if it is obtained as a result of the application of psychological coercion or is the consequence of crude force. And is this not the same occasion? Looking back across time, it is obvious that the so-called student "hunger strike" was a political means of forcing the hand of the government and parliament of the republic. Crude force (the movement of the columns to the Supreme Soviet) was applied along with equally crude psychological cultivation of the people's deputies (disinformation about the delivery of "hunger strikers" to intensive care).

Thus, the "fasting" students and their, let us say, ideological-political "sponsors" considered the final action a victory. And they had certain grounds for doing so. After all, the "hunger strike" achieved prominence and put a certain psychological and political pressure on the government and the parliament. And its result was the

resignation of V. Masol, chairman of the government, and the obligation of the Supreme Soviet to examine a series of other demands. Our republic really has never seen such a thing...

But is all this the truth? The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has not talked about any victory. However, there was nonetheless a victory. A substantial victory. Political balance and wisdom of the state have been upheld, which has given us an opportunity to extinguish a severe political and social crisis. At the cost of certain concessions? Yes. But on the scale of the interests of the state and the people, the weight of the end result is incontrovertible.

As a result, the decree of the Supreme Soviet can be looked at in several ways. I would say the following: What has happened is already history. As we know, it cannot be rewritten. But it is valuable because it teaches, warns, and cautions us. In light of this, it raises the question of whether we can be obligated by what is immoral if we are truly to be a democratic, humane society.

#### Transcarpathian Separatism Examined

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[Article by O. Myshanych, doctor of philological sciences: "Who Are They? Concerning the Ideological Consequences of the Recent 'Carpathian-Ruthenianism'"]

[Text] Oleksa Myshanych, the well-known Ukrainian scholar, literature expert, and doctor of philological sciences who heads the department of ancient literature at the Institute of Literature imeni T.G. Shevchenko of the Ukrainian SSR, spoke on 23 December 1990, at the concluding session of the First Congress of the RAU (Republic Association of Ukrainian Study) on the subject "Ideological Consequences of Recent 'Carpathian-Ruthenianism.'" His report offered a diligent analysis of the development, with assistance from outside, of separatist "forces" in the Transcarpathian Ukraine. For example, a Society of Ruthenians, headed by V. Tomchaniy (son of the well-known Ukrainian author) has been founded in Uzhgorod. Toward the end of last year his deputy V. Fedinshynets (a Ukrainian poet) travelled to Prague where he supposedly "had a meeting of minds" with some people, who were not so very far from leftist political circles, interested in separating Transcarpathia from the Ukrainian SSR. The Society of Ruthenians uses a mimeograph machine to publish the newspaper OTCHYY KHRAM (editor I. Popovich), as well as the newspaper KARPATSKIY KRAY, which is officially considered the organ of the Uzhgorod city soviet; its editor is I. Dolgosh, a member of the SPU [Ukrainian Writers Union], and the special correspondent is I. Petovtsiy (also a member of the SPU). Both newspapers came out for the first time on the eve of the New Year holiday, and both printed the so-called "Declaration of the Ruthenians..."

We publish the article on this subject by O. Myshanych.

The same processes are taking place in Transcarpathia that are taking place throughout all of the Ukraine: There is a continuing struggle for the national and cultural renewal of the region and for the construction of a social community. Public organizations have been created: Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika], the Ukrainian Language Society, "Memorial," and "Prosvita," together with the scholars of the Uzhgorod University, are joining forces to establish there a Ukrainian model of culture, preserve their distinctiveness, and provide for objective illumination of the truth about the historical past of Transcarpathia. Everything is being done to eliminate the consequences of those numerous deformations of the cultural, economic, ecological, and demographic spheres which a totalitarian system created there across 45 years of Soviet power.

At the same time, forces are arising that are trying to break up the unity of the Ukrainian people of Transcarpathia, wrest them from the Ukraine, and create a separate ethnic group which supposedly has a claim to a separate state formation—an autonomous republic of Carpathian Ruthenia—which vacillates between Russian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak orientations and considers itself a separate people—Carpathian Ruthenians—who have nothing in common with the Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Naturally it is a question not of the entire population of the oblast, but rather of a small group of the creative and quasilliterate intelligentsia which is diligently creating an anti-Ukrainian lobby and is stirring up the local population in the Ukraine and among Ukrainians, especially Galicians with their activity in the struggle for Ukrainian statehood.

On 17 February 1990, without any advance preparation in the press, there was a constituent assembly of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians in Uzhgorod. With lightning speed, on 20 February it was registered with the oblast executive committee as the "oblast's cultural and educational Society of Carpathian Ruthenians," which entailed very vague tasks with the broadest possible profile.

Exploiting popular and ethnographic Ruthenianism and the willingness of the local Ukrainian population to refer to itself by the historical title of "Ruthenians," the leaders of the society very quickly forgot about their "cultural and educational" tasks: No one has managed to find any trace of their cultural activities. They were not in the least interested in the "restoration of the history, culture, and customs of the Ruthenians, as well as the right to one's own language for the entire population of Transcarpathia," as the statute says.

The true goals of the previously innocent "cultural and educational Society of Carpathian Ruthenians" appeared later: On 29 September 1990, the "Declaration of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians for the Return of the Transcarpathian Oblast to the Status of an Autonomous Republic" was adopted at a meeting of the "board." Thus the "board," which is made up of several people, arrogated to itself the right to adopt and publish

this fairly crucial document. But in whose name? In the name of the 1.5 million-strong population of Transcarpathia, about 70 percent of whom are Ukrainians? Who gave the "board" the authority for such a "declaration?"

The essence of the "declaration" is to gratuitously deny the validity and legality of all legislative acts of the supreme soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR in 1945-1946 reuniting the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine and to recognize as legal and valid only the Munich decision of Germany, Italy, France, and England, of 29-30 September 1938, on the dismemberment of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the creation, in consequence of this, of an autonomous Carpathian Ruthenia as part of that same Czechoslovakia on 8 October 1938. As we see, more than 50 years later the "board" of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians yearned for the consequences of the "Munich conspiracy": It is preparing to revise even the results of World War II and the interstate treaty between the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

*Proof of the ideological orientation of the "declaration" is eloquently provided by the fact that it does not say a single word about the Carpathian Ukrainian state created on legal grounds at the will of the Ukrainian people of Transcarpathia after the inglorious fall of the "autonomous Carpathian Ruthenia" and the arrest of its leader—A. Brodyy, a spy of then-fascist Hungary—by the Czechoslovaks. Today's "Ruthenians" do not consider the statehood of Transcarpathia and its historical development pertinent at all, and they do not consider or recognize Ukrainian statehood.*

*Then what is hidden behind the facade of this latest "Carpathian Ruthenianism?" What are its consequences? For whom is it necessary today? Who is acting as the ideological proponent of this aggressive Ukrainophobia? Is it such an urgent necessity to make the Ukrainian people of the Transcarpathia into an ethnic group, return them to the times of foreign social and national subjugation, and lock them in their own "Ruthenian ghetto?" And are the true Carpathian Ukrainians a separate people who have nothing in common with the entire Ukrainian people and who wish to return to the level of 1938, if not to the conditions of old Austria-Hungary?*

*In the first place we need to speak candidly about those difficulties that trouble the people of Transcarpathia, give rise to their dissatisfaction with the existing totalitarian system, and evoke a wish to tear themselves from the iron embrace of their "liberators" and live a normal life. The unprecedented robbery of the natural resources of the region and the felling of the remnants of the forests continue. Unemployment has reached previously unseen dimensions: Over 300,000 of the region's able-bodied population are seeking work throughout the entire Union, enduring the scornful nickname of "moonlighters." In their place tens of thousands of people from other regions of the country seeking an easy living are systematically settling there every year, and they are sharply changing*

*the infrastructure of the oblast, oppressing the local population by assigning it a secondary role in society, and despising their language, traditions, and culture. The false slogans of "internationalism" and "friendship of the peoples" in fact conceal accelerated Russification of the oblast which embraces all spheres of daily existence and public, cultural, and educational life. The distinctive features of cultural and historical traditions have been reduced to a minimum, monuments of culture are being ruined, and the second-class status of the local population is practically accepted as a doctrine ("This is a nice place to live, but for some reason there are an awful lot of locals")*

All these and dozens of other troubles are giving rise to opposition by the people and their wish to find a solution to the impasse, to affirm themselves, and to halt the economic, ecological, and ethnic genocide. Within these troubles is concealed the bacillus of Ruthenianism in accordance with which a certain part of the people, in order to rescue themselves from dissolution in the sea of the "Soviet people," are prepared to renounce Ukrainianism and hide in the nook of "Carpathian Ruthenianism" without being aware that the troubles of Transcarpathia are also the troubles of all of the Ukraine and that it is necessary to fight them together. It is necessary to painfully acknowledge that the Ukraine has not been a good mother to the Transcarpathian Ukrainians, who were attached to it in 1945. But that is not the Ukraine's fault: It too suffocated in the clutches of Stalinism and endured the bloody bacchanalias of collectivization, famine, repressions, economic robbery, and extermination of culture. It would be criminal to reproach today's Ukraine for its failure to reunite Transcarpathia—it did all that it could. And the attempts of a certain portion of the population to escape today from the Ukraine, to reject its language, culture, and history and go into the service of alien gods can only be called national apostasy and deliberate betrayal. One can understand popular Ruthenianism. It has its own deep roots in the people's consciousness, it maintains the historical traditions of its ancestors, and it rescues monuments of culture from forgetfulness and destruction; but it does not have anything in common with political Ruthenianism, which cannot mask its servitude to an imperial ideology with phrases about autonomy.

The anti-Ukrainian and Rusocentric orientation of the program of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians is apparent. But it is naive to think that it is truly a question of the creation of a separate Ruthenian state or of the "triumph of the justice" of the rulings of the Munich agreement of 1938. Even if the "board" of the Society threatens to appeal to the United Nations as the "predecessor(?) of the League of Nations" [as published] to "monitor" its ruling and acknowledge as valid the provisions of the Saint-Germain and Trianon peace treaties of 1919 as well, this has nothing in common with the opinion of the entire population of Transcarpathia, which recognizes the well-known Helsinki agreement on borders established after World War II. Only irresponsibility, a lack of basic political culture, and crudity can



explain such casual manipulation of the Munich agreements of 1938, which were in fact supported by the forces of "world evil." These very forces of "world evil" had a very great influence on the Transcarpathian Ukraine and caused it so much sorrow at the end of the thirties and forties. In the light of this the "board" of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians wittingly or unwittingly is performing the role of a Trojan horse and is conducting a shameful effort directed at the disintegration of existing political and cultural structures and traditions despite its false statements about preserving traditions.

*The new Carpathian Ruthenianism can be compared to the habit of some Ukrainians of considering themselves merely "Little Russians," which cannot be a positive habit because its true calling is not to build but to destroy. This ethnic devaluation also has a long tradition and is a tradition of imperial multiethnicity—whether in the Russian empire or in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The present name of this phenomenon is "internationalism," behind whose screen are those same imperial and none-ethnic ambitions.*

*The question of "Carpathian Ruthenianism" cannot exist today by itself, as something local and amorphous. This is an imperialist doctrine which comes from the middle of the 19th century, reached its apogee in Transcarpathia in the twenties and thirties, and has been revived today as one of the means of fighting the Ukrainian people, their statehood, and all progressive, democratic forces. It can only be examined in one context: To be or not to be for the Ukrainian people and a Ukrainian state.*

*Transcarpathian "Carpathian Ruthenianism" has its own shameful traditions that began back in 1926 with its program document—the brochures called "The People's Catechism"—which confidently assert that "Russian and Ruthenian mean the same thing," that "our main enemies are the Communists or the Bolsheviks," who "betrayed the Russians into the power of the Jews," that "Ukrainians are the next enemies of the Russian people after the Communists," and that "there is no Ukrainian language just as there is no Ukrainian state" (pages 2-7). With the course of time all these revelations have undergone certain changes and clarifications, but the conviction that Ruthenians are a "Russian people" and that "there are more than 100 million of all Russians" has remained unchanged. [preceding quotations published in Russian]*

*Today's "Ruthenian," like the "Little Russian," diligently fulfills the "social order" of his master. He is not against flaunting the democratic embellishments of his region, but his political apathy on the national level is not disguised and he is prepared to sell his region to a powerful neighbor. True, "Carpathian Ruthenians" do not have unity and orient themselves alternately toward Moscow, Prague, and Budapest, but not toward their own people. The medicine for such an illness can only be our own Ukrainian state; but a slavish psychology sends those who practice evil in another direction, to a stronger*

*master, under whose wing there is a state structure that, even if it is foreign, is already established.*

There is nothing new and mysterious in the declaration, which is primitive and composed of positions that contradict history, on the new "autonomous republic of Carpathian Ruthenia." The center still needs one dependable "window on Europe." The Transcarpathian Oblast is just such a window. There is active preparation underway for a "free economic zone" that has been announced here and that stipulates not only complete "internationalization" of the region but no less complete robbery of its natural resources by various "joint" ventures and its settlement by all those "highwaymen" that have felt an inclination for commerce and acquisition. But as everyone knows, all joint ventures that promise hard currency are subordinate to the center; and the Ukraine, as an independent province, even though its declaration of sovereignty is only on paper, can be an obstacle to this international bargaining. There is one solution: To remove Transcarpathia from the jurisdiction of the Ukraine and, by virtue of the rights of autonomy, join Russia. In this manner, the new "window on Europe" will have its own Union master without any encroachments on its future hard currency wealth on the part of the Ukraine. The "board" of the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians is sacrificing the national interests of its own people in favor of the imperial plans of the center. This is why all the backstage maneuverings of this shameful antipeople and anti-Ukrainian farce about an "autonomy of Carpathian Ruthenians." In its anti-Ukrainian policies the apparatus is reanimating forces of very doubtful value.

Is the indigenous Ukrainian (formerly: Rusyn) population of Transcarpathia really so ignorant of national issues that it renounces its nationality with a light heart and is prepared to enter with its eyes closed into the creation of a new "Ruthenian ghetto?" Not at all! The entire centuries-long history of the Transcarpathian Ukrainians proves that they have developed as a single united structure with the entire Ukrainian people, especially with Galicia. Here the process of national self-awareness was completed later, at the end of the thirties, but its path was historically justified and legitimate. It was not imposed on them from the outside by anyone. The creation of the Carpathian Ukraine in 1939 with its law on the Ukrainian language was the natural consequence of the development of the national consciousness of the population of the region, which had its own distinctive features and was a manifestation of the inner forces and desires of the people.

In his well-known 1930 essay "Land Without a Name," Czechoslovak author Ivan Olbrach noted that "those living in the Carpathians are not yet a people but only an ethnographic mass," and that "a struggle is underway there which should group the ethnographic mass of the Ruthenian population into a people and give it a name." This name became the name of the Ukraine, at which the Transcarpathians arrived even before the establishment there of Soviet power. Having lived in Transcarpathia

for a long time in the thirties, I. Olbrach noticed that "Ruthenian and Ukrainian are nothing but two names for one and the same people. The residents of Lemko, Boyko, and Hutsul are Ukrainians." As a result he firmly stated that "Carpathian Ruthenia is becoming Ukrainian." Here are only the most basic stages of that path by means of which the national self-awareness of the Transcarpathians progressed from Carpathian Ruthenians to Transcarpathian Ukrainians.

Before World War I, the people of Transcarpathia, which called themselves Ruthenians, really were a rather amorphous ethnographic mass belonging to Austria-Hungary and who were known in the scientific literature under the names of "Hungarian Ruthenians," "Hungarian Russians" [published in Russian], "Carpathian Rusyns" [published in Russian] (together with the Galicians and Bucovinians), "Greek Catholic Magyars," "Hungarian Rusyns," etc. The majority of respected scholarly historians, philologists, and ethnographers considered this people to be a part of the Ukrainian people or of a "southern Russian tribe" [published in Russian]. For instance, Yu. Venelin called his countrymen "Russian Hungarians" [published in Russian] and believed that they settled here from Podolia in the 16th century together with Prince Fedor Koryatovich. Andriy Deshko, another ethnographer from Russia and an emigrant from Transcarpathia, also maintained this opinion, never doubting that "the Carpathian Russian people are a branch of the southern Russian people" ("The Kievan," Moscow, 1850, page 26). M. Drahomanov, M. Pavlyk, V. Lukych, I. Franko, I. Verkh-ratsky, V. Hnatyuk, Ya. Holovatsky, H. Kupchanko, M. Voznyak, and V. Shchurat, famous Ukrainian scholars of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, considered the people of Transcarpathia to be Ukrainian and their language, culture, and literature to be Ukrainian as well.

In 1896, Yu. Zhatkovych, the authoritative Hungarian and Ukrainian historian, ethnographer, and translator, declared unequivocally that the Ruthenians of Hungary "belong to the Little Russian people." And in 1908, Ivan Brashchayko wrote: Hungarian Ruthenia is a "small portion of the Ukrainian-Rusyn people" ("The Sitch," Anthologies, Lvov, 1908, page 186).

After the end of World War I and the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Ruthenian people of Transcarpathia reached out to their brothers to the East. The rulings of the Starolyubovnya, Svalyava, Maramorosh-Sygit, and Khust People's Councils of 1918-1919 were unanimous: To unite Transcarpathia with the Ukraine. Historically it happened that Transcarpathia was united to the newly created Czechoslovakia in 1919, but its journey to the Ukraine did not stop with that. T. Masaryk and Ye. Benesh, the political leaders of the republic at that time, acknowledged that the Transcarpathians belong to the "Little Russian people" but expected that the two borders between Transcarpathia and the Ukraine would always separate it from the Ukraine and that it would gradually be assimilated and

become Czech. These factors dictated postponement of the promised autonomy and a ban on using even the terms "the Ukraine" and "Ukrainian."

But the ethnic mass gradually began to consider itself a people: The Ukrainian literary language with its phonetic orthography was accepted, a new Ukrainian literature grew and gathered strength, and a Ukrainian national consciousness gathered strength among the people. The first congress of the youth of Transcarpathia, which took place on 7 July 1929, stated, "We declare to the entire cultural world, that we, Carpathian Ruthenians, are a part of the great Ukrainian people and that our language and our literature were, are, and will be the same as that of our brothers on the other side of the Carpathians." Five years later the second congress of Ukrainian youth took place in Mukachevo, and 9,650 people took part. The resolution from the congress said, "The congress rejects with indignation the deceitful attempts...to artificially make our population into some kind of separate 'Carpathian nation,' because the Carpathian foreland is settled by a portion of the great Ukrainian people" (PROBOYEM, Prague, 1934, No. 7, page 101).

*Today one must take into consideration these proclamations and statements: They testified to the growth of the national consciousness of the local population, which gradually truly awakened from a deep sleep and proclaimed its existence not as a separate ethnic group but as a part of the entire Ukrainian people.*

*The most complete and most convincing Ukrainian national consciousness in Transcarpathia was manifested in 1937 in the preparations for the All-Prosvita Congress in Uzhgorod. Over 20 political parties, unions, societies, and editorial boards of journals and newspapers supported the "Manifesto of the Ukrainian People of the Carpathian Foreland," which declared the Ukrainian national identity of the population of Transcarpathia and formulated its cultural and national demands. Here are several paragraphs from this important document:*

*"We voluntarily joined the Czechoslovakian republic and we are loyal citizens of our democratic state—but in language and cultural matters we were and will be a part of the great 50-million-strong Ukrainian people and we will never repudiate this popular and cultural unity of ours."*

*"In our schools we wish to learn our own language, which is Ukrainian"*

*"There is no doubt that in Carpathian Ruthenia two peoples do not exist. There are no 'Russians' [published in Russian] and there are no 'Carpathian Rusyns.' There is only one Ukrainian people. Therefore one language, one culture, and one orthography belong to the one people."*

*The Communist Party joined all the progressive and democratic organizations of the region which signed the "Manifesto." At the congress of the society "Prosvita" that*

took place in Uzhgorod on 17 October 1937. O. Borkanyuk gave the great speech "Culture Belongs to the People!" He condemned the linguistic conflicts that had been provoked and those reactionary forces that "inflamm nationalist discord and use Russophilism for their own reactionary goals." O. Borkanyuk clearly and unambiguously stated, "We, the Communists, jointly with all of you at this congress, protest the forced inculcation in our schools of so-called Russian textbooks, and we desire that our children study their maternal language in the schools, that is, Ukrainian!"

As a result, Transcarpathia even before its liberation and unification with the Soviet Ukraine in 1945 was Ukrainian, which also was emphasized by legislative acts of the Carpathian Ukrainian state in March 1939. This was a natural process without pressure from the Soviet Union or Polish-Austrian "intrigues." It was not a smooth process, taking place in an arduous duel with the enemies of Ukrainianism and in a struggle for the establishment of a great Ukrainian Truth beyond the Carpathians.

The population of Transcarpathia paid dearly for its Ukrainianism during the time of the Hungarian-Fascist occupation of the region in 1939-1944, and the process became irreversible. In 1945, Transcarpathia became part of the USSR, but the problem was not solved: Deformations of political, economic, cultural, and religious life tied the knot of conflicts even tighter and has today reanimated the ghost of Carpathian Ruthenianism and sowed discord among a single people.

There is no doubt that the model of the culture of Transcarpathia is a Ukrainian one. The achievements of Ukrainian culture and literature in Transcarpathia are indisputable. The development of the literary language took place in a way that is traditional for Western Ukrainian lands—from ancient Ukrainian via "dialect" [yazychiye] and Russian to a Ukrainian literary language. The existing popular language has been studied sufficiently and attributed to southwestern dialects of Ukrainian on a scientific basis. The threats of leaders of the "Carpathian Ruthenians" to create a new "Ruthenian" literary language, which according to their predictions should also become a "state" language, is surprising by the very fact that the question is raised at all. All of historical experience shows that the alternative to the Ukrainian literary language in Transcarpathia cannot be a separately created artificial "Ruthenian Language" but rather Russian, which is forcibly imposed on all spheres of daily life and has practically no support from the local Ukrainian population because of that population's passivity and secondary standing in society. The struggle around the artificially created problem of "Carpathian Ruthenianism," a separate "Ruthenian" people, and its "Ruthenian" language only hastens the process of Russification of the oblast and transforms it into a faceless locality with a relic of a former "local population" if it isolates itself from the Ukraine.

*The consequences of "mass agitation efforts" of the Carpathian Ruthenians can only be perceived as anecdotal. Some people and their zealous supporters of an "autonomous republic of Carpathian Ruthenia" have already given credence to their own state independence and apparently, without having received appropriate "instructions," have thrown themselves on the Russian liberators in the heat of the moment, proposing to them, "Drop everything you've taken from us and go back to Russia!" It is difficult to foresee when the "immediate secession of the Carpathian region from the USSR" will take place, as the anonymous leaflets in the name of the mythical "independent Carpathian region" heatedly proclaim, but one thing is clear: That these outcries are inspired by tried and true methods of provocation.*

There is much talk today about the fate of Ukrainian Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as about the support of "Carpathian Ruthenianism" by Carpathian Rusyn communities in the United States and Canada. Ruthenians and Ukrainians in Yugoslavia, as well as Ruthenian Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, and people from the Lemko region in Poland, whose fate at one time was closely tied with that of the Carpathian Ruthenians, have their own models of cultural development today. They are all tied by a single historical and cultural tradition, but our agitated times contribute more to their separation than to their unification. This factor must be taken into account. Old Carpathian Rusyn communities in America and Canada can help the Society of Carpathian Ruthenians financially but cannot share new ideas with them inasmuch as their model of "Carpathian Ruthenianism" has lagged behind modern conditions of life in Transcarpathia by more than 50 years. Today's Transcarpathian difficulties are not pertinent to that model, and its intellectual potential no longer has a "Carpathian Rusyn" orientation.

That Transcarpathian intelligentsia which left the region at the end of the thirties and the beginning of the forties and now occupies a prominent position in the university community in the United States and Canada has grown more active recently in the United States and Canada. On 13-15 July 1990, there was a conference of emigres from Transcarpathia in the town of Keyn [as transliterated] which adopted a special statement on the affairs of Transcarpathia. The Third Congress of Transcarpathian Ukrainians in diaspora took place on 19-21 October in Toronto. Both the conference and the congress support today's revival of Transcarpathia and desire to do everything possible to establish economic, cultural, and religious ties with the home region. A Coordinating Council has been formed which will promote ties between Transcarpathia and various societies and institutions of the Transcarpathian emigration. Both the conference and the congress opposed political Ruthenianism in Transcarpathia and condemned attempts to artificially create a new "Ruthenian people," as well as those who inspire and sponsor a new "Carpathian Ruthenianism" in the United States and Canada. These documents and the political opinions offered in them must be taken into

account. They point out that the new "Carpathian Ruthenianism" is not only the origin of the contentious internal development of Transcarpathia but also has its ideological authors among "the enemies of Ukrainian revival" far beyond the Ukraine. The conference and the congress acted as the initiators of an international symposium to be conducted in August 1991 in Uzhgorod entitled "Ukrainian Carpathia: Ethnicity, History, and Culture."

The present-day arrangement of political forces in the Ukraine, the broad attack on democratic forces, and the general Ukrainophobic stance of the society are contributing to the resurrection of a ghost from the past—"Carpathian Ruthenianism"—which is being used as one of the effective means of struggling against democratic forces and against the revival of Ukrainian culture and the establishment of Ukrainian statehood. Its insidiousness lies in the fact that it is well camouflaged: Behind the painted decoration are concealed bad intentions dictated by the forces of world evil and rapacious imperial greed.

#### National Assimilation Policy in Crimea Detailed

91UN13181 Kiev LITERATURNI UKRAINY  
in Ukrainian 14 Feb 91 p 7

[Article by Vitaliy Radchuk: "Caution: Chauvinism!"]

[Text] **Divide and Conquer**

At present, the future of the Ukraine is not being determined by the parliament, which from its own sanctuary is being disparaged, or rather, having its nose rubbed in reality, by General Moiseyev, in the same way as was done by Mrs. Thatcher. The basic political question—whether the Ukraine is to be or not be a sovereign state—is now being decided in the Crimea, and this not through the will of those people of the Ukraine who, through their toil on the peninsula, feed and pamper more than one local elite.

The Crimea is perhaps the most convenient ideological reservation, a little preserve of Stalinism-Brezhnevism, or a neo-colonial watchtower sitting on the head of the inert, fatalistic Ukrainian nation, much calmer and warmer than, let us say, the former Koeningsberg, which has suddenly become a kind of Port-Arthur.

Up to now, apart from official and not so official dachas in the Crimea, the imperial center did not have and did not demand to have under its jurisdiction any individual territory: in any case, everything belonged to it. But now that it has realized that it can be asked to leave, even from Moscow, or have its rights limited like those of the British queen and her entourage, there has arisen an urgent need to have a nice little piece of land as an ideological fortress, a sixteenth republic-party, a papal state under the blessed sky of Eastern Europe.

The Crimea is a precedent, the corner stone of the revived empire. Having to the north a dismembered

federal Ukraine made up of several New Russias, one can even manage without tearing away her umbilical cord, to create a new Perekop, by simply changing ideological bullion into silverware and cruisers for the Black Sea fleet, a fleet that will take its oath in a foreign language, and not in the language of the mothers of the Ukraine, which, without Sebastopol and the Navy, will forever remain an underdeveloped coastal colony and the shame of Europe before the inhabitants of Papua, who already have their sovereign maritime state.

The Crimea—and this was understood not only by the princes of Kievan Rus-Ukraine, but also the ancestors of Mrs. Thatcher and of General Moiseyev—is the Ukraine's key out of the Black Sea, her exit into Europe and the world. It is not Yeltsin's Russia which wants the Crimea for herself; it is the "one and indivisible" that longs to keep it.

In the official language, this is termed "raising its status" to the level of a "legal entity of the USSR and participant of the Union treaty." The handwriting here is the same as in Moldova. What is at issue here, of course, is an agreement "between the republics and the Center" and not simply "among the republics."

An excuse was found—the revival of the Crimean ASSR in connection with the return of the Tatars. But in that case, why not talk of Tatar autonomy, rather than Crimean? As to what kind of autonomy it was (completely Stalinist!), and how it came to exist on the territory of the Ukraine (economically) and Russia (legally), is passed over in silence: as though Crimea had not earlier belonged to the Ukrainian state, as though it had not been annexed (whether by the Whites or the Reds makes no difference for international law), as though the Crimean oblast committee had appeared out of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine all by itself or by some kind of miracle. . . . But no secret is made of the fact that autonomy is necessary in order to cancel the 1954 decree about the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine and to have a free hand to completely eradicate everything Ukrainian on the peninsula, everything that remains there as a living reproach to the destroyers. Why in particular things Ukrainian should be eradicated is not difficult to determine from geography and history: in any case, that which is related is always devoured most easily and with the greatest brutality. And just in case of need, there is a simpler formula: if the Ukraine leaves the Union, we remain. You ask: "in Union with whom?" "With nobody. In Russia." The Union is not a union of anyone, but a state which was "forever (!) united by Great Russia." One must not be late for the parade of sovereignties!

The Crimea is needed by the center in order to blackmail the Ukraine. What else can be used to turn back the pages of history?

When, in 1945, the Crimean ASSR was made an oblast of Russia, the argument concerning "Tatar betrayal" did not make any sense: even before that the Crimea was not



an autonomous Tatar region, but only the private beach and the empire's cruiser, moored next to the Ukraine. The Act of 1954 was, in essence, an acknowledgement of, on the one hand, imperial colonial expansionism and the artificiality and absurdity of attaching overseas Crimea to Russia in 1921 and, on the other, the "commonality of the economy, territorial closeness and close economic and cultural links" of the Crimea with the Ukraine. The Act was not in the least a present to mark the anniversary of the Pereyaslav treaty, as stated in the official separatist propaganda in the Crimea, which counts on the shortsightedness and naivete of the man in the street. In fact, in order to avoid provoking the geese, the metropolis used the Crimea to "settle accounts" with the Ukraine for the rayons of the Chernigov oblast and Slobodzanshchyna that became part of the present-day Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod and Voronezh oblasts, along with large Ukrainian populations, for Taganrog and the surrounding Azov region, which had been officially part of the Ukraine (now in the Rostov oblast), for tens of millions of Russified Ukrainians in Kuban, Upper Volga, Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Far East. In the northern Caucasus alone, there were 3.8 million Ukrainians (that's two-and-a-half times as many as presently in Estonia)—and where are they? All have been registered as Russians. Recently, school atlases have stopped portraying this enormous region as Ukrainian-speaking, although it still is, in spite of massive closings of Ukrainian schools there before the war.

B. Yeltsin, expressing the will of democratic Russia, has flatly refused to enter into any reconsideration of state boundaries, because he well understands that mutual territorial claims cannot lead to anything good. But there is also another Russia, which identifies herself with the single and "untouchable" Union and its center, which does not give a damn about any treaty between two sovereign states; in the Crimea, there are whole settlements of "Yakutzoloto" "Tiumennafta" and other Union super industries, departmental subsidiaries and the like, which, during the last two years alone, have been granted 260,000 land lots for individual construction. Let the Tatars wait! And if they try to settle without authorization, let them experience the taste of clubs. The authorities will only benefit from that. For a large resettlement of voters is taking place, "their own people" and others, and this, as is known, is a prerogative of state policy. After the war, the population of the Crimea grew from 350,000 to 2.6 million; until 1978, migration was officially stimulated by organized recruitment. After the war, the empty steppes and valleys were populated and worked by people from Poltava, Cherkassy, Kursk. And they happily swallowed up fertile spots on the coast. The resettlement from Siberia and the North, SOVETSKII KRYM tells us (November 18, 1990), was suspended in 1986.

#### Internationalism or Russification?

We are in favor of an international republic, the pro-centrist separatists beat their breasts; we do not need a state bearing the name of any particular nation. And for

that reason, they do not allow the arriving Tatars to settle close together, the Tatars who dream of the rebirth of their own state as a guarantee of their national and cultural development. For that reason, they raise the specter of overall Ukrainization of the Crimea, declaring an "inter-ethnic war" as is being done, for example, by the people's deputy of the Ukrainian SSR, the writer V. Terekhov: "The Russians, without having gone anywhere, while in their own motherland (that's a phenomenon), are becoming a foreign-speaking diaspora that is deprived of rights. The persecution of the Russian language, which has not been granted any status, which is supposedly extra-legal, the persecution of the Russian language in all spheres, including the parliament, will inevitably end with the Russians, and even all Russian speakers, being physically pushed out."

One might get the impression that in the Crimea, all cinemas and all TV channels show only Ukrainian-language films, that all the newspapers—at the oblast and rayon levels—are published exclusively in Ukrainian, that the radio broadcasts only in Ukrainian (there was, in fact, a broadcast of 15 minutes per week, but they could not wait for the internationalizing referendum; they closed it down), that all schools and kindergartens in the Crimea are uniformly Ukrainian. Did the writer-deputy find even a single Russian colonist in the Crimea or a like-blooded descendant of permanent settlers, who has become so Ukrainized that he declares a language other than Russian as his native language? Rather than comparing the number of Ukrainian state schools in Russia (where more Ukrainians live than Georgians in Georgia) with the number of Russian state schools in the Ukraine and considering soberly why it is not acceptable to speak Ukrainian in the Russian parliament, although every tenth person in Russia has a Ukrainian surname, and simply try to fathom the tragedy of the singing nation which has had its tongue cut off, in order for another to be sewn on (who, having lived through this, would want to do the same thing to someone else?), V. Terekhov almost chokes in his chauvinistic fever: "They are attacking our people!" Let us repel this onslaught of Ukrainians, of whom there are too many in the Crimea: "Having been granted the gift, Kiev undertook activity which resulted in many migrants from the Ukraine, including Western Ukraine, appearing among the Crimean population, and in the administration, the percentage of Ukrainians increased sharply." There's not enough room; the Russifying mill is not working fast enough. And for that reason, autonomy is not sufficient for V. Terekhov; he wants Russia to exist wherever he might settle. But his Russia, Terekhov's, not Sakharov's or Yeltsin's. That is why the title of his article in the KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA of December 12, 1990, calls for repartition: "Another Step is Needed." This, you see, is the law of the colonizer; national justice is synonymous with his own comfort. But there are some other people here. . . . Still, what kind of Ukrainians can there be in the Crimea—there are only "migrants." V. Terekhov himself admits that the Crimean population "during the time of the transfer was basically already

Russian." Already! For earlier, it had not been. According to the "Ukrainian Encyclopedia" of 1926, there were, in the Crimea, 28 percent Russians, 25 percent Ukrainians, 20 percent Tatars (out of a population of 714,000); but if we look in the book "Multi-Ethnic Crimea: Questions and Answers" (TAVRIYA 1, 1988), on page 64, we will learn that already in 1921 the Crimea had no Ukrainians at all: Russians—51.5 percent, Tatars—25.9 percent, Jews—6.86 percent, Germans—5.88 percent, Greeks—3.31 percent and so on. What happened to the Ukrainians who, according to the Crimean Khanate census of 1666, as evidenced by the travelling Turkish historian, E. Chelebi, numbered 920,000 out of a population of 1,120,000? They were registered as Russians, in order to increase the proportion of Russians to 51.5 percent.<sup>2</sup>

No secret is made of this wonder: the book "The Crimean ASSR 1921-1945" (TAVRIYA 3, 1990, p. 101) tells us: "The census of 1921 included them (Russians and Ukrainians—V.R.) as a single ethnic group." And yet, it is known from historical sources that in the second half of the 19th century, when the massive settlement and economic mastery of the Crimea began, tens of thousands of peasants who had been resettled from Russia escaped back home, while the Ukrainians got used to the steppes and remained; reliance was made basically on them. In MOLOD UKRAYINY of December 26, 1990, H. Okolko provided the following data taken from the Simferopol state archives: out of 50,000 state peasants from Tobolsk province, almost all ran away. So it is no surprise that on the dialect map of 1914, prepared by the Imperial Academy of Sciences, scattered throughout the Crimea was only the "Little Russian dialect" (see the insert in the book by K.F. Zakharova and V.G. Orlova, "The Grouping of Dialects of the Russian Language According to Linguistic Geography," Prosveshchenie, 1967).

The pseudo-census of 1921 had a truly historical significance. It was the basis for the declaration of the Russian language as the official language of the Crimea, along with Tatar. The Ukrainian language did not receive such official protection (although it needed it much more), and the Crimean ASSR did not become Tatar, but was given to Russia, which was, in essence, a repetition of the colonial seizure: a whole people, which did not have another motherland anywhere else, was deprived of the right to self-determination.

Isn't it all simple? Demography can do a lot!

In fact, in the Crimean ASSR, where in 1930 for show they even established a Ukrainian national rayon, behind the scenes the cynical 1863 decree of Valuev was being applied, which stated that Ukrainians themselves "demonstrate very clearly that there never was, is not and never can be a Little Russian language, and that the speech which is practised by the common people is the Russian language, only spoiled by the influence of Poland." Today, the Valuev decree is literally being renewed in the Crimea right before our eyes. It is not by

chance that the KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA of November 28, 1990, published a long article by the associate member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, V. Strutynskii, who historically justifies the Valuev decree and takes aim at the return of Ukrainians to their language, viewing this tendency as oppression by the national minority, "a rooting out of the Russian language and Russian culture," as though that language and culture were particular to the Ukraine, because the Ukraine, you see, came into being on lands conquered by Russian tsars and "the Russian language existed in Kiev throughout the whole history of that city." One might think that this was the case even before the birth of the Russian people and Muscovy—Russia and its language, which occurred through the Slavization of the Ugro-Finnish tribes by means of the Church Slavonic language. If that's so, then it is also true that Romanians lived in Ancient Rome, which spoke the Romanian language, and that Jesus Christ was born during the rule of the Romanian emperor Augustus Octavian. . . . In truth, the "older brother" is at best an illegitimate child, which is not a reason for shame or brutal ungratefulness, "in historical study, there are no sufficient proofs of the existence of a single Russian nationality" (O. Pritsak), "the existence of a single Russian language has also not been ultimately proven" (Yu. Shevelov). Let us compare the lexical compositions of languages: closest to present-day Russian is Bulgarian, and to Ukrainian—Belorussian, then Polish, Slovak and Czech, with Russian being only the fifth cousin. Let us also recall the fair-minded article by E. Ilyina, "Reading the Book of Vles" (LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA, September 27, 1990), in which she, a Russian, exposes those who, having neglected their own roots, underhandedly stole from the Ukraine the history of Kievan Rus, which was played out on the territory of the Ukraine by the ancestors of Ukrainians. The historian who claims that Rus is ancient Russia, she warns, "is either a know-nothing, that is, not a historian, or a supporter of a unitary state, which is also not compatible with scholarship."

So I will not even cite the Ukrainian version of KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA, which in the context of the present forced internationalization of the Crimea is a unique translated curiosity in the oblast, and will not last long irritating the newly-arisen Valuevites. They will not take long to make the Ukrainian language elective even for Ukrainians (in contrast to English) and reduce it to nothing, so that the inhuman thesis of the tsar's minister would be realized, that "the general Russian language (!) is more understandable to Little Russians than the so-called 'Ukrainian language' which has been created for them." It is clear that if up to now the enormous Ukrainian community in the Crimea did not have any Ukrainian state school (on December 2 even the Sunday school in Sebastopol was closed down), then in the "international republic" this will be even less likely. The remaining Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions will continue to be closed down: the Ukrainian history of the Crimea will be passed over in silence and distorted; the Ukrainian Language Association will be

persecuted, aggressive, emotional rejection of everything that is truly Ukrainian will be propagated through the press and what will be disseminated will be an exotic, ethnographic image. Only now, this will be done from behind the shield of their own interpretation of the local law.

The Valuev approach is the official ideological policy of the Crimean administration.

### Russification and Automation

Assimilation, that is, the swallowing up of a people by imposing on them a foreign language and culture (simply speaking—cultural genocide) is an anti-human act, a crime not only against that particular nation, but also against humanity, which loses the possibility of benefiting from its unique acquisitions. In the civilized world, this is a generally-recognized truth. However imperial academics may justify the disappearance during the Soviet era of dozens of languages and the dissolution of dozens of ethnic groups (and this scholarly sentence is passed with the cold indifference of cat skimmers), this loss cannot be justified in any way, for it is a loss of the results of the efforts of minds and hearts, and thus, the meaning of life for countless generations of people, a loss that is immeasurable, particularly if we consider the fact that every language is an unrepeatable instrument for the recognition and creation of thought, a gene pool of an original culture, a valuable common to all humanity.

For the Russian empire, which even now has not fallen apart, the Ukraine was always a tempting and easily-digested tidbit because of the closeness of language and culture, and Ukrainians—fertilizer to be used in demographic experiments. It is telling that over the last century, the number of Russians has grown three-fold, largely through assimilation (in 1897, there were 55 million, in 1959—114 million, in 1989—145 million), while the number of Ukrainians has remained almost the same. In 1913, Lenin spoke of the "37-million-strong Ukrainian people." In 1929, there were 29 million Ukrainians in Ukraine and over seven million in the Russian Federation, that is, again close to 37 million. That same 37 million also appears in the census of 1959, which included the western oblasts as well. At present, 37 million live in the Ukraine, and another seven million throughout the Union, with only 4.4 million in the RSFSR calling themselves Ukrainians (in 1979 there were 5.3 million), although organized migration to Russia has never stopped. Over a century, the proportion of Ukrainians in that country has almost halved.

I will not speak of the era of the Pereyaslav treaty, when there were significantly more Ukrainians than Russians. Whatever one might say, this loss is the saddest result of the fact of not having a state.

"Do we still not realize that the myth of internationalism, which we believed perhaps most sincerely, was, in truth, only a fig leaf covering up the spiritual and physical castration of all non-Russian peoples of the Union? To be a Ukrainian in the Stalinist unitary state

became, at first, not prestigious, then, embarrassing, and finally, frightening and even life-threatening. There was only one way out for us—Russification. Renounce your ancestors, their churches, culture and language, and you are a true Soviet citizen. Is this not idiocy?" In these musings of L. Pastushenko (HOLOS UKRAYINY, January 4, 1991) there is no exaggeration. Let us listen to Yu. Golubev from the city of Gorky:

"The Russians conquered Crimea more than once, but only the Little Russians entrenched themselves there. And they so entrenched themselves that they do not want to let in the Crimean Tatars. The Tatars have turned to Moscow, to the Russians. But Kiev remains silent. The Tatars are taking up lands and are being chased away for 'illegal seizure.' And the 'full responsibility' for this falls onto the Russians, just like, in the past, responsibility for the fact that Marshall Tymoshenko surrendered the Ukraine and brought the Germans to Moscow.

"There is a limit to everything. And if the Russians one day slaughter all the provocateurs like sheep, I will not be very happy that you pushed my people to such bestiality, having mercilessly harassed and betrayed them." (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, November 17, 1990).

This type of world view and "picture of the enemy" does not come out of nowhere: they are made up from countless sources of information which are easily accessible, from school history text books and generals' memoirs, to films with cautious, crafty khakhols, who strangely murder the language and who, through their fussy simplicity, serve to emphasize the sober thoughtfulness of the main hero. The ground for chauvinism has been well worked. And there is no lack of gardeners. It is no surprise that in the lexicon of those agitating for "one more step," there exists the malicious word "nevozvrashchenets," referring to refugees to mainland Ukraine.

Russification in the Crimea—that model of the Stalinist USSR - - is simply dizzying in its scope, which in itself testifies to the spiritual sickness of our whole society. The methods that have been used to implement it are unworthy, including the gossip that circulated during the "great resettlement of nations" from the Crimea, that, supposedly, Ukrainians, too, would be removed. People have not forgotten that a similar rumor in neighboring Kuban really did end in the massive deportation of Ukrainians in cattle cars beyond the Urals. And for that reason, every new census in the Crimea is a registration of Ukrainians as Russians.

A skipper from Yalta, O. Kindrachuk, tells us about Kuban: "It is known from various sources that, for example, in the 1926 census, three million inhabitants of that area were registered as Ukrainians. And this is completely understandable. But already in the next census, these same people, without having changed either their language or way of life, turned out to be Russians. People who had lived there for a long time told me that at that time the census takers would open their

holsters and ask: "What will you be: Russians or Petliurites?" The same thing happened in the Crimea. Without the holsters, it is true, but in 1959, in Yalta, a woman census-taker spent half an hour convincing me to register as a Russian, arguing that the Crimea is not the Ukraine." (KULTURA I ZHYTTIA, January 21, 1991).

"After all, you're living in the Crimea!" the 1989 census-taker in Chornomorsk tried to convert to a Russian the writer O. Korsovetskii, who through his demographic research convincingly demonstrates that all pre- and post-war censuses in the Crimea were falsified ("That's How They Were Registered" LITERATURNA UKRAYINA, September 13, 1990).

They took place under the internationalizing slogan "But we are all Russians." And with appropriate preparation. Here is yet another example of ideology deliberately and cleverly put at the service of politics. In the already-cited book, "Multi-Ethnic Crimea," which is a collection of answers to questions asked of local propagandists, there are even questions such as this: "When did Slavs appear in the Crimea?" The question is about Slavs. But the answer is like an incantation, which counts on the fact that not every reader is capable of catching and replacing the falsehood:

"... Judging from everything, in the second half of the 10th century, **Russians** strongly entrenched themselves in eastern Crimea and on the Taman peninsula. Here developed the **Russian** principality of Tmutarakan. An important milestone in the development of **Russian**-Byzantine relations was the campaign of the great Kievan Prince Vladimir against Khersones. The campaign ended with the **Russians** taking Khersones. . . It is believed that in the 13th century in Khersones there existed a **Russian** quarter. This is evidenced by a **Russian** altar cross found in Khersones, on which are portrayed the **Russian** saints Boris and Gleb. This means that in Khersones there was a **Russian** parish. . . This testifies to the significant role of **Russians** in the Crimea at the beginning of the 13th century. . . The presence of **Russians** in Soldaya (Sudak) in the 13-14th centuries is confirmed by findings of a **Russian** cross and two **Russian** carders. . . Solkhat (Old Crimea) was populated in the 13th century by Kypchaks, Alans and **Russians**. The 1316 statute of the city of Kafa testifies to the existence of **Russian** churches in that ancient city."

What kind of Slavs were these, when in their peace treaty with Volodymyr, the Greeks recognized the ancient rights of Kiev to these lands, when Russians still did not exist even a thousand kilometers away, and the Chud tribe took revenge against the RUS people for the oppression by cities of villages at the time of the arrival of the horde? It is the genes of their descendants, who, it turns out, have long-standing ethnic roots in the Crimea: the genes of the Cossack-Rus people voted for the sovereignty of the Ukraine. No, the "enlighteners" are tricking us—the Rus sea is foreign to them, the Ukrainians are intruders in the Crimea, intruders also in Zaporozhzhia:

"In the 18th century, on the Right Bank of the Dnieper, facing the future Melitopol district (as though the present-day administrative and territorial divisions of the Ukraine did not exist) were spread out the settlements and camps of Zaporozhian Sich. Sich established its observation posts ('polianky') on the territories of the future Berdiansk and Dnieprovsk uyezds. Thus, in the 18th century, on the borderlands of the Crimean Khanate, there existed a particular type of Russian, or more exactly, Ukrainian settlement."

This is, completely, as we can see, in the spirit of the great power internationalism of Valuev and the hard-won musings of the "poliankologist" Solzhenitsyn.

This is how the Crimeans were being enlightened by the propaganda professionals in advance of the census of 1989. And here are its results: total number of Crimeans—2,430,495, Russians—1,629,542 (67 percent), Ukrainians—625,919 (25.8 percent), Belorussians—50,054 (2.0 percent), Crimean Tatars—38,365 (1.2 percent, presently close to 105,000), Jews—17,371 (0.7 percent), others (Poles, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, Bulgarians, Estonians, Karaites, Czechs, Krymchaks, etc.)—69,244 (3.3 percent).

Our statistics know everything. But they will never reveal for public knowledge how many non-Russians, for whatever reason, but mainly for the sake of peace or their careers, changed their official listing to Russian; how many people came to Crimea at what time and from where; what proportion of children from mixed marriages consider themselves part of the ethnic minority (which is an important indicator of inter-ethnic harmony) and what proportion says of itself, "Daddy is a Turk, Mommy is Greek and I am Russian," and so on. They will not reveal this information, because there is no need for everyone to know where the Crimea is going, that is, where they are leading and pulling it. How many goats and sheep were killed during the war—this "Multi-Ethnic Crimea" will tell us; how many Crimean Ukrainians were killed—that you will not find out.

But what's a figure? The pure result, said Hegel, is only a corpse which has left a tendency behind it. And that tendency is a terrible one, one that can be divined from the corpse's death mask, which KRYMSKAYA PRAVIDA displayed prominently on December 26, 1990, as a great achievement of official national policy:

"According to the census of 1989, out of 2,430,495 permanent residents of the Crimea, the Russian language was considered the native language by 2,008,597 people, or 82.6 percent of the total population of the oblast. In addition to Russians (and there is no data about how many Russians considered a language other than Russian their native language - V.R.), others considering Russian as their native language included 296,491 Ukrainians, or 47.3 percent of all resident Ukrainians, 64.8 percent of Byelorussians, 42.9 percent of Moldavians, 64.2 percent of Latvians, 93.3 percent of Jews, 86.5 percent of Karaites, 71.5 percent of Krymchaks, 76.4



percent of Greeks, 67.1 percent of Poles, 60.5 percent of Koreans, 76.8 percent of Germans and so on."

It is a known fact that with the disappearance of a language, a people disappears as well. Try to refute this: if the Crimean administration does not allow any Ukrainian schools, it wants to destroy Ukrainians in Crimea. The language is the soul of the people. Given that 381,776 non-Russians in the Crimea regard as their language not their national language, but Russian, and of course, many more are heading that way, KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA boasts that: "This percentage is higher than overall in the USSR." In other words, it would be nicer if the "success" of Russification were to reach 100 percent, complete "linguistic unity," as a transitional stage towards total self-renunciation and dissolution. This is a very important admission, for it not only reveals intentions for the future, but also confirms the conclusion, made from analogies and calculations, that since the war, the number of Russians in the Crimea has increased at the expense of Ukrainians by at least 300,000 - 400,000, and at the expense of other nationalities, by at least 50,000. Naturally, these are statistical Russians, which can be used for political purposes, for the nomenklatura has as much interest in things truly Russian as in things Ukrainian or Tatar; the empire castrates everyone, one after another, for its own convenience, many to such an extent that a blank in their passport would be the most accurate record of their ethnicity.

In the tempestuous year of 1921, the founding convention of the Soviets, which proclaimed the Crimean ASSR, noted that "On the territory of Crimea live many ethnic groups. There are Russians, Tatars, Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Karaites, Jews, etc."

Will there be any Ukrainians in Crimea?

#### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> According to the census of 1926, as the ethnologist V. Naulko informed me, within the present borders of the Krasnodar kray, there lived 1,421,000 Ukrainians (41.1 percent of the total population); in the Stavropol kray—480,100 (27.3 percent); in the Rostov oblast—1,174,500 (53.0 percent).

VISTI VUTSVK of November 15, 1927, stated that in the Northern Caucasus there were 3,842,000 Ukrainians (in particular, in Kuban—2,273,000); in the Kursk oblast—1,300,000; in the Voronezh oblast—1,000,000; in Siberia—1,200,000. In Turkestan—600,000; in the Far East - over 600,000.

<sup>2</sup> This half of 1930 they broke down in a brotherly fashion: Russians—41.8 percent, Ukrainians—10.2 percent. At that time, Tatars constituted 25.4 percent. The cited book (p. 72) says that in 1939 there were in the Crimea, out of 1,126,000 total population, 558,000 (49.6 percent) Russians, 154,000 (13.7 percent) Ukrainians, 218,000 (19.4 percent) Tatars, 65 thousand (5.8 percent) Jews, 51,000 (4.6 percent) Germans and 21,000 (1.8 percent) Greeks.

### Kuban Cossack 'Revival' Detailed

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[Article by Svetlana Shipunova, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA staff correspondent, reporting from Krasnodar Kray: "The Kuban Cossacks": "Who They Are and What They Want Today"]

[Text] *Recently many newspapers have published reports from the city of Anapa. It was reported that Golovchenko, ataman of the local cossacks, had publicly flogged a 25-year-old scoundrel who had molested an underage girl. A Cossack assembly order the young man's family to leave the city within a week.*

*It was said that the public, particularly women, viewed the disciplinary action with evident approval: anything as long as the Cossacks restore order.*

*A girlfriend calls from Moscow:*

*"Listen, what is going on with you down there in the Kuban? Cossacks, atamans, whips... Is the government at least soviet?"*

*The government is soviet*

*But something really is happening*

*Our discussion today is an attempt to analyze one of the most remarkable and massive social movements in the Kuban: the movement for a Cossack revival*

#### Revival—For the Sake of What?

This movement perhaps first became evident in the middle of last year. It was then for the first time that people in Circassian dress, rakishly tilted Kuban hats and daggers in their belts began appearing in the streets of Krasnodar.

Nowadays it is hard to surprise people. However, whenever they hear about the latest social movement people are usually interested, wanting to know in support of whom or in opposition to whom (or what) their fellow citizens have joined together this time. Generally people in the Kuban have a fairly selective attitude toward such events. A people's front did not gain a foothold here, even though attempts were made to establish one. The democratic parties and movements are represented by small groups which do not enjoy broad support.

The Cossacks are another matter.

The very word conjures up so much that is native, remote, forgotten and affecting to memory and feelings. What can we say? The Kuban was and remains in its spirit and its customs the land of the Cossacks. From the very start of the new social movement it was clear that in contrast to other movements it had a social base, and that meant that it would have support.

And so it turned out to be.

In October 1990 the All-Kuban Cossack Founding Congress was held. And made its voice heard! The congress proclaimed the establishment of a Kuban Cossack Rada [council], elected an ataman [chieftain] and adopted a charter and a program for the movement. As this article is being written the Rada has over 50 city and village Cossack communities as members.

Nonetheless the most fundamental questions of all—the political nature of the new movement, the purpose for which it was established, and the goals which it has set for itself—continue to concern everyone, both the Cossacks themselves, who are inspired by the idea of revival but have not yet thought the issue through completely, and their countrymen who do not consider themselves Cossacks yet do not want to be left out. All of us here in the Kuban must live together, and all together we number over five million.

Who are they, the Cossacks? Where did they come from and how do they differ from other people? What has actually happened to the Cossacks in our history?

The word "cossack" is of Turkish origin, and has been interpreted in various ways: "free man," "young man," "champion" or "horse man," all of which might, after all, just be variations on the same meaning.

The great Zaporozhe Sech was the definitive parameter of the Kuban Cossacks. The very existence of this "free guard" with its "people's power" in the midst of feudal Russia and its absolute autocracy in the 18th century was paradoxical.

No less paradoxical was its revival in a new place and under new conditions, as evidence of the invincibility of the very idea of the Cossacks in the popular mind. After disbanding the Zaporozhe Sech in 1775 "for disobedience" and supposedly because it was no longer needed, just 15 years later the czarist government found itself forced to call the Cossack army to its defense once again, in order to protect the southern border areas won from the Turks and to open up new lands in Russia.

Fugitive peasants as well as people of other estates gathered together here in freedom, coming from all parts of Russia. The Cossacks accepted people of any clan or tribe—Tatars, Germans, Poles—and they had a law that no one would be betrayed. But the predominant part of the Kuban Cossacks was formed by Russian and Ukrainian blood, creating a special mixed culture, distinctive customs and a unique character. When Cossacks were questioned about their nationality they usually replied: "We are Cossacks."

In contrast to their ancestors in the Zaporozhe, who roamed throughout Little Russia, the Kuban Cossacks settled down, began living the "domestic life," became a special estate and were granted privileges. The greatest of these was land: the amount of land granted to Cossacks was five to ten times greater than that allotted to peasants (from 16 to 30 *desyatina* per person), and their

land was somewhat better and more fertile. The Cossacks were exempted from paying state taxes, including land taxes.

Furthermore, the Cossacks of Russia always had, in modern terms, a professional army comprised of easily mobilized (communities provided horses and equipment) and exceptionally brave soldiers with a strong sense of patriotism. Their feats of valor at Ochakov and Izmail, during the Patriotic War of 1812 and during the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke are renowned.

The Soviet period of their history is a separate topic. Let us put it this way: the Soviet Government mistrusted the Cossacks and saw them as (in the words of Ordzhonikidze) "a people of landowners." The revolution ended the existence of the Cossacks as an estate. A substantial portion of them were physically destroyed in the crucible of the Civil War, and especially afterwards, as the result of an anti-Cossack policy.

The extermination of Cossacks in 1919-20, followed by massive deportation of their families to the Urals and Siberia during the collectivization period and, finally, the famine of 1933, when once-flourishing villages died out completely, completely eliminated the Cossacks from the Kuban within a brief period of time.

No matter how tragic history was, it did not destroy the Cossack way of life and did not crush the self-awareness and spirit inherent in the descendants of the "free men." A large cultural stratum was also preserved in the enduring memory of traditional customs, Cossack songs and a special, loving attitude toward horses and weapons. All these things lived on and bided their time. Then that time came.

Several exceptional phenomena in the cultural life of recent years clearly contributed to hastening that time. I would list the truly valiant work of the world-renowned State Kuban Cossack Chorus, directed by Viktor Zakharchenko (presently deputy ataman for culture) as the first in a series of such events.

Also in that series I would include—not in terms of significance, but in terms of chronology—the first time the "History of the Kuban Cossack Army" by Fedor Shulhurbina was published in the Kuban Almaas in the Soviet period (1989-90 edition). This unique scientific work aroused many people's sincere interest in the history of their ancestors.

About the same time people in the Kuban were reading a fictional version of the history of the Kuban Cossacks. Viktor Lukhonosov's novel "Nashi malinki. Byvshii" [Our Little Paris] which centered on Yekaterinburg at the turn of the century and described the Kuban Cossacks of which we know so little.

It is indisputable that this gradually paved the way for the rejuvenation and resonance of the idea of reviving the Cossacks in the hearts of the Kuban's people. This way

made a reality by the changes which have occurred in our country in the last few years and by the general trend toward revival of ethnic (and at times both ethnic and territorial) self-awareness which could be termed the "little homeland" syndrome.

Now the main issue, in our opinion, is what specifically should be revived.

I recall a remark made by Ataman Mikhail Sholokhov (the son) at a meeting with journalists: "Nothing can ever be revived completely."

That is absolutely true.

Life has moved on, and the past cannot be brought back. The Cossacks can and should be revived, but they should also fit into modern life in such a way that the reality of them will intertwine in a natural fashion and not through coercion with their best traditions (and there were some worse ones).

In this regard much depends upon the policy pursued by the Kuban Cossack Rada.

#### A 1990-Style Rada

The Rada of 1990 is not an organ, an organization or an association of local Cossack communities. The title was chosen mainly as a tribute to tradition.

In order to better understand the significance of the "rada" (council) one should bear in mind the word "radet'" [to delight in], as in to delight in the prosperity of one's people and Fatherland. To delight in the Kuban land.

But is that not also the main goal of legally elected soviets of people's deputies? Yes, of course it is. However, there are several differences in the ways soviets and the Rada work to achieve those goals. Whereas soviets base their decisions and actions on the law and state institutions and agencies, the Rada relies more on customs, traditions and the moral authority of elective organs such as the Council of Elders and the honor court.

This definitely has both pluses and minuses. Customs often prove stronger than laws, and if with the aid of them it proves possible to improve the moral atmosphere, strengthen the family, revive devotion to the land, the economy, respect for elders, and so on, then what better could one wish for one's native land? But they also conceal a danger which was graphically illustrated by the case in Anapa, in which a miscreant was flogged and his family exiled. A strong example? Yes, but in a rule of law state lynch trials are not acceptable in any garb, even a Cossack one!

The main thing is that soviets are supposed to look after the entire population regardless of origin, nationality or religious faith and there are over 100 nationalities living in the Kuban). The Rada naturally presides over the Cossacks. For that reason alone it cannot usurp the authority of or much less replace soviets, even at the

lowest levels. Actually that idea seems never to have come up. But there is some public concern of that nature.

That concern increased following the publication of a "Declaration of the Cossacks of Russia" in the local press. This declaration was adopted in November of last year in Krasnodar by the Council of Atamans (the directive organ) of the Cossack League. Here are the main points in that document:

"Today throughout all of Russia and the other republics which are traditionally home to Cossacks there is a growing movement to revive the Cossack people. Once again Cossacks are prepared at a time of confusion and tribulations, as in the Great Patriotic War, to serve their Fatherland in faith and in truth. But the state as well must give all the aid it can to a people who are tillers of the soil and warriors."

"It is in Russia's interests to take essential state measures at once to revive the Cossack way of life, the basis for which should be:

"1. discarding of stereotypes created by the perception of Cossacks according to Trotskyism and neo-Trotskyism as a reactionary force, and official acknowledgement of the criminal policy of genocide pursued with regard to the Cossack people;

"2. recognition of the Cossacks as a distinct ethnic group possessing rights to ethnic self-expression equal to those of other peoples;

"3. establishment of Cossack representation in the highest organs of authority of the USSR, union republics and autonomous republics;

"4. creation of a state commission (or committee) to revive the Cossack people; development of a targeted state revival program;

"5. restoration of Cossack self-government and the economic independence of Cossack territories... establishment of a special land-use system on a traditional basis;

"6. exemption of the Cossacks from state taxes including land taxes, until 1995;

"7. restoration of Cossack military units within the Armed Forces and Border Guards;

"8. return of Cossacks scattered throughout our country and around the world to their historical homeland."

This document prompted many questions from the public. For example: what do "restoration of Cossack self-rule" or "a special land-use system" mean? How can Cossacks be exempted from state taxes, as that would entail at the very least determination of who is a Cossack and who is an "outlander"? (Incidentally, thus far the Rada has declined to conduct a Cossack census.)

Let us attempt to get to the bottom of at least a few of these issues.

#### Attitude Toward the Soviet State

Well, is the Kuban Rada striving to take power?

"We are not a party, we are a movement," says Ataman Vladimir Prokofyevich Gromov (40 years old, a docent in the history department of Kuban University, not a party member, a Cossack descended from the Kushchevskiy Kuren [unit of Zaporozhe Cossack troops], and elected ataman from among six candidates).

"Therefore," he continues, "we have no intention of usurping the authority of the kray soviet or local soviets. But we would like for each soviet, from village soviets to the Supreme Soviet, to include Cossack deputies. In that sense we are struggling for power, by nominating our own candidates for seats as they become vacant. In the past the Cossacks had strong traditions of self-rule and grassroots democracy. Within a community all decisions were made by the village assembly; each year an ataman was elected, and he was strictly accountable to the people of the village, and the elders' authority was unquestioned. We feel that that sort of self-rule could exist today at the lower levels, in villages, hamlets and settlements. That is, Cossack self-rule could merge with that of lower-level settlements, working together to resolve all issues within their territory."

It should be noted that the kray soviet has recognized the Kuban Rada and the krayispolkom has registered it and allocated space to it in downtown Krasnodar. The ataman is invited to sessions of the kray soviet and attends official events.

In its turn the Rada is on many issues subordinate to the kray soviet, as in its support of the soviet, for example, in the conflict with the republic government which arose early in the year as a result of the kray's failure to ship the specified quantity of meat for centralized distribution. At that time the Rada came out decisively in opposition to "Stalinist methods of grain procurement and meat delivery," and sent a telegram on this subject to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

How are relations with party organizations developing?

Soon after the founding congress of Kuban Cossacks the CPSU kraykom buro adopted a resolution which stated:

"The program guidelines of the Cossack Rada deserve support in that they strengthen friendship among peoples, discipline and order and improve family relations, the upbringing of children, attitudes toward military service and other things... The revitalized Cossacks may become one of the foundations upon which to consolidate the people of the Kuban in the face of growing signs of crisis."

Yet at the same time the buro expressed its disagreement with certain tendencies which it could observe even at the initial stage. Specifically, it disagreed with the placement of responsibility for the repressions of the 1930s upon the party organs in existence today.



Nevertheless the kraykom made an attempt to render practical assistance to the new movement. Two buro members—RSFSR people's deputies—were instructed to propose that the Russian Parliament consider a state program to revive the Russian Cossack way of life as a matter of legislative initiative. Carrying out that assignment, B. Kibirev, CPSU kraykom second secretary, on two occasions appealed to B. Yeltsin; Ataman Gromov had written to Yeltsin previously. They expected that the "Cossack question" would be of interest to the Russian leaders and that they would devote some attention to it. But thus far that has not happened.

I would like to emphasize one other important aspect. While officially recognizing and supporting the Kuban Rada, the CPSU kraykom has at the same time taken a stance in regard to its activities which does not permit even the slightest interference with it.

As for the local democrats, at first they saw the Cossacks as a powerful source of support for themselves and clearly hoped to launch a joint attack on the CPSU, relying on the Cossacks' massive numbers and authority. However, this did not come about.

One small example: in January the Rada held a rally in Krasnodar in memory of the victims of repression. It turned out that the democrats had decided to take advantage of this and showed up with their traditional posters bearing slogans like "CPSU—take responsibility!" The Cossacks formed a human chain and prevented them from approaching the microphone.

This unexpected rebuff provided grounds to accuse the ataman and the Rada of "ties to the CPSU" and of supposedly being its "pocket movement."

It should be noted that there really are communists among the Rada members, and that they share the idea of Cossack revival. When Yu. Udodov was elected ataman at the founding congress he said:

"Bear in mind that I am a communist in my convictions and that I do not intend to renounce them."

"We will make you!" was the reply heard from the back rows.

"You will not!" firmly declared Udodov.

He was elected. Just as another communist, N. Shepel, was elected auditing commission chairman. The anti-communist shouts were not backed by the other congress delegates.

A Verkhov military elder of the Rada related an unusual case.

"The members of the Democratic Party of Russia cannot stand the Cossacks, who will not go down and wreck party gorkoms, or drag out 1920's-era Maxim machine guns from under their haystacks, or turn out in droves to

vote. And not just the democrats. One year ago a cooperative member came to us and flatly stated at our first meeting:

"Gentlemen Cossacks, you are not starting out right! You should do this: put on your uniforms, take to the streets and shout 'Down with Kondratenko and Polozkov!'" "All power to the cooperatives!" Then we will give you financial aid so you can mend your uniforms."

"That was how cheaply they thought we could be bought, when they realized that we were not for sale they began slandering us every chance they got."

The attacks on the Cossacks are in fact prompted by the fact that they are striving to be completely independent of any parties or ideologies (including the CPSU), striving insofar as possible to avoid politicizing their movement excessively.

But it is not easy to avoid politics. Not only because of pressure from without by certain forces, but also due to certain differences of opinion within the movement itself.

In order to understand these differences of opinion one must look carefully at the kind of people who have joined the Cossacks, and at the personal motivations which prompted them besides their common desire to revive the traditions of their ancestors. It is clear that motives differ for the old veterans, concerned over the loss of historical memory and lack of attention to the older generation, and for the green youths who are more likely attracted by the exotic uniform and the chance to carry weapons. Whereas members of the intelligentsia are mainly concerned with the preservation and revival of the cultural treasures and historical values of the Cossacks, it is clear to commercial leaders—kolkhoz chairmen and directors of enterprises—that by joining the Rada and striving toward greater independence they may also increase their own authority.

It is curious that the Cossacks have attracted many members of the militia (there is even one ataman, in the settlement of Dzhubga, who is chief of the local militia). Is that not because it is difficult to realize one's potential as a protector of law and order in a militiaman's uniform? Do they perhaps want to try and do so wearing a Cossack uniform?

Finally, it is quite clear that as in any other social movement there are those who are working for quite definitely extremist goals in hopes of attaining those goals more easily under the guise of the Cossack movement.

The leaders of the Rada are attempting to dissociate themselves from that sort of extreme sentiments. Recently, for example, the ataman ordered the disbanding of the Krasnodar City Coordinating Council, whose positions on many issues did not correspond to those declared by the Rada.

However, the difficulty lies with the fact that Cossack organizations are emerging parallel to the Rada. For example, in the city of Eysk there is now a "Kuban Anarchist-Green Cossack League," one of whose leaders has stated: "In our opinion power in the villages of the Kuban should be concentrated in the hands of the elected ataman and the ataman leadership, and in cities in the hands of an elected дума, a city head and a council."

#### Response to the Land Issue

When the Cossacks talk about revival of traditional land use they interpret this to mean community land use. The fact of the matter is, contrary to ideas common among those not familiar with them the Cossacks never owned land on a private-property basis; the land belonged to each community. A Cossack and his family received tenant shares which they could either work or lease, but they had no right to sell the land.

The following is from a telegram to B. Yeltsin, RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman:

"The Kuban Cossacks, like all of our country's Cossacks, categorically oppose the passage of a law permitting private land ownership within the boundaries of the Cossacks' traditional homelands. We deem it essential that a special system of land use be established in a way that is traditional to the Cossacks and is based on community principles."

"Signed: Gromov, Ataman of the Kuban Cossack Rada"

In mid-February the land question was discussed at the kray's Council of Atamans. The council expressed its support for development of all forms of farming: kolkhozes, sovkhozes, peasant (farmer) farms, cooperatives and associations).

An excerpt from the Council of Atamans resolution:

"We deem it essential to inform soviets of people's deputies of the opinion of the Council of Atamans regarding the need to be guided by Article 74 of the USSR Constitution, which states that in cases of disagreement between a union republic law and an all-union law the all-union law takes precedence, and not to put into effect within the territory of Krasnodar Kray any RSFSR laws establishing a right to private land ownership until an all-union referendum has been conducted on this matter and an appropriate decision made."

We should add that the Kuban Rada favors giving land in the Kuban to anyone who is willing to work it and presently lives within the kray's territory, not just to Cossacks. That is a very important fact, because there are within the Cossack movement ideologues on the land issue who present this matter somewhat (but a very important somewhat!) differently. Thus, Comrade Ataman V. Popov of Rostovskiy District has stated in the press that Cossacks have a "priority right" to own land, "to distribute land to 'its legitimate owners'."

Here is what Petr Tkachenko, a member of the Kuban League in Moscow and a writer, had to say on this subject:

"That means that I would have to travel to my native Kuban and indicate where my grandfather's parcel of land was, though even my father never worked on it. Let us suppose that I do find this, as we call it, 'little kingdom.' Today it belongs to a kolkhoz. What should I do? I am being urged to take an axe, cut stakes, build a fence around it and start farming it. My example would be followed by other Cossack descendants, and soon all the land would be divided up. And I am certain that within a year it would have grown into such a thicket that wolves would roam there. I am sure that we would be assured of famine within a year."

However, there is clearly still some uncertainty on the issue of land. Whereas the Cossacks have clearly stated their position in regard to private land ownership, there is still some disagreement as to what is community land use and what mechanism should be used to realize it. Today the land is under the control of local soviets and kolkhozes. Consequently the only option is an amicable agreement between them and the Cossack community on the point of land distribution. Or will there be a Cossack representation on those ispolkoms which will deal with this matter? That remains unclear.

In the meantime the chairman of a kolkhoz in the village of Starokorsunskaya addressed a Cossack assembly and proposed to rent them land for gardens and orchards. Moreover, there would be an additional 500 hectares in potatoes made available which the kolkhoz itself would sow and till, and the Cossacks would only have to harvest the potatoes. But on another farm, in Kalminskiy Rayon, everything was reversed: there the kolkhoz chairman has been scaring kolkhoz members by warning them that soon the Cossacks will supposedly begin seizing and dividing up the land, and that those who are not Cossacks will be driven out.

In short, some people are going to extremes. That is due to insufficient information about the Cossacks' stance on the land issue and due to insufficient clarity in that stance.

#### The Sacredness of Military Duty

Military valor and devotion to duty are to a Cossack traits of ethnic character. It is said that even today there are no cases of desertion or refusal to serve among draftees from places of Cossack population.

The Kuban Rada has set itself the task of organizing pre-induction training for young people in their villages in special Cossack camps, training them in horsemanship and the use of weapons (equestrian sections are already in operation in many places). Most importantly, they will have instilled in them respect for the army and a sense of patriotic duty. It is proposed that the young

men perform their service together in special Cossack units of the Armed Forces, units with which each village could retain patronage ties.

According to A. Martynov, an ataman of the Cossack League, the heads of the USSR Ministry of Defense have shown an interest in this proposal. In the Moscow region a so-called "Cossack detachment" has already been formed, with individuals exclusively from Cossack regions serving in it.

But in this regard as well not all is proceeding smoothly and easily.

Excerpt from a letter from the Council of Elders to the Ataman of the Kuban Rada:

"...Among certain Cossacks (this is especially typical of the city Cossack club) certain sentiments have gained currency which have nothing to do with the revival of the Cossacks, but are in fact romanticizing about the era of the White Guards and creation of a cult surrounding Kornilov and Shkuro and propaganda in favor of them among Cossack young people. Serious concern has been prompted by the passion of certain leaders of the city Cossack club for showing off the Cossack uniform whenever they please, as well as their awarding of high Cossack ranks to themselves... In the public's perception the abundance of newly-hatched Cossack officers has given rise to a sarcastic attitude toward the idea of revival and is doing harm to that idea. It is essential that we define the Cossacks' goals as precisely as possible, as well as the objectives of our revival, and that we dissociate ourselves from political climbers at any level, break off contacts which could discredit the Cossacks and establish order with regard to the wearing of the uniform and bearing of arms."

The Council of Elders is mainly comprised of veterans of the 4th Kuban Guards Cavalry Cossack Corps, and among the new generation of "esauls" [Cossack captains] there are many who do not even know how to ride a horse. Thus there is some justification for the elders' concern.

#### On the Equality of Peoples and Nations

The lives of the Cossacks and the mountain people have to a large extent become intertwined and merged over two centuries of living side by side. Suffice it to recall that the dress of the Kuban Cossacks (in contrast even to the neighboring Don Cossacks) is simply the dress of the Circassian mountain people. The Adygey and the Slavic Cossacks are linked by close commercial relations and cultural traditions, and in their daily lives they are more friends than foes.

The Adygey people are presently experiencing a period of revival as well. The Adygey Autonomous Oblast which formed a part of Krasnodar Kray has become an independent autonomous region. That is another serious topic which we cannot go into here; we would merely like to note the nature of relations between the Kuban Rada

and what might be termed an analogous public organization called "Adyge khase." Even before the founding congress a joint appeal entitled "To Our Adygey and Cossack Brothers" had been signed; that appeal states that "we are clearly aware of the fact that the Kuban is our common homeland. We must build our lives ourselves and through our joint efforts. In order to do that we need mutual trust, mutual respect and counsel one with another... It is possible that there are those who would wish to set us against each other... Do not let yourselves be provoked!"

This appeal from two respected public organizations definitely played a role in ensuring that a stable situation continues to prevail in a kray which has witnessed no interethnic conflicts for 150 years.

But there is another problem which is no less complex, and perhaps even more so. It is connected with migration into the kray by persons leaving our country's "hot spots," primarily the republics of the Transcaucasus. The Kuban has given shelter to genuine refugees, such as the victims of the Armenian earthquake. Yet at the same time the Kuban has witnessed an uncontrollable influx of people with plenty of possessions and plenty of money. Prices for private homes have risen by factors of between 10 and 20 (nowadays a village house is going for up to 300,000 rubles). Many acute social problems have arisen, the most pressing of which is the food problem.

In view of these circumstances a kray soviet session on three occasions considered the situation and finally made the difficult but inevitable decision to place temporary limits on issuance of Krasnodar Kray residence permits. This stance is strongly supported by the Rada.

Incidentally, at the aforementioned council the atamans in regard to the Union Treaty expressed their clear support for preservation of the USSR in a renewed form and underscored the impermissibility of realizing the constitutional rights of some peoples at the cost of flagrant violations of the equally legitimate rights of other peoples.

#### A Living Process, Not a Formula

Now let us return to the demands contained in the program for Cossack revival. Some of them seem quite well founded, while others need further consideration.

It is clear, for example, that there is a need for official recognition of the criminal policy of genocide against the Cossacks, as has already been done with regard to a number of other peoples in our country. It is equally essential to recognize the Cossacks as a distinct ethnic group, though references to a "right to ethnic self-expression" in connection with that recognition should probably be accompanied by major caveats. The Cossacks are after all essentially an interethnic phenomenon, and different philosophical and legal criteria should be applied to them.

There is no question that we need a state program to revive the Cossack way of life which would define and set forth at least the scale of that process, which has thus far been defined in the broadest manner. It would be a serious mistake on the part of Russia's Supreme Soviet and parliament to continue to refuse to recognize this movement.

As for such highly complex issues as local self-government, economic independence for Cossack regions (as well as the very definition of those regions) and establishment of a special land-use system, in our opinion these things will require more careful consideration and comprehensive study.

Clearly it is not enough to simply declare principles—one must also define a specific mechanism by which to make them a reality. This is possible only through absolute compliance with current legislation and the Constitution. Otherwise this matter is fraught with the danger of serious conflicts with local authorities and the public.

The demand for exemption from state taxes raises serious doubts. This is the surest route to confrontation with the non-Cossack segment of the population. Can there even be privileges for one estate when no estates exist?

Furthermore, concerning the return of Cossacks living abroad to their "historical homeland."

Last year the Kuban was visited by more than 10 people from the United States who are descendants of Bursak, one of the Kuban atamans. They were taken to his small village, which is even today called Bursaki (this deeply touched the visitors). In Krasnodar they were shown the "Bursak House," which is presently under restoration. After this the visitors happily departed for the United States, expressing neither the desire to return to their native land nor their intention to do anything for its benefit. That can scarcely come as much of a surprise.

*Does all the above mean that the movement to revive the Cossack way of life should be regarded as one of the state's most important tasks?*

*In our opinion that is not true at all. Despite the inevitable drastic loss of territory, Cossacks occupy more important and genuine positions than the Cossacks' present-day positions on a number of vital contemporary issues: they favor preservation of a stable, united Union and an indivisible Russia; they oppose private land ownership; they favor strengthening of the army and oppose ethnic confrontation; they oppose disorder and crime and favor stronger families and morals.*

At this time both the Rada and local organs of authority, demonstrating wisdom and tact, are in our opinion taking the only promising route: developing healthy cooperation and mutual support, and searching for points of commonality in regard to the most burning

issues in our lives. For the sake of a common goal: the good of our Fatherland and the people who live in it.

### SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Lezgins

9JUN13194 SOYUZ in Russian No 3, Jan 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Science M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Science Yu.B. Simchenko: "The Lezgins"]

[Text] They call themselves by their native name—**Lezghi**.

Previously, all the people of Dagestan who lived in the mountains were called Lezgins.

According to the 1989 census there are 466,006 Lezgins living in the USSR now.

The Lezgin language belongs to the Lezgin group of the Dagestan branch of Caucasian languages. The same group includes the Tabasaran, Agul, Rutul, Tsakhur, Khinalug, Kryz, Budug, and Udin languages.

Lezgins live in a dense group in the southeastern part of the Dagestan ASSR in the Kurakhskiy, Suleyman-Stalskiy, and Khivskiy Rayons, as well as in the adjacent areas of Azerbaijan.

The Lezgin territory is located in an area at the base of the mountains and also in mountainous areas which differ greatly in their nature from other locations.

Lezgins find their beginnings in the native population of southern Dagestan. Their ancestors were known as **Legi**. As early as in the 9th and 10th centuries Arab writers described the "Kingdom of the Lakzes" that was situated on the territory of southern Dagestan. Kufic inscriptions were found in the villages of Akhty, Zrykh, Kochkhor, Gelkhen, Ashaga-Stal, and Kurakh which made it clear that the villages in question, as well as many other ones, appeared long before the 16th century.

Until the last century the Lezgins did not have any statehood. Most of them were united in independent "free societies"—agricultural communities.

The Azerbaijanian Lezgins were subjects of the khan of Kuba, the Lezgins from around the city of Derbent were subjects of the khan of Derbent.

In 1812 the Kyurin khanate was formed with its center in the settlement of Kurakh, on the land in the valley of the Kurakhchay and Samur River basins which became part of Russia. They were joined by the Lezgin "free societies" from the settlements of Akhty-Para, Alty-Para, Dokukh-Para, etc.

Before the advent of Soviet power the Lezgins belonged to Samurskiy and Kurinskiy Districts [okrugs] of Dagestan Oblast and Kubinskiy Uyezd of Baku Province [guberniya].



The main occupation of the Lezgins was agriculture and cattle rearing. Three major tendencies were formed long ago: Kurakhskiy, Khivskiy, and Akhtynskiy Rayons specialize in raising cattle. Magaramkentskiy Rayon is known for its agriculture, and Akhtynskiy, Suleyman-Stalskiy, and Magaramkentskiy Rayons also have well-developed orchards.

Lezgins breed small livestock—sheep and goats—primarily. Many farms keep buffaloes as milk-producing or draft animals. Lezgin livestock rearing is built on the system of distant pastures. The winter pastures are located, as a rule, in the areas at the base of the mountains and the winter ones are in the mountains.

Lezgins plant corn, wheat, rye, barley, peavine, and rice. As for industrial crops, they plant sunflower, kenaf, flax, hemp, and tobacco. They also grow a lot of melons.

The traditional crafts of the Lezgins were mostly dependent on their cattle rearing products. The settlements of Akhty, Ikra, and Kasumkent, for instance, developed widely the production of leather, sheepskins, footwear and fur coats, saddles and harnesses, ethnic clothing, and smithery items. The village of Ikra was the home of many outstanding gunsmiths and jewelers, whose art was greatly appreciated not only in Russia but also in the neighboring countries.

Lezgin rugs were also known outside of the Caucasus. They were made by women who learned this skill when they were little girls.

The official religion of the Lezgins is the Sunni branch of Islam.

#### SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Lithuanians

91UN1319B SOYUZ in Russian No 5, Jan 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. B. Simchenko: "The Lithuanians"]

[Text] They call themselves by their native name **Letuva, Lietuvayai**.

Lithuania and Lithuanians were mentioned in West European manuscripts in 1009 and Russian chronicles mentioned them in 1040.

There are more than 3,753,000 Lithuanians in the world today and that number includes 3,067,390 in the Soviet Union.

From the point of view of anthropology Lithuanians belong to the White Sea-Baltic race of the great European race. At the same time, the anthropological type of certain groups shows southern traits.

The Lithuanian language belongs to the Baltic group of the Indo-European languages.

Several dialects may be distinguished in conversational language, the bases of which are Zhemaytskiy (lower Lithuanian) and Aukstaityskiy (upper Lithuanian).

The literary language has been forming around the Aukstaityskiy dialect since the 17th century. It has been and still is developing on the basis of the Latin alphabet. The written form of the language appeared in 1547 when an alphabet book and a catechism were published in Lithuanian.

The Lithuanians' desire to preserve their own spoken and written language played a major role in the national fight against the russification policy of the tsarist government. In 1864 the tsarist government, under the guise of opposing polonization [opolychivaniya] of Lithuania, announced a ban on publishing and teaching school in Lithuanian. The ban was lifted in 1904, due to the pressure from the national liberation movement.

Lithuanians are faithfully and continuously preserving their native language (about 98.0 percent). At the same time they are increasing their knowledge of fluent Russian (35.9 percent in 1970, 37.9 percent in 1989).

Present day Lithuanians owe their origins to a number of Baltic (Lett/Lithuanian) cattle rearing and farming tribes who created neolithic culture and curved axes. Long time ago, as early as the end of the third to the beginning of the second millennium B.C., they were moving from the south to the north to the Neman and Daugava River basins assimilating the local tribes on the way.

The present Lithuanian nation was forming in the 9th-12th centuries and that process coincided with the period when feudal relations were evolving. The basis of this formation was made up of medieval tribes including Lithuanians proper (Aukstaitys or Litva, according to the Russian chronicles), Zhemayts (Zhemoyt, Zhmud), Skalys, Nadruvs, as well as some of the Sudavs (Ptolemy called them Sudins in the second century A.D., Russian chronicles called them Yatvyags), the southern group of Kurshes (Kors), Zemgals (Zemigola), Sels, and part of the northern Prussians (Barts, Notangs, Sembs). The creation of the Lithuanian state in the first half of the 13th century served as a kind of a catalyst in the process of consolidating Lithuanians into a single ethnic entity. The feudal disunity and the exhausting struggle of many centuries with the Teutonic order prevented interethnic relations from growing stronger on the one hand, but they helped to develop an understanding of how important it was to unite and fight together for an independent, unique, and original place in history, on the other hand. The contradictions and incompleteness of the ethnogenetic process is displayed by the fact that there still exist ethnographic groups within the Lithuanian nation which have noticeable cultural and dialect distinctions. It is known, for example, about the Aukstaitys in the east of Lithuania, Zhemayts in the west of it, Dzukhs in the south-east, Kapsins in the south, and Zanavaks in the northern part of the Trans-Neman region.

The absolute majority of believers among the Lithuanians have been Catholics since 1387 (the year of christening). One exception is the western Lithuanians who live in what used to be "Small Lithuania" and who partially converted to Lutheranism under the influence of the Germans.

### New Justice Minister Defines Ministry's Role

91UN1337A Moscow PRAVDELSTVENNY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 2, Jan 91 p 10

[Interview with USSR Minister of Justice S. Lushchikov by Yu. Popov; place and date not given; published under the rubric "Appointments: First Interviews": "USSR Minister of Justice Sergey Gennadyevich Lushchikov"]

[Text] **Highlights of biography:** Born in 1951. Russian. Graduated from Sverdlovsk Institute of Law in 1972. CPSU member. Started career in the Komi ASSR procuracy organs; also worked in the procuracy apparatus. Republic deputy minister of justice in 1987. Elected USSR people's deputy in 1989. Recently worked as deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation.

[Popov] You are taking up the position of USSR minister of justice at a very complex and important moment in the life of our society, at a time when it is beginning to turn its face toward the law. How do you see the role of the ministry in this national turn toward law and order?

[Lushchikov] In a law-based state, the law must rule in the full sense of the word. State structures should serve this purpose. However, in the past Soviet organs, organizations, and departments often looked for ways that would make it possible for them to bypass the laws they themselves had established. I have worked in the organs that create legislative acts: I was a member of the first USSR Supreme Soviet, while at the same time serving as a member of Committee on Legislation. This experience led me to a conclusion: It has now become more difficult to apply the law, to bring its demands to every enterprise, collective, or individual. I see an important role for the Ministry of Justice in accomplishing this task.

The point is that when we decided to make the law a cornerstone of our life and to put it at the pinnacle of the legal pyramid, we encountered a serious problem: Our state and our people turned out to be not very literate in regard to legal matters. This holds true, for instance, in regard to quite a few employees of all-Union ministries, who do not possess the necessary degree of legal culture. The same is happening at the level of enterprises and organizations, where people are more used to following directives and instructions than the law. I have found out from firsthand experience that many of our high-ranking officials do not even read the text of a particular law to the end; they are used to receiving interpretations from above or precedents that show how it should be applied in real life. All the while, however, the only thing that is required is to understand the meaning of a legislative act and to follow it unequivocally.

What can we say then about ordinary bureaucrats, and the youth? What reigns here is an imbalance of rights and responsibilities, deformation of notions, and lack of understanding of the problem of responsibility and discipline. We are now drowning in the euphoria of our own rights, to which we have given priority and which we

seriously exaggerate, forgetting that in a society any right means at the same time the responsibility of an individual: The more right an official has, the more responsibility he has to shoulder. Unfortunately, many of our people cannot comprehend this simple truth.

The fact of the existence of rather low legal culture from top to bottom defines a very important role for the USSR Ministry of Justice: It must become a coordinating center in legal education and upbringing, and in the inculcation of legal knowledge. Further down the road I see the ministry expanding its activity into the sphere of legal education, that is, the resolution of one of the priority tasks of our time: Our society is politicized as never before, and in these politics the voice of a jurist—someone who has good knowledge of legislation—has to carry sufficient weight.

In addition, the USSR Ministry of Justice is exactly the organ that should help to bring the economy and the law together. Many of our troubles stem from the fact that we used to be a technocratic society and put the economy ahead of other things, although it was, as is known, a creation of the administrative command system. We saw economic problems in a one-sided way, without their legal support. But this approach can doom any progressive economic thought. If an enterprise director is unable to get his bearings in legal matters, how can he provide fair pay for the labor of conscientious people; how can he free the collective from ballast—people who do not wish to work, loafers, and demagogues!

[Popov] Where does the USSR Ministry of Justice fit into the new structure of executive power?

[Lushchikov] The head of the executive-administrative power is now the president. The Cabinet of Ministers will probably limit itself to economic problems. It will include, first and foremost, branch ministries, which will conduct coordination and guidance of activities in their sectors. The Ministry of Justice must among other things assist the Cabinet of Ministers and provide aid in its activities, since the economy should also rest on the law and not on voluntaristic decisions.

However, the ministry will also have a place in the structure of presidential state power. Why? Because many presidential decrees and their legal support, forecasts, interpretation, and analysis are becoming subject to criticism from all sides. The ministry must help the president in establishing the legal basis of his activities as an executive power. This may involve the development of draft laws that are presented for consideration at the USSR Supreme Soviet on behalf of the president, as well as the preparation of other normative acts in accordance with the special powers of the head of the executive branch, especially those related to the transition to market relations.

Any true law-based state features separation of powers, legislative, executive, and judicial. We do not have any organ other than the Ministry of Justice that would be positioned so close to each of these powers.

It is true that from the legislative point of view we are the working organ engaged in the preparation of laws and other normative acts issued in the name of the president, the Cabinet of Ministers, or other components of the executive.

The laws regulate a small number of relations; administrative regulations, however—of which we unfortunately cannot rid ourselves yet—encompass a wider field and literally are holding our life captive. It is necessary to conduct a revision of them and eliminate the obsolete ones that are putting the brakes on our forward movement. This is a direct responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. In addition, we will be involved in legislative forecast: We must have a clear understanding of where a particular version of a law will lead us.

Since we are an administrative organ, we have units that carry out functions of executive power. Therefore we are involved in everything that is related to adequate application of the law, that is, we do the same in this area as any other department.

[Popov] What will be the basis for building the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and appropriate republic-level organs?

[Lushchikov] I was very glad to see that in September a meeting of ministers of justice of all the Union republics took place in Moscow. All of them envision a place for the activity of the Union Ministry of Justice, defer a large number of issues to its jurisdiction, and even advocate an expansion of its powers. What is this sphere being assigned to it? In addition to what I have already mentioned in our conversation it is, first of all, the role of coordinator. We have a highly developed scientific potential: a law academy has been created under the ministry. Each republic separately does not have the resources to train and retrain cadres. We are also working closely with the Baltic republics, for instance, in matters of large-scale expert examinations: They cannot handle such tasks on their own, it requires joint effort.

Another example is protection of human rights. Imagine a fairly widespread phenomenon—a person lives in one republic today and moves to another tomorrow, where his rights should be affirmed and maintained. Who is going to render assistance to him? Our services, including the Ministry of Justice.

Therefore our course is to avoid a tug-of-war with the Union and autonomous republics, or any other national entities. Balanced approach to problems, two-way discussion in the language of the law, and its adequate application. By the way, it is easier for us, jurists, to reach an agreement than it is for many politicians who do not have adequate legal knowledge.

[Popov] What new functions necessitated by the changing times is the ministry undertaking?

[Lushchikov] Here is a new example. On 2 January the registration of political parties and public associations,

including trade unions, started. By law, our ministry is charged with this responsibility; this entails certain control over whether the charter by-laws are being observed. This applies to all parties, movements, and organizations claiming an all-Union, interrepublic, or international status, both those that are registering for the first time and those that have already registered—the latter must reregister with us before 31 December 1991. This is a real step toward a law-based state.

With the increase in international contacts there is a growing need for both sides to protect the rights of their citizens, enterprises, joint enterprises, banks, and other organizations and offices. We are facing substantial work to minimize the losses our state may incur in the process of international cooperation. The role of the Ministry of Justice in this process will be substantial.

#### Justice Ministry Figures on Capital Punishment

91UN13364 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 5, Jan 91 p 17

[Article by Grigoriy Mertsalov: "Terribly Interesting Numbers..."]

[Text] Glasnost in the operation of the USSR Ministry of Justice has finally turned to "capital punishment": This department has removed the veil of secrecy from statistics on the use of extraordinary punishment, which have been left out of court reports virtually at all times.

Therefore, 14 "firing squad" articles made it possible to sentence 770 people to ultimate punishment in 1985, 526 in 1986, 344 in 1987, 271 in 1988, and 276 in 1989 (the number of those pardoned during this period came to 193). The sad "results" of 1990 have not been summed up yet... Ninety-five percent of all those sentenced to ultimate punishment ended up in this "narrow" circle (accounting for 0.04 percent of the total number of convictions) for aggravated murder. Therefore the other 13 types of crime became the stumbling block for just a few individuals... This is why it is expected that Basic Criminal Legislation which is being developed now will preserve this harsh penalty for only four crimes: betrayal of the Motherland, terrorist acts, sabotage, and, naturally, aggravated murder.

For comparison, the number of people sentenced to capital punishment in the United States was given; at present, there are "only" 2,124 of them. This substantial difference is attributable not only to a higher crime rate but also to our low rate of crime solving. In the words of Zoya Grigoryevna Yakovleva, chief of the Department of Legal Statistics of the USSR Ministry of Justice, the growth of crime last year amounted to 13.2 percent, and the total number of those committing criminal acts came to approximately 2.8 million. Only 1.3 million of them were found. About 400,000 to 500,000 will be absolved of responsibility at the pretrial stage; about 700,000 will be tried.

[Mertsalov] Zoya Grigoryevna, how many people were convicted for inflaming interethnic discord?

[Yakovleva] Very few: Five people were convicted in 1980, four in 1982, three in 1983, nine in 1987, one in 1988, and nine in 1989. There were no such convictions in 1981 and 1984 through 1986.

[Mertsalov] In what republics do the courts apply capital punishment most often?

[Yakovleva] With regard to murder (this is the main reason for applying the extraordinary measure), it is used most frequently in Armenia. Incidentally, their murder rate is the lowest in the country. Naturally, we cannot link the severity of punishment directly to the status of crime.

Next to the gratifying news about the process of the humanization of criminal penalties continuing in our country, the conclusions of the Committee for Fighting Crime which was set up at the United Nations did not sound reassuring. The committee predicts an increase in crime rates in all countries of the world. Thus, according to its statistics, an average statistical country with a population of 10 million should be prepared to handle tens of thousands of grave crimes and hundreds of thousands of crimes against property annually. However, these are only those crimes that are reported by victims to the police. Actually, this country is threatened with hundreds of thousands of grave crimes and more than a million crimes against property annually. The research the committee has done in a highly developed country with a high crime rate makes it possible to conclude that over the average expected life, one in 133 citizens will become a murder victim, eight out of 10 will become victims of attempted violent actions, and half of them will become victims of these crimes more than once. The committee has calculated that a developed country spends between two and three percent of its budget to control crime, and a developing country about 14 percent. As far as our country is concerned, it considers itself developed.

### Impact of Union Treaty on Legal System Discussed

9JUN13274 Moscow PR UTTELSTVENNY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 12, Mar 91 p 9

[Interview with Yu. Golik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Law and Order and the Battle Against Crime, by Yu. Vladimirov; place and date not given: "The Guarantee of Security"]

[Text] The draft Union treaty has been published. The acute problems of fighting crime, which despite the steps taken is on the increase, is reflected in it. Will the Union treaty, if signed, guarantee greater safety for the public?

Yu. Golik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Law and Order and the Battle Against Crime, reflects on this.

[Vladimirov] There are many arguments and disagreements about the draft Union Treaty concerning the problem of a single procuracy. The question is being asked directly: Do we need a Union procuracy or is a union of procuracies better?

[Golik] Under the conditions of our state the procuracy is a unique phenomenon unlike any other in the world. In the United States the attorney general is part of the executive branch of power and is subordinate to the Justice Department. Strictly speaking, in the United States there is no procuracy that exercises indirect oversight of legality, and Americans themselves note that this is a major defect in their democracy.

So the conclusion is clear: Except for the power of law, a procurator should not and cannot have power. Accordingly, all statements to the effect that, supposedly, within a republic the procurator used to be "not theirs," and now is "theirs" not only do not bring us closer to a rule-of-law state but on the contrary bring us up against the "telephone law" and "pocket procurators" of the recent inert past from which we are gradually trying to break away. Until we break away from this approach there is no point in even talking about a rule-of-law state.

[Vladimirov] What is preventing us?

[Golik] Stereotypes in the public awareness. We very often encounter a situation in which my colleagues the USSR people's deputies state with pride: "I gave instructions to the procurator on how he was to act..." Or: "I sent instructions to the court on how a particular case was to be resolved..." "But remember," I say to them, "you yourself voted in the USSR Supreme Soviet for the separation of powers and for the independence of the courts." They answer: "But I am a deputy!"

[Vladimirov] Article 19 of the draft Union treaty states that the republic procurators are appointed by their highest legislative organs and carry out their duties as part of the USSR Procuracy Collegium. In their activities associated with overseeing compliance with Union laws they are subordinate both to the highest legislative organ in the republic and to the USSR Procurator General.

[Golik] Yes, representatives of all the republics that signed the draft Union treaty agreed to that. So whence the sources of our "parliamentary war?" They are to be found in our remarkable legal illiteracy and deep legal ignorance. There cannot be "first class and second class" laws. The legal force of any law is the same, and it is through civilized separation of competence that we are able to reach agreement between the republics and Union, and that the draft treaty has been drawn up. The combined introduction of some matters is naturally inevitable, and it requires coordination and concentrated efforts.

Let us turn once again to the American experience. There, all controversial issues between the federal



authorities and the state authorities are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. And that decision is final.

And here? I read in the newspapers that the leaders of the miners have again demanded the resignation of the USSR president, citing the "experience" of the strike movement in the West. I can assure you that if you look at the American laws you will be convinced that such political demands in strikes are impermissible! And no striking American miners or metalworkers or chemical industry workers will ever take it into their heads to demand the resignation of the U.S. President. Their firms and companies and associations may simply close down or they may lose enormous amounts of material goods. And no court will even accept a suit dealing with their own production. It is by howling at the management of their own corporation that they wring higher wages and new privileges from it.

[Vladimirov] How does the sphere of the courts look in the draft Union treaty?

[Golik] It is being proposed that there will be three groups of Union courts in the country. These are the USSR Supreme Court, the USSR Supreme Court of Arbitration, and the courts of the USSR Armed Forces. The last named are intended to replace the present military tribunals, whose name and activity are no longer consonant with the spirit of the times. One working title is Military Courts, but doubts remain even here.

[Vladimirov] The draft Union treaty contains no direct instructions on how the Union organs of the Committee for State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs will be organized.

[Golik] Yes it does. The draft states the most important thing. Together with the republics the USSR defines the strategy of state security for the Union and the republics in it; it provides for state security for the members of the Union and it establishes the regime for the state borders of the USSR and for the territorial waters and airspace of the USSR.

It is proposed that the signatories to the treaty transfer the coordination of activity to maintain public order and fight crime to the USSR.

This is a very important provision. Crime recognizes no frontiers, it is an international, extraterritorial phenomenon. It is important to note one important circumstance here. Our own "criminal bourgeoisie" is gathering strength within the country. Up to now everyone has held the view that this phenomenon does not exist, but meanwhile criminality has been growing and becoming stronger. In countries in the West they have been dealing with this problem seriously for decades and there is a body of serious research and recommendations.

Alas, I think that it will take mankind a long time to reach that stage in its development in which crime as such will not exist in society.

[Vladimirov] Delegations of the USSR Supreme Soviet often take trips to learn of the experience of parliaments in foreign states, where, of course, there is something to learn. But we never hear anything about joint work by the parliaments of the USSR and the republics. Now, when the draft Union treaty has been sent out for review by the highest legislative organs in the republics, what do you see as the key in the new stage of work on the treaty?

[Golik] Well, do we have to invent something new here? Let us remember the form, unfortunately forgotten, of the deputy groups at places of residence. They have united deputies at all levels from rural soviet to the Supreme Soviet who have come to power by the hand of the people. We must all meet more often, both within the walls of the parliaments and with the voters at their places of residence. Then the road to agreed Union and republic laws will be clearer.

Our committee is constantly inviting colleagues from the republic parliaments. For example, when we were discussing the draft law on the militia, a representative from Kazakhstan spent an entire day with us, and as he himself put it, it was the best way to conduct business.

I also think that in the process of discussing the draft Union treaty in the republic, the USSR people's deputies will play a very active part. The tribunes of the Union and republic parliaments should be open to all viewpoints. Only in this way will we be able to consolidate our efforts in defense of a unified Union state.

### Measures To Strengthen Role of Procuracy Introduced

91UN13874 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Apr 91 Union Edition p.3

[Decree of USSR Supreme Soviet: "On Urgent Measures for Strengthening the Role of the Procuracy To Consolidate Lawfulness in the Country"]

[Text] For the purpose of strengthening the role of the procuracy in ensuring lawfulness, the protection of the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens, the sovereign rights of the USSR and the republics, the active opposition to the processes that entail the destruction of the legal pillars of society, and the resolute suppression of any encroachments on law and order, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves

1. The USSR Procurator General, the republic procurators, and the public prosecutors subordinate to them shall

—in the execution of oversight over the fulfillment of the laws of the USSR and the republics, proceed from the decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies on the basis that, until the signing of a new Union Treaty by all state organs, the USSR Constitution and the Union laws that are in effect must be observed.

—consider the most important task to be the guarantee of human rights regardless of national origin, language, attitude toward religion, and convictions; decisively suppress any discrimination against citizens, no matter who the source is.

—in full measure, use their authorities in the oversight over direct adherence to the laws by local soviets of people's deputies, their executives and administrative organs, public associations, and all officials. At the same time, cooperate actively with the soviets of people's deputies at all levels, and introduce specific proposals to the soviets on questions of lawfulness and law and order, protection of citizen's rights, and the social protection of the population.

—continuously study law enforcement practice in the most important directions of observing lawfulness and the fight against crime.

2. To recommend to the higher organs of state authority of the republics, in the elaboration of normative acts that regulate the activity of the procuracy organs, that they proceed on the basis that they are called upon, in the interests of the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens, the strengthening of lawfulness, and the intensification of the fight against crime, to ensure uniformity in the fulfillment of the laws of the USSR on the territory of the entire country; and that they make republican legislation conform to changes introduced by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies in Articles 164-166, 167, and 168 of the USSR Constitution

3. To recognize that it is necessary to grant the public prosecutor the right to appeal to the court in the event his objection to a legal act that contradicts the law is overruled, and also to establish responsibility for preventing the legal activity of a public prosecutor

The Union SSR Procuracy jointly with the USSR Supreme Soviet on legislation and law and order will prepare and submit for review by the USSR Supreme Soviet pertinent changes to the existing USSR law "On the USSR Procuracy" and accelerate the preparation of the draft of a new Law on the USSR Procuracy

4. To agree with the proposal of the USSR Procurator General:

—on bringing public prosecutors of the Union republics and the public prosecutor of the city of Moscow to the staff of the board of the Union SSR Procuracy.

—on establishing a special subdivision in the Union SSR Procuracy for operational reaction to interethnic conflicts and the violation of citizens' rights on this basis.

—on granting it the right to establish a structure, staff size, and wage fund for workers of the Union SSR Procuracy within the limits of approved appropriations.

5. To charge the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, within the limits of the sum of approved expenditures, to examine

proposals of the USSR Procurator General on the improvement of the material, technical, and personnel support of procuracy organs, and also research and educational institutes under the Union SSR Procuracy.

6. Local soviets of people's deputies and their executive and administrative organs will make available official accommodations for procuracy organs situated on their territory on a lease basis.

Workers of procuracies, and also families of workers of procuracies, who die in the performance of official duties enjoy privileges in the distribution of housing, installation of apartment telephones, granting of places in children's preschool establishments, and in the resolution of other social conditions support in a procedure envisaged by legislation of the Union SSR and the republics.

A. Lukyanov, chairman  
USSR Supreme Soviet  
Moscow, the Kremlin  
17 April 1991

### Procurators Suggest Ways to Decrease Crime

91UN14524 Moscow NEDEL'YA in Russian No 19  
22 Apr 91 p 9

[Article by V. Vodolazhskiy and I. Zaverin. "From the Procurator's Point of View"]

[Text] The nation loses over four billion rubles every year due to theft and shortages.

In the agro-industrial complex, 20-30 percent of the harvested crops and over 2.5 million tons of meat vanish or are carried off.

The number of registered crimes is approaching three million.

Last year more than one million crimes went unsolved.

One thing is clear to everyone: the processes of establishing a democratic, civic society and a rule-of-law state have encountered serious difficulties. Moreover, all spheres of socio-economic life and the actions of the organs of power are in crisis. If we do not succeed in restraining the present trends and the internal discord in society in the near future—and many people connect this restraint with the most rapid adoption of the Union Treaty—the situation could become simply catastrophic.

Members of the NEDEL'YA Juridical Club roundtable discussed the reasons for the situation that has come to pass, how to get out of it, and how to most fully realize the powers granted in the recent USSR Supreme Soviet resolution, "On Urgent Measures for Enhancing the Role of Procurators in Strengthening Legality in the Country."

V. Kravtsev, Deputy USSR General Procurator

The "war" of laws, the wild outburst of nationalism and extremism in a number of regions, and the rash of open

anti-constitutional demonstrations could not but be reflected in the work of the procuracy, which is, I'll tell you frankly, going through hard times. The integrity of its system is under threat. More and more often one is faced with resistance to the center, failure to take active measures for investigating and solving crimes committed on international soil, and so on.

**The crime rate has sharply increased. In 1990, 2.8 million crimes were registered (or 13.2 percent more than in 1980), including 25,000 murders, 57,000 premeditated aggravated assaults, 22,000 rapes, and more than 150,000 violent thefts and robberies.**

**Nor has juvenile crime decreased: the number of teenagers who broke the law in 1990 increased by 4.2 percent over the preceding year.**

**In 1990 more than 800,000 persons were convicted (and, I think, one can take little comfort in the fact that the crime rate grew more slowly in 1990 than in 1989).**

Violations of the law in the economy present a great danger, especially those which parasitically prey on its difficulties and unresolved problems.

Embezzlement, misappropriation and speculation are on the increase. According to estimates alone, the country loses over four billion rubles each year due to theft and shortages. In the agro-industrial complex, 20-30 percent of the harvested crops and over 2.5 million tons of meat vanish or are carried off. Thus the state is forced to purchase an equal amount from abroad at the expense of foreign exchange.

It goes without saying, that we are not simply acting as bystanders here. The USSR Procuracy has participated most actively in working out urgent measures for fighting organized crime and special-purpose programs for interdicting theft, economic sabotage, corruption, and street crime... A quick-reaction investigatory group has been set up at the USSR Procuracy and is now in operation.

There are increasing demands to guarantee legality at the investigation and inquest stage, and a sharp increase in violations of the law in predetermining the volume, nature and direction of procuracy oversight in this most important sector.

During the year the organs of investigation and inquest examined 3.5 million statements and reports of crime. The investigative staff and organs of inquest have held inquests on more than 2.7 million cases.

Alas, procuracy oversight is still unable to totally guarantee the timely exposure and curtailment of violations of the law. Some things remain beyond the field of view of the procurators. There are also instances of unlawful detention and arrest, and bringing people to criminal liability without sufficient grounds. And, of course, it is unacceptable that thousands of crimes are, as before, not included in the count, so that the majority of the reported crimes would receive a timely response, and so on.

In the wake of all these violations, there were 1,167,000 unsolved crimes last year.

#### **V. Stepankov, RSFSR General Procurator**

I am convinced that first of all we must restore to the procuracy its true purpose, and change it from an appendage of the administrative-command system to an organ with genuine oversight functions.

While carrying out oversight in the sphere of economic activity, we must take the very position in which—without procuracy oversight—infractions of the law would not be eliminated, and the guilty parties unpunished. As far as exposing crime is concerned, this is the duty of the investigatory organs, an area that procuracy oversight must turn its attention to as well.

Union republic declarations of state sovereignty proclaim the supremacy of republic laws. In accordance with the latest changes to the constitutions of a number of republics, procurators there are appointed by the Supreme Soviet and are accountable only to it; in the Russian Federation, they are accountable to the Congress of People's Deputies as well.

These changes require abolition of the former strictly centralized procuracy system, which incidentally does not mean isolation of the republic systems from the USSR Procuracy. The RSFSR Procuracy believes that a unified system of procuracy oversight must be preserved (with consideration of republic sovereignty). The interests of affirming and strengthening uniform legality require it. Without this, one cannot guarantee the protection of the citizens' rights and liberties nor the sovereignty of the republics at the union level and in inter-republic relations.

Therefore, today, in our view, it is necessary to establish a basis on which to build relationships between the USSR Procuracy and the procuracies of the union republics. Such a basis could be recognition of the fact that oversight of execution of the laws of a union republic is the prerogative of the procurator of that republic.

On the other hand, republic procurators must be accountable to the USSR General Procurator for the state of procuracy oversight within the bounds of the powers of the Union.

#### **VI. Potebenko, Ukrainian SSR Procurator**

I must say that we are very disturbed by the growth in the crime rate and the state of legality in the republic, as well as in the country as a whole. During the last year nearly 370,000 crimes were registered, which is 14.7 percent greater than in 1989. The most dangerous crimes of violence such as premeditated murder, aggravated assault, overt theft, etc. have increased. The level of lawbreaking among minors is alarmingly high.

I did not cite these figures by chance: for the crisis in law and order and the war of laws (in which legal nihilism is often displayed) was caused primarily by the breakdown

in the economy, the worsening socio-political situation and the relaxation of discipline at all levels, from production and planning to labor.

Alas, recently people have become carried away in terms of the number of laws adopted and ukazes issued. At the same time we have at times forgotten about their qualitative aspect, about monitoring them and about demandingness in their execution at all levels.

Holding unsanctioned mass meetings and actions such as these, in which, unfortunately certain people's deputies of Soviets at various levels have taken an active role, have a negative effect on the state of the economy and social discipline. Pursuing their own narrow political goals, such deputies attempt to exert pressure on the law-enforcement organs, and present our reality only in a negative light.

One cannot say that violations of legality have not been interdicted. As a rule, the procurators submit representations and protests when the actions of local Soviets and decisions of executive organs are deemed illegal. Law-violators are subject to prosecution. But it is probably true that one does not learn by the club alone, especially where deliberate violations of the law are concerned. I believe that the statutes should be able to define the terms under which those who continually break the laws continue to be members of the people's deputies.

In my opinion, the time has come to perfect the structure of the investigative staff, which should be united under a single administration. At the same time it should be completely withdrawn from subordination to the internal affairs organs. As concerns the procuracy, it would be expedient for both oblast and republic organs to retain small groups of investigators in order that these people investigate those cases which the procurator deems necessary for them to take up.

#### **G. Tarnavskiy, Belorussian SSR Procurator**

The excessive and one-sided attraction for political reform has led to violation of the foundations of the state, and a decline in the authority of the powers and the law. At present, the confrontation of the Center and the republics has reached the danger point. What is more, law-enforcement organs have become hostage to these confrontations.

Urgent measures are required to stabilize the situation. One of these, in my view, is temporary subordination of the organs of internal affairs, state security and the procuracy directly to the president of the country. Such subordination would exclude their carrying out illegal actions in violation of the Constitution of the USSR and the laws of the union.

Legislative confusion promotes economic disintegration, and has become a growth medium for political conflict and a wild outburst of crime.

In our republic, mercenary motives are the incentive factor for the commission of two-thirds of all crime. Moreover, in the conditions of an impoverished market, more and more often the things that are stolen are everyday household items such as soap, detergent, linen and foodstuffs.

The way out of this situation is by way of solving the economic problems. At the same time one must not exclude from consideration the necessity for reform of the entire law-enforcement system.

Revitalizing the concept of procuracy oversight must be based on the fact that the procuracy is not an appendage of the executive powers, as it is in essence today, but an organ which in the name of the state maintains oversight of the observance of the laws. And only the laws.

We must no longer put up with the practice of using the powers of the procuracy in the struggle for quality production, planting and harvesting operations, and timely unloading of rail cars. The procuracy is obligated to react only in case of disclosure of cases punishable by criminal law, and must avoid involvement in executive and management activities.

We must precisely define the position of the investigative apparatus in the law enforcement system. It is expedient to concentrate the investigation of the vast majority of all crimes in a specially-created Investigative Committee.

#### **Origins of Crime, Better Ways to Fight it Examined**

91UN13034 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by Professor V. Luneyev, leading scientific fellow at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute on the State and the Law: "Criminal Mythology: What was Hidden Under the Cloak of Secrecy"]

[Text] Many years ago, when I had access to working with Top Secret materials, I went to the Main Military Procuracy with a letter from the chief of the Military-Political Academy. He was asking them to acquaint me, an instructor in military criminology, with certain data on crime (if only in percentages) necessary to teach a course to future military lawyers. After a cursory glance at its contents, the first deputy chief of the Main Military Procuracy asked me with irritation, whether I had read KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (which had reported on the rosy criminological situation in the Army). I said that I had. Then, with a sigh, he wrote diagonally across the letter "What is required is granted. A. Polev, 11/09/1972."

At that time the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a quarter-century old, and other important international pacts which we had ratified had been in existence for about five years. It states in them that "Every person has...the freedom to search for, receive and disseminate information."



"What on earth did he want?" another military officer says. "To receive and disseminate information about crime in the Army? Even now they are sealed with seven seals. But then, the request was made through official channels, for use under the strict limits of the rules of secrecy. All the same, you should not be poking your nose into things!" And that was how it was, until just last year, and not only in the Army—but everywhere.

Their purpose was not just to shut the mouths of the dissidents: the machinery of repression was already in operation there; measures were devised which were to have directed the thoughts of the entire nation into the channel of official lies—which is to say, propaganda. These measures were as plain as straw and as old as the hills—depriving the people of the information necessary to interpret the real situation.

From the early 1930's, when life began to part ways with the slogans of the propagandists, whole categories of social, economic and moral statistics became a state secret—including, naturally, the statistics on crime, as the most indicative sign of the social health of society. The iron curtain was dropped not only at the state border, but also at the entrance to agencies, institutions, organizations and even certain offices.

Soviet crime mythology traces its beginnings to that time as well. Even now, when the steel safes containing criminal statistics have swung open slightly with a creak—true, not all of them!—and the statistics gushed out onto the heads of potential victims, the myths have not perished.

Some of the statistics inspire fear, others reassurance. The figures are for objectivity. They are real, but they are removed from the statistical context.

If for example one were to compare the crime rate of 1989 with that of 1983, the average annual increase would be about 4.0 percent; compared with 1988, however, the increase is 18 percent. We can live with the first indicator, but the second is pretty awful. And if one compares the data from 1988 and 1989, the increase is dumfounding: 32 percent! In comparing the indicators for 1990 and the past years, one can come to any conclusion one wants. In comparison with the preceding year crime has increased by 13.2 percent. The growth rate is lower than that for 1989 by a more than a factor of two. This trend continues in the current year as well. That means the situation has improved, right? But you see, while crime increased, the increase was higher than the statistical average. And that means the situation has become worse, does it not?

Information on individual kinds of crimes only increase the possibility of distortion in the statistical mirror.

They say that statistics know everything. No doubt they do. But at the same time statistics can help provide a basis for whatever one wants. One can also put it like this: there are lies, damned lies, and statistics. Perhaps that is right, but what kept them under lock and key?

One must search for the answer not so much in the statistics, as much as in the method of presenting them.

The sources of the current fables about crime lie in the fact that objective, complete and comparable information is not available to any mortal who wishes to look into everything himself. The data that is made public is like a briefing, if one can put it that way. It is fragmentary and situational. And the television, as a rule, cries out for causes, moreover the most sensationalistic. None of this does much to clarify the general situation.

The force of statistical arguments lies not in games with figures, no matter how eloquent they are, and even less in the sensational case—but in the stability of the statistical trends, correlated with the social dynamic as a whole. It is not fashionable these days to quote the classics, but I will risk it: "No matter how dry these tight columns of figures in the official printed documents appear," wrote Karl Marx about crime figures printed in the Blue Book in Great Britain, "they actually provide more valuable material for history than tomes full of rhetorical nonsense and political babblings." We do not yet have any blue books, but last year, the Juridical Literature Publishing House printed the first small statistical handbook called, "Crime and Lawbreaking in the USSR."

#### As for the Myths Themselves

The first myth is the principal one and the oldest. It proceeds from Lenin's proposition, stated on the eve of the Revolution, about the "withering away" of the excesses involving the violation of the laws of the community, with the elimination of the fundamental social causes of crime, exploitation, poverty and want. And although Lenin stressed that he did not know how rapidly or how gradually this would take place, and did not return to this idea in his subsequent works, the question of "withering away" became axiomatic. The Third Program of the CPSU (1961) set the task unequivocally: to eradicate crime. Khrushchev was planning to shake the hand of the last criminal. I must admit that for a long time I was impressed with this idea.

Did the statistics support this idea? Yes—if one does not count the "counterrevolutionary" and "labor" crimes (showing up late from work or leaving the job), which were in the millions—criminal activity did decline from the 1930's to the 1950's. And not by single digits, but several times over. How else could it be? This was proof of the great advantages of socialism over capitalism! People believed it. I did too.

Later it became clear that if this was our trump card, the "Reduction of Crime" in those years was the result of total, open and secret, state, party, trade union, Komsomol, Pioneer, and other surveillance; which was not intended to provide social assistance to the people, but to slake the "patriotic" thirst for exposing and nailing someone. Informing, which was considered a positive national trait, was also cultivated simply by fear. People used to say that it is better to knock [be an informer] once than to tap out prison code for seven years.

Year after year, decade after decade, surveillance of the people became more severe. In the 1950's, moreover, it was in the criminological sense even more effective than in the 1930's. What then—were the Stalinists correct when they affirmed that under the "Leader of the Nations" crime would disappear into the past? But we ask: whose crimes? Those of the authorities, or those of ordinary mortals? The crimes of the authorities were boundless. There are many forms of protection against crimes by mortals—but not whatsoever from the crimes of a dictatorship.

Stalinism killed millions; today's criminals, thousands. It is a cynical statistic, but it exposes the quadratic law of criminal compensation of vulgar crime with the sophisticated crime of the authorities. In all countries in which criminals ruled or still do, crimes by its subjects are few (not counting "political" crimes). The reduction of crime in the 1930's and 1950's was not connected with our superiority, but with the phenomenon of bloody totalitarianism.

After Stalin's death, the scale of crime began to change, not in accordance with "our" laws, but with those of the world at large: once again as Marx discovered, it began to grow at a faster rate than the population. If one takes 1956 as the base year, the year of the first attempt to destroy Stalinism, by 1991 crime had increased by 481 percent in absolute terms. The average annual growth rate for 34 years was 11.2 percent, while the population grew at a rate of 1.2 percent. This is already a trend, or if you will, a law, which testifies to the fact that crime began to increase long before perestroika. The costs of the latter merely intensified its increase, especially in the last two years.

Since 1966, the year of the first increase in criminal liability in the post-Stalin period, the CPSU Central Committee alone adopted more than 15 resolutions aimed at intensifying the battle with crime. Now added to these are the resolutions of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. But alas! There is no correlation at all. It is true, there is nothing with which to correlate—not one of the resolutions was carried out. But let us take even the most elementary one—for 25 years they have been speaking about providing telephones to the investigators. And what has come of it? The question is still being debated today.

The second myth is the current one: that we will build a rule-of-law state, switch to a market economy, feed the people, make it possible to earn an honest living, and...crime will decrease. I hear these promises from respected people, speaking to the entire country on television. And I voted for all these planned changes. Only the last statement gives rise to doubts, for there is abundant proof today that this is another myth.

I have before me UN crime surveys. In the years 1975-1980, according to data from 54 countries (not all of which submitted information to the UN; the USSR did not do so), the number of reported crimes per 100,000

population increased in 34 states and decreased in 20. On the average, the changes amounted to 11 percent in the direction of increases in crime, or 2.2 percent per year each. In the following five-year period, 1980-1985, according to data from 48 countries, crime increased in 39 and decreased in nine. The statistical average increase—4.6 per year. According to preliminary results, during the period 1985-1990, the growth rate once again almost doubled. Reduction of crimes is registered in only certain states, as a rule the developing countries. It would be reasonable to propose that their subsequent progress will lead to a subsequent decrease in crime. Ah, but that is not the case.

The forecast for the years 1975-2000, according to UN calculations, indicate that the statistical average of registered crimes per 100,000 population will reach 8,000 in the developed countries this year: eight crimes per year per 100 citizens. This is a great many. The developing countries may reach this mark in the year 2000.

Our country is increasingly called a developing country. Thus, this year our crime rate is one crime per 100 citizens. On the basis of world trends, this number may increase several times over in the coming decades.

However, a prognosis is not a law; it always has many variations, and depends on the circumstances. Even within the country the difference in crime ratios among the republics reaches six-fold, and between some regions, twelve-fold. One thing is indisputable: the planned strategy for bringing the USSR closer to the developed countries in terms of politics and the economy does not automatically lead to a decrease in crime.

The high crime rate and its steady growth in North America and Western Europe is the price society is forced to pay for democracy and liberty, political, economic and psychological.

The USA, Sweden and Japan have the highest standard of living. The richest country, the USA, has the highest crime rate, exceeding the world indicators many times. It is a little lower in well-off Sweden. Only Japan, alone among the developed countries, is able to maintain the crime rate at a comparatively low level; which is to say, incidentally, about the same as ours today. I will not deal with quantitative comparisons. That is hard to do in a newspaper article, and requires analysis of the legal systems, the procedure for counting crimes and so on. But one thing is clear: crime is not connected with "isms." It is a more profound and universal phenomenon than it is a result of any of the social systems.

The third myth, the populist myth, is faith in a panacea. It exists, as a rule, among the non-professionals. And not only in the crowds.

Last April, after the session of the Presidential Council, where the problem of the battle with crime was discussed, I was invited to the CPSU Central Committee to the aides of one of the (former) members of the Politburo and the Council. They told me that I have a chance to

realize my scientific ideas: "You must propose measures which could provide an effect by the 40th day of the presidency." I was taken aback.

A sarcastic thought flashed through my mind: why by the 40th day? Probably the 40 days would mark something altogether different. Then I understood that this devil-may-care idea belongs to neither the president nor to a member of his Council, but to a most fascinating party staffer. But you see, even that says a lot, judging by the measures undertaken, that such an approach remains intact.

A doctor prescribes for his patient: If you want to be ill less often, take up a healthy lifestyle, become active in sports, eat sensibly, and do not smoke or drink. Good Lord, thinks the patient, how tedious all that is! You just cure me with a pill; I already know how to behave. And that is the way it is with the crime rate: just propose something extraordinary, so that there will be no more crime. But why compare it with an illness? In journalism, that is a figure of speech; whereas in science, it is a false comparison. Crime is not the illness, but merely a symptom of more profound illnesses in society. And they are countless multitudes. Moreover, they are not stable, but fluid and changing.

Many people are ready to treat the symptoms of crime. The basic prescription, which enjoys nationwide recognition is—harshness. Crucify him! The more reserved people call for letting the punishment fit the crime: an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth. Scholars in criminal law also demand proportional punishment; not punishment-in-kind, but punishment meted out in a civilized manner. You cannot get along without it. But you see, this is still treating the symptoms. An analgesic during a hypertonic crisis. The causes that were not treated will spawn swarms and swarms of new criminals. But we have hardly ever reached out to touch these causes.

A wide variety of representatives of the world community attended the Eighth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Law-breakers; they differed not only in the color of their skin, their speech, or their dress... They did not always reach agreement on the basic questions. But two questions managed to break through: How to stop the growth in the crime rate; and how to ensure humane treatment of criminals?

Are these variants compatible? Undoubtedly—with one reservation: they are compatible in a civilized, democratic society, which recognizes the true, natural causes of crime and the scientific and practical groundlessness of treating criminals harshly. Showing humanism toward them—as paradoxical as it may sound—is a more reliable method of curbing crime than harshness.

Many of us who consider ourselves disciples of Hegel and Marx, find it difficult to grasp the dialectical unity of the given variants. Until now, when discussing the methods of fighting crime, we have been forced to go directly to intensifying them and making them harsher. If you want to talk about humaneness, that has nothing

at all to do with criminal reality. We are people of extreme judgements, and not only in the battle with crime.

For example, at present the market and the western way of life are being mythologized. Appeals to careful scrutiny are interpreted as interference with perestroika. Psychologically one can understand or explain this. But all at once?! Therefore, one may only praise everything that is new or desirable. Problems? We will deal with them later. But they should be soberly discussed—in a timely manner, in parallel, and with respect to their relationship to one another.

How in general does the propaganda of today compare with that of the past? In my opinion, there is no comparison. An amazing cycle has evolved: take a beneficial idea, and mythologize it with no regard for the laws of nature and society; then employ aggressive party methods to put it into practice; then discredit the idea, and then search for someone to blame. Everything is laid to this devilish construction: socialism, collectivization, land reclamation, the cooperative movement, the battle with drunkenness; and—the battle with crime; the mythologizing of ideas, and the substitution of ideology for science and practical experience.

Myths aside, crime is increasing, I reiterate, throughout the world. And even more intensively in the juvenile and youth milieu. Criminal behavior is increasingly rationalized and profitablized [ukorystvovaetsya] (An awful word!). In most countries, the protection of criminal law cannot keep pace with progressively-worsening, self-regulating crime. Its increasing state of organization is a law-governed process.

The world community is extremely upset. "We the undersigned are members of the UN Committee on Preventing and Combatting Crime and are heads of UN-associated institutes studying the problems of crime in the world... We are not panicsters, nor have we come to our conclusions hastily. We are professionals and realists, who have tried with all our might to work within the framework of the existing structures... Combatting crime is one of the fundamental responsibilities of the state. It is extremely important. It is the necessary condition for national progress. To the extent that a state cannot guarantee the safety of its citizens, its gains, and its basic institutions, the economic, social and cultural development of that state will be held back..." This is from the appeal of the members of the committee and scholars, to the state. God help us if they are understood as an appeal for harshness.

Then one must ask the age-old questions: How are we to live? What is to be done?

I will not flatter myself with the hope that I know the whole answer. But, if we are to get rid of the mythology about controlling crime, we must:

—soberly look at crime as a collateral but natural product of society. Society is incapable of rooting it

out, but it can restrain it to a socially-tolerable level. There are no panaceas, nor are there any permanent remedies. It can be successfully controlled on the basis of continuous study, forecasting, and adequate, timely reaction.

- rationally utilize criminal information for studying the changing causes, in order to restore the health of society;
- not explain crime as the nature of man (as one person writing in *IZVESTIYA* made an effort to do recently). It is true, that a great deal is associated with nature. But for what reason? To improve the breed? To kill? Man has a critical need for social help. This is the only realistic method for making mankind more humane;
- to recognize, that in treating criminals, one must not make use of their methods; although this, as totalitarianism shows, does provide a temporary effect; that harshness here is not only fruitless, it is immoral: without reducing crime, it brutalizes the morals of the entire society; and,
- to guarantee a person the professional state protection from criminals under conditions of strict legality.

Criminal justice, guided only by law and serving only the people, in any political weather (or game), must remain stable and capable. Being under the control of the people, it must also be respected by them. It must never be above criticism; but it should be protected from political speculation, from turning the law-enforcement organs into an object, or subject of political struggle, which gives birth to the mythology of crime.

### Soviet Citizens Committing Drug Crimes

#### Police Official Comments

91WD0566A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT  
in Finnish 25 Feb 91 p. A5

[Article by Jarkko Sipila]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In January, the lower courts in Finland imprisoned as many citizens of the Soviet Union as during all of last year. There are hundreds of organized Soviet criminals operating in Finland, who bring alcohol, drugs, and steroids into Finland and take out illegally procured goods.

All this is known to Finland's police, but they are not able to prove it. The greatest part of Soviet crimes in Finland are concealed crimes. The Soviet criminals of Finland have connections with both Finnish criminals and the Soviet Union's Mafioso.

The Soviet Mafia that is operating in Finland cannot yet be addressed as such because the word is not correct. Soviet criminality in Finland is not connected with the machinery of state and economic life as it is in the Soviet Union.

However, Soviet criminality . . . Finland is organized. There are many Soviet gangs, and they operate everywhere in Finland. The gangs do not avoid any kinds of crime and many engage in prostitution, smuggling, and the selling of stolen goods.

For example, there is often an organization behind the shoplifting thefts carried out by Soviet citizens. A woman who works as a prostitute at night steals by day and delivers the goods to the "manager's level," from where they are conveyed to Soviet markets. There is no information about mutual cooperation among the gangs, but, according to some sources, "all the Russians who are in Finland know each other." Soviet Union 'twilight men' frequently travel between Scandinavian countries and Germany.

#### Support Organizations Composed of Emigrants

Many thousands of people who have moved from the Soviet Union live in Finland, so that, for criminals who shift from one country to another, there is a complete support organization already in existence. Russians preferably work with Russians and Estonians with Estonians. Of course, not all Soviet citizens living in Finland are connected with criminality.

The problem Finland's police have is that they do not get official information about the Soviet Union's crime situation. The existence of the Mafioso is, however, admitted. For example, last Friday, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov compared the criminal groups working the currency exchange to the Colombian Mafia.

The news that reaches Finland about the Soviet Union's criminal groups is based, however, on material intended for entertainment. For example, *Comrade Godfather—Criminality in the Soviet Union* by Dmitri Lihanov and Vadim Belyh is widely read in Finland's police circles.

The book's conclusion is simple: The true extent of the Soviet Union's Mafioso is evidently known only to its chiefs.

Soviet criminality can also work in reverse. According to information from Estonia, the heads of Tallinn's criminal gangs live in Helsinki because comforts are more extensive on the northern bank of the Gulf of Finland than on the southern one.

The Finnish police do not have official connections with the Soviet Union's guardians of the law. The Finnish do not even dare to work together with the Soviet militia because they are afraid that Finnish information will go straight to the criminals.

#### Smuggling Flourishes

For the present, Soviet criminals favor smuggling most of all. The police suspect but have been unable to prove that the smuggling gangs are members of the crews of the Tallinn vessels and trains that travel to the Soviet Union.



One thousand bottles of alcohol for street sales can come on one voyage by way of the ship *Georg Ots*. Soviet citizens living in Finland and Finnish black marketeers are frequently waiting in the harbor to buy bottles legally brought in by the tourists arriving from Tallinn. Some tourists sell the bottles themselves in the cities.

In addition to alcohol, steroids and drugs, primarily marijuana, are freighted into Finland by ships, trains, tractor trailers, and passenger automobiles. Some of the drugs and steroids remain in Finland and some continue to a third country—to some Scandinavian country or Germany.

#### **The Drug Markets Have Room for Neighbors**

It is easy for Soviet citizens to get a share of Finland's drug market because Finnish drug smugglers and merchants are also frequently users themselves. Narcotics hardly grow in Finland so they must be smuggled in from abroad.

Most narcotics circulate in the vicinity of the capital. Drug-free areas are no longer found anywhere in Finland. According to the police, there are thousands of hashish and marijuana smokers.

In Helsinki, most drugs circulate on weekends in the vicinity of the Makkaratalo. Sales have increased tremendously during the past two years. In addition to Soviet citizens, other foreigners sell narcotics.

Soviet criminals particularly smuggle hashish and marijuana, which grow in the southern republics and in Afghanistan. Tens, possible even hundreds, of kg of cannabis have been brought into Finland. In addition to the capital region, Soviet hashish has circulated in Vaasa, Lappeenranta, and Tampere as well as in other places.

#### **The Trails End at the Border**

On the Soviet Union side, the narcotics trade is firmly in the control of the Mafioso. The Finnish police are generally able to follow the trail of arrested smugglers only as far as the middleman, and only if they have received information from arrested gang members.

Some of the smugglers of narcotics, steroids, and alcohol are merely paid "rules." Ordinary tourists are also used in smuggling. While they are in the Soviet Union, they are given the goods to be carried and an address in Finland. The smugglers are compensated with Western currency for the risks they take.

Since last fall, customs has confiscated more than 200,000 steroid pills. However, customs suspects that a lot more "buttons" have been brought over the border. Steroids are used in gyms, but the journey of the steroids has possibly also continued on into Sweden. One steroid button cost 10 pennies in Estonia and 50 pennies on the black market in Finland.

#### **Threats or Bribes**

In the Soviet Union, the Mafia uses exceedingly strong methods. Activity is frequently based on violence or the threat of extortion or a bribe. The object of violence can also be a friend or a family member of the prey to be persuaded.

An Estonian who got caught in January for smuggling more than 120,000 steroid pills kept his mouth shut and claimed that he was living under pressure. In the background there could really be a threat, or the pressure of it could be claimed so that the court would look upon the pressure as an extenuating circumstance.

The Finnish police fear that Soviet criminals will begin to use methods familiar to them from the homeland, whose intent is to paralyze officials by threatening and bribing.

There already have been examples. Not very long ago, in Helsinki's South Harbor, customs inspectors were threatened with violence if papers were inspected too closely. Since then, at least one high-ranking police officer and some private citizens have been threatened.

That criminality is intensifying is shown by the fact that many men and women of Helsinki's police department have procured, at their own expense, body armor that can be worn through an entire tour of duty. However, part of the reason is the fact that domestic police calls have become more violent.

#### **Only Capital Offenses Are Missing From the List**

Soviet criminals in Finland have not yet been arrested for capital crimes. The eastern neighbor can be found in the other statistics.

Russian and Estonian prostitutes circulate in the restaurants of Helsinki's biggest hotels. The girls pay their pimps a share of their earnings, which in one night might come to thousands of markkas. However, in Finland at present, prostitutes have not been used as bait for robbery as in Tallinn and Leningrad.

There were about 10 robberies in Helsinki last fall in which the perpetrator was suspected of being a Soviet citizen. In the majority of the robberies, the victim was threatened with a hunting knife, not with a firearm. As far as is known, there are a lot of Soviet-made weapons circulating in Finland, but they have not been caught in the net of either the police or customs.

The police have also learned of a few robbery cases among the Soviets themselves, but, according to the police, "not even the devil could solve them."

Those interrogated by Helsinki's criminal police about a series of order frauds have intimated the involvement of a semitrailer driver from the Soviet Union. In the order fraud, different kinds of goods, which are then left unpaid for, are ordered in the name of an enterprise.

Frequently, a large portion of forwarded merchandise disappears without leaving a trace.

The security police have warned Finnish enterprises that organized Soviet criminals could attempt to operate within the protection of joint enterprises.

#### **Finnish Markkas Flow From Estonia**

According to some assessments, there are altogether a couple of hundred million Finnish markkas in Estonia, mostly 100-markka bills. However, since the beginning of the year, large amounts of money have returned to Finland.

A Soviet citizen can open an account in a Finnish bank, but, in principle, only money earned in Finland can be deposited. Banks have been elastic about the principle and accepted the markkas of Estonians without questioning their origin.

#### **Why?**

How does a Soviet citizen get a visa?

In 1990, about 220,000 visas for travel to Finland were approved for Soviet citizens. Seventy thousand were approved in Leningrad, 90,000 in Tallinn, 60,000 in Moscow, and 100 in Petroskoi.

If a Soviet citizen applies for a visa now in Leningrad, for example, it will be handled after four months. This year, not quite 300,000 visas will be granted.

In practice, a visa or entry permit into a country is a stamp that is put into a passport.

What kinds of visas are given to Soviet citizens at Finland's consulate general in Leningrad. Consul General Markus Lyra?

"They are generally tourist visas that allow a stay in Finland for a month, at most. The basic philosophy is that the individual has to be able to get along in Finland. He has to have either funds or a guarantee that some Finn will cover his expenses. The guarantee is a so-called invitation.

"We also grant multiple visas, with which Finland can be visited often. For example, a businessman from a Finnish-Soviet citizen joint enterprise can get that kind."

How many visas do you grant daily there?

"About 300 to 400."

Is there any kind of background check of the applicant?

"Yes. While granting the visa, questions are asked about personal information, previous journeys to Finland, and the object of the trip. If we have information about a criminal background, it prevents the granting of a visa. Of course, the seriousness of the crime must be taken into consideration.

Are many visa applications disapproved?

"Yes, a couple each day. The basis of disapproval most frequently appears to be that the invitation was falsified."

Are attempts made to obtain visas by blackmailing you?

"No. Criminality appears in falsified invitations and with professional inviters. Some sell invitations to Finland as a profession."

How much does that kind of invitation cost?

"About a thousand rubles."

#### **"The Police, Not the Citizenry, Have Reasons To Become Anxious"**

Kari Rantama, the assistant chief of the Central Criminal Police, considers the growth of Soviet criminality in Finland alarming, but only from the viewpoint of the officials. "The penniless old woman does not need to be afraid of Soviet criminals."

In Rantama's opinion, an exchange of information between the officials of the Soviet Union and those of Finland would be the most important tactic in the prevention of Soviet criminality. "When the need arises, we could also conduct joint operations," Rantama says.

Rantama is fretting over the present one-sided situation, in which the Finns know very little about the affairs of their neighbors. The exchange of information at present is based upon the personal relationships of the Finns and the Soviet Russians.

"As long as cooperation is not based on agreements or in joint rules of the game, then it doesn't work properly."

In Finland, there is also no interest in organized crime on the part of the criminal court. In the criminal court, the emphasis is on the sentencing of criminals one at a time. In Finnish laws, there are no conspiracy statutes on the basis of which the Mafia bosses have been brought before the court in the United States, for example.

"The situation is not yet so alarming that laws need to be legislated."

#### **Visas for Criminals**

According to Rantama, the Soviet citizen visa obligation cannot be removed if the situation is looked at from the viewpoint of crime prevention. It is true that visas are granted to the wrong people. It is difficult to check the backgrounds of the applicants because there are so many applicants.

A sentence and an expulsion do not keep Soviet criminals out of Finland. "Information about the crimes of the applicants for the mandatory visas has not always reached the grantors of visas."

In Finland, a Soviet criminal who has received a sentence has immediately gotten a new visa, even though he should not get one.

"The coordination of the entire program directed at foreigners should be reorganized so that it is thought through in its entirety," Rantama says. According to him, at present, every authority deliberates only the problems of his own area, and nobody looks at the whole.

### Paper Views Situation

91WD0566B Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT  
in Finnish 1 Mar 91 p 2

[Editorial: "Soviet Criminality Is Growing"]

[Text] As Soviet criminality spreads more than before into Finland, it is a new challenge for both the police and the foreign ministry. Last fall, the Soviet Union became a member of the international police organization, INTERPOL, but the connections are still incomplete. The official path between the police of the Soviet Union and those of Finland is through the Foreign Ministry, and, therefore, it is too slow to prevent professional criminality. Practical cooperative relationships should be established between the police officials of our countries as quickly as possible.

When the borders opened, criminality also "integrated." The lack of agreement concerning cooperation and information exchange with the Soviet Union's police authorities became, however, a surprise problem. Now that accomplishment is easier said than done.

Criminality is increasing, and the police in the Soviet Union are powerless because the country's social conditions are shaky. The Finnish police can be expected to master the criminality organized outside of the country's borders only in cooperation with its neighboring country. There must be a response to the severe grips of the criminals, but arrests, raids, and interrogations are not enough.

Kari Rantama, the assistant chief of the Central Criminal Police, is correct when he says that the entire design concerning foreigners should be organized again so that it is considered in its entirety. Consideration must not, of course, lead to a decision such that foreign policy becomes a preliminary preventer of crime. Foreign police should spring from other factors. Visa practice is a good example. As Rantama affirms, the spread of criminality should not be prevented by tightening the granting of visas. That would really lead to the closing of the borders.

### KGB's Karbainov on Public Relations Efforts, Rome Visit

91UF0685A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with KGB General A. Karbainov, chief of the USSR KGB Center for Public Liaison, by TRUD correspondent P. Negoitsa, Rome, 23 April 1991: "Italy: The KGB Tells All"]

[Text] I want to make it clear at the outset: I did not come up with this title. I borrowed it from a colorful

prospectus published in Italy in connection with the unveiling of the agreement signed by Italy's Damar film production company, and the USSR KGB Center for Public Liaison. The center's chief, General Aleksandr Nikolayevich Karbainov, arrived in the Eternal City at the request of the Italian organizers. He kindly answered numerous questions from the correspondents, who had gathered on this rare occasion at the Foreign Press Association. The questions, of course, touched upon more than this future television series: In it, Damar is planning to cover certain pages from the history of the Committee for State Security. There were questions related to the attempt to assassinate the Pope—does the KGB have a dossier on this? Or, why has the "most secret" of all secret services suddenly decided to dispel some of its mystery for the public? Frankly, I was also interested to hear an answer to this. We made arrangements for a separate meeting, to talk in a quiet atmosphere.

However, at the Plaza Hotel, which is located just a short distance from the government's Palazzo Chigi, I again found the general surrounded by foreign journalists.

"Personally, I am not surprised by this interest in the KGB," said Aleksandr Nikolayevich when my foreign colleagues finally left and we could start a conversation. "After all, for many decades the Committee for State Security remained some kind of a monster in the imagination of many people."

[Negoitsa] This is probably natural in the absence of information...

[Karbainov] That is why we have created, in the spirit of glasnost, the Center for Public Liaison—to inform the people about the tasks of the KGB, and the directions and results of its work. One of the center's main tasks is to enhance the trust in KGB organs. We know that this is not an easy task. But people must come to realize that during a certain period of time the state security organs were turned into Stalin's mechanism for power. They were put above the party.

We should not diminish the organization's responsibility for ruined lives, but at the same time people should know that during that time the machinery of repressions also worked against the state security organs as well. In the thirties and forties and in the beginning of fifties, 22,000 chekists were executed. Some of them were guilty. But the main blow was directed at honest intelligence officers. Suffice it to say that during that time almost the entire Soviet foreign intelligence network was ruined. The most horrible crimes took place under Yezhov, who himself eventually became a victim of the regime. That Dante's Hell is still alive in popular memory. Some people play on this human pain and try to make a political career out of unmasking the KGB. But I think that the majority of people will feel sympathy, not bitterness.

[Negoitsa] In your opinion, what could help to increase people's trust in the KGB?

[Karbainov] The law. Also, a parliamentary oversight of the activities of the state security services. In the past, the KGB organs were guided in their activities not by the law, but by the notion of "political expediency"—this is an expression coined by Vychinskiy and supported by Stalin. The USSR Supreme Soviet is now deliberating on the draft law on the KGB. I am convinced that when it is adopted many myths and conjectures about the functions of the Committee for State Security will fade away. The name itself defines the priority direction in its work: ensuring the state security of the USSR and its citizens. The rest will be based on this.

[Negoitsa] Lately, the KGB has become involved in combating organized crime. Society's reaction to this varies...

[Karbainov] Yes, there is the opinion that in this area the KGB is taking over a function of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But we have our own area of involvement: interception of currency smuggling; uncovering connections between the emerging Soviet mafia and organized crime abroad; and unmasking corruption in the organs of power. I should mention that there has always been KGB involvement in the investigation of especially serious crimes. For instance, the state security services were involved in the "Ocean" case, and the investigation of the Yeliseyev store in Moscow. Now, however, we are dealing not just with individual incidents but with a whole, deep-reaching criminal strata. We have experience in foreign operations; therefore, we are uniquely positioned to prevent in a timely fashion the fusion between our criminal world and the foreign one. We have already had the first exchanges of information in this area with the special services of other countries.

[Negoitsa] You have probably heard the opinion that organs of Soviet power are infiltrated by former criminals—people who have done time in prison. Does the KGB have any information on this subject?

[Karbainov] It is not our job to check out personalities. It is useful to remember, though, that some capitalist countries, including the United States, have regulations under which candidates must submit certain forms and statements before they can register to run. I think we need a similar law in our society. Its application in regard to citizens who wish to be elected to the organs of power would not contradict universal human norms. After all, when people apply for a job, their resumes are put through the necessary verification check. Why should the voters not protect themselves from unscrupulous candidates or criminals? But let us not talk about criminals in the parliament. Elected power should be respected. If there are factual grounds start a judicial investigation, but do not casually throw around accusations for the purpose of political gain.

[Negoitsa] In conclusion, please tell TRUD readers about the "deal of the century" with the Italian company Damar.

[Karbainov] We have signed a contract—on a commercial basis—to produce a 13-part television series about the KGB. We hope that it will be an engaging, suspenseful, and at the same time objective narrative about Soviet intelligence. Its history has some failures and betrayals, but they were not the factor that shaped its role and high professionalism. The television series will make use of some unique documentary material. While we are on the subject, I want to mention that our center is working on other cultural initiatives. We are organizing, together with the Ministry of Culture, an exhibition "The Rescued National Treasure." Visitors will see national relics which have been rescued by intelligence officers. We will also be publishing a monthly magazine soon, which will be available through subscription.

[Negoitsa] In short, having read and seen the works about KGB activities, you really decided to change the stereotypes that had developed about your committee, and to accommodate the public?

[Karbainov] Moreover—to accommodate specific individuals.

*To prove that he means what he says, Aleksandr Nikolayevich gave two telephone numbers for the Center for Public Liaison: 224-15-88 or 224-15-64. So, before you believe rumors about another KGB "plot," please call. You will get the information firsthand.*

### KGB Apprehends Arms Dealers

91UF0667A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by V. Filin: "We Take Everyone Who Is in the Clearing: Our Correspondent Participated in an Operation to Apprehend a Group of Arms Dealers"]

[Text] An evening telephone call knocked me out of my customary rut. "Hello," the person said, "are you the person who worked on the black market in arms in our country?"

"Yes, I am."

"I am calling from the State Security Committee [KGB], the Administration for the Protection of the Constitutional System. My name is Colonel Vladimir Vasilyevich L., and I am in the Department to Fight Terrorism. If you would like to, you may participate in our operation to disarm a group of arms dealers."

At exactly 0630 hours I got into a black Volga with a radiotelephone.

The trip took about an hour and a half. During that time the person with whom I was traveling, Major Vasilii Burlin, briefly filled me in with the course of events.

A certain Major S., who served in one of the suburban Moscow units, had come into the field of vision of the military counterintelligence and procuracy agencies. He distinguished himself from the other personnel in his



unit by the fact that he actively sought places where he could "get his hands on" weapons without any interference. S. frequently had friends as guests. For the most part, they were from the southern krays, and several of them were also, in passing, interested in weapons. In addition to everything else, the major had recently become the owner of a nice new "pyaterka" ["fiver"—type of vehicle], equipped with a television receiver and a video tape recorder, but his ties with his friends obviously had led to criminal circles in "hot spots" in the country.

His acquaintances, judging by the information about them, by that time had already had time to get their hands on a small quantity of the "commodity" being sought, and to send it to their parts of the country, where at that time there had been widespread pogroms in the markets and commission stores. They needed a very large consignment of weapons, especially since they were not experiencing any shortage of money. At one of the stages of the operation, the KGB "switched in." All the "merchants'" actions were put under surveillance. They were secretly photographed on video tape and the appropriate documents were prepared. The "development" occupied two plump volumes.

The procuracy, upon becoming acquainted with the preliminary materials, gave its approval to detain the "dealers" and "traders" with evidence in their possession. The place of the transaction and the entire course of events were computed with almost mathematical precision. Today it would be necessary to carry out, so to speak, advanced piloting in operational work—the apprehension of the "traders" and "dealers" at the moment of the transaction.

"You will see the rest yourself," the major said. He stopped the car near an unprepossessing dirty fence on the edge of a deserted settlement of dachas. "They are waiting for you here."

The car drove away. A gate in the fence opened, and I saw a tall man wearing a sports jacket and blue jeans. He had the physique of a former weight-lifter.

"Hello, I am Colonel L.," he said.

Situated in the ordinary little dacha was the holy of holies of the operation—the command post. A blonde woman with a high hair-do was smoking a Belomor silently on the small porch. She was an investigator from the procuracy. Work that was at first unintelligible was in progress in the small squeaking attic that smelled of drying oil, in the midst of sauna whisks that had been hung up to dry. Two agents were unpacking and adjusting television apparatus—video cameras and a portable Panasonic television set. Another agent, with the power back of a wrestler, was speaking quietly into the mouthpiece of a radio telephone. Someone wearing a raincoat, a bright shirt, and a necktie was smoking in the corner.

"We still have about 50 minutes before the operation begins," L. explained to me. "Our people are currently monitoring our 'wards' actions. They are still getting ready to depart. It will take them about an hour to get here. According to our information, there should be five or six people, most probably armed. Inasmuch as they are supposed to have something like 270,000 rubles on them, it is possible that they will arrive with a 'cover detachment,' fearing a 'hit.' Weapons, the commodity, and at the place of the transaction."

Fighting against a strange and increasingly intense inner feeling that is apparently similar to the feeling experienced by a hunter in an ambush, I looked at the Panasonic screen and listened to L.'s explanations.

"This is the place of the transaction. Concealed television cameras and microphones have been installed all around. Here comes a car. It is a courier, who has arrived ahead of the others, apparently in order to check out the place." Then, speaking into a walkie-talkie, he immediately tells someone, "Do not get excited. Things will not be beginning for a long time."

"I am not too excited," the reply came over the walkie-talkie. "It is just that I am going to have to leave quietly to attend to personal needs..." The people in the attic chuckled quietly. The woman waved her hand.

"The fellow over there," L. continued, pointing to the "wrestler" in the leather coat, "is Volodya. He is the senior man in the apprehension group from the antiterrorist subdivision of USSR KGB" (the names of the main figures have been changed). "These people," he said, pointing to the people with the television apparatus, "are technicians from the external surveillance group." Then, pointing to the others, he said, "And these are comrades from the local KGB department and investigators."

The radio telephone sprang to life. Picking up the receiver, Volodya, from the apprehension group, reported, "That was the 'externals.' The dealers had a telephone conversation with Leningrad. Now they are driving all around the city, checking to see whether they are being followed."

L. flexed his shoulders: would they come or would they not? If not, then everything at first...

"We are leading them," the "externals"—the external surveillance group—reported. "There are four people riding in a red Moskvich. There is a gray diplomat with them."

The operational mechanism, which up to now had been wound up tightly in accordance with its own laws that were invisible to the outsider, reached its maximum tension.

"They have split up near the 'train station,'" the radio-telephone said, coming to life again. "Two of them have started toward you in a car, and two have stayed here."

"Dammit," L. said. "Well, that is all right. We will still get all of them, except that we will have to do it separately. First we will get these two at the clearing, and then the other two at the 'train station.' We will get all of them."

The red Moskvich slowly drove onto the clearing, right in front of the television cameras. Then it backed up slightly to the trunk of a Zhiguli. The people got out of the cars slowly and approached one another apprehensively. They greeted one another. The microphones clearly picked up the conversation with an abundance of unprintable expressions. Then they approached the trunk of the Zhiguli. One of them opened it...

Volodya, frowning, quietly spoke into the radiotelephone. "'Boxes,' let's take all of them who are in the clearing. Go!"

I daresay that no one has actually seen with his own eyes the work of the professionals from the antiterror group of USSR KGB. Except maybe in Sukhumi, during the seizure of the isolation ward with the hostages.

Tall figures in the typical helmets with visors and individual "communication" on the back of their necks, wearing camouflage suits and bulletproof vests, appeared from no one knows where and, with blood-chilling shouts, instantaneously pinned the "dealers" and "traders" to the ground. Apparently none of them had time to say a single word, much less do anything.

We came rushing out of the attic and dashed to the side of the clearing, the distance to which proved to be only about 150-200 meters. The technicians were already there, using the video cameras and photographic cameras, and the woman investigator from the procuracy was recording into a dictaphone the official record pertaining to the inspection of the place of detention. Two more passenger cars and a Jeep drove up. These were "wolf-hounds" from the special-purpose group. Without cooling off after the seizure, they worked intensively to record everything that was happening. The detained individuals, in handcuffs and closely squeezed in on all sides, were put into different cars, after first being recorded on video and by photographs. Bundles of money were taken from the diplomat and put onto the hood of the Zhiguli. People began counting it...

"It is all here," L. said, with a relieved smile. "We have done our job."

I looked into the trunk, where there was a pile of pistols. Then I looked at the money strewn on top of the car and at the main "dealer" with a white face and wobbly legs. Yes, without a doubt, everything actually had been done here...

A little while later I was dashing back to Moscow in one of the official cars of the apprehensive group. Tolik, as I had christened to myself the tall, muscular agent who was apparently a boxer, had his hands firmly attached to

the steering wheel. He drove the "pyaterka" in such a way that at times it jumped up off the ground and flew over the asphalt...

There are a lot of weapons on the streets throughout the country. The demand for them is high, especially in the "hot spots."

What is there to oppose them, other than the might of the KGB and MVD structures. And will there be enough of those structures under the conditions of a constitutional crisis? It seems that there will be, at an expensive price. The shots in Rostov at VV officers are not a random situation.

To this day no one has yet attempted in any concrete way to answer two questions: from where and in what manner did this tremendous amount of weapons find its way into the areas of interethnic conflicts and who issues the orders to the people who are doing the shooting?

#### **Kalugin Comments on Case Against Ryzhkov, Current Issues**

*91UF0717A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 2 Apr 91 p 2*

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy and former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA; date and place not given: "There Are too Many People Like That"]

[Text][KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Oleg Danilovich, the USSR Supreme Court satisfied the objection of the Procurator General in the case of "Kalugin versus Ryzhkov." Your comments...

[Kalugin] I was deprived of my rank and pension without a trial and an investigation, and the decision of the Supreme Court unequivocally demonstrated the thinking from which our judicial departments are suffering. In our country, you can take the ispolkom [executive committee] to court, for example, at the rayon or city level. But the ispolkom of a higher level must be, as the saying goes, above suspicion. Only, you see, here it is a question of official forgery! There was no decree of the Council of Ministers. There was a decision signed by Ryzhkov and Shkabardnya, and what kind of collegiality can be talked about here? After all, there was no court sitting as such.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Will you take any steps after the Supreme Court decision?

[Kalugin] Yes, of course. There is Comrade Kryuchkov whom we might take to court, because he took away my pension. Second, there is the Constitutional Oversight Committee. Third, there is the Supreme Soviet. Fourth, the free press.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Does it not seem to you that the hardness displayed by the president on the

question of the rally of 28 March is indirect confirmation of his consent to the introduction of troops into Lithuania?

[Kalugin] I would not forecast too far. In any case, it showed that he has nothing else other than the armed forces. But I do not think he will repeat Lithuania. I heard from a number of American congressmen that they will not tolerate such a variant. Of course, it is not a question of an invasion, but of influence of a moral and economic order, and Gorbachev understands this too well.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] How do you comment on the recent TASS statement about granting political asylum for "fighters for an idea?"

[Kalugin] I think this reflects the increasing role of the "proletarian internationalists" of the Polozkov type who imposed their party will on Gorbachev and consequently on all Soviet structures. This is the rescuing hand that is extended to brothers-in-arms who, somewhere in the GDR and other countries, are guilty of illegalities because who knows who will need help tomorrow...

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Is not this statement "in reference to Honnecker?"

[Kalugin] Very possibly. He was stolen from Germany, violating all the norms of international law, and now they want to legalize all of this.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] In your opinion, what is the worst we can expect from the third Russian Congress of People's Deputies?

[Kalugin] I see nothing of the kind that would put us in an extremely pessimistic frame of mind. A quite possible variant is that everything will remain as previously.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] And what then?

[Kalugin] Well, then... Life goes on. Someone has to leave. I think it will be Gorbachev. It appears that the process of his discrediting in the eyes of public opinion on the 28th has been concluded. Many of those who preserved a residue of belief have lost it after encountering monumental but absolutely unnecessary force. And incidentally, no matter what is said from the rostrum, there were cases of beatings in Moscow. People in civilian clothes were doing the beating. They dragged people into special buses and they used clubs. And this is recorded in photographs, including by American senators who observed these monstrous scenes from the window of the Metropole Hotel! I think the press should publicize these facts. I talked about this with A.N. Yakovlev and he said: "Yes, it is necessary to bring criminal charges." But how is this done against "people in civilian clothes" who disappear quickly as soon as an attempt is made to seize them by the collar?

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But do you have "tails?" As a specialist you also should notice these things?

[Kalugin] At one time, there were. I do not see them now. But this does not mean anything. I became accustomed to living under observation for 20 years. What difference does it make to me whether it is American or Soviet "observers..."

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] It has become usual in our country to treat anything associated with the KGB with almost a genetic fear. But in your opinion, Oleg Danilovich, do not your colleagues, who are democratically inclined deputies, experience a similar sensation from the fact that you are next to them?

[Kalugin] A very insignificant part. Among the Russian deputies, I can, for example, name Ponomarev. But this is connected with the fact that at one time he was accused of cooperation with the KGB, and, for some reason, he is inclined to attribute these accusations to me. Although, I have said that I will never mention the name of even one person associated with the KGB (and there are quite a few of them in the supreme organs of the Union and Russia), if there is absolutely no necessity to do this, and if these people do not intentionally harm the democratic movement. But so... Let them sleep peacefully. There are too many people like that, and why ruin their lives? But "they know that I know." Some of them even approached me: "Oleg Danilovich, you know that I worked only for intelligence, and not for counter-intelligence."

### Changes in RSFSR Criminal, Civil Codes Published

91UN13424 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 18 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Law of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic "On Entering Amendments and Addenda to the RSFSR Criminal and Civil Codes and the Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes, and to the RSFSR Administrative Law Code"]

[Text] In connection with the adoption of the USSR Law "On the Press and Other Mass Media," the RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To enter the following changes and additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, 1960, No. 40, p. 591; 1962, No. 29, p. 449; 1982, No. 49, p. 1821; 1985, No. 45, p. 1572):

1. To change the title of Chapter Four in the Special Part to read as follows:

"Crimes Against Political, Labor, and Other Rights and Freedoms of Citizens."

2. To add to the Code Article 140<sup>1</sup> with the following contents:

"Article 140<sup>1</sup> Interference In Lawful Professional Activities of Journalists.

"Malicious interference in whatever form in the lawful professional activities of journalists, or coercion aimed at forcing them to distribute, or refuse to distribute, information with the purpose of limiting the freedom of the press or other mass media—is punishable by corrective labor for a period of up to one year or a fine of up to 2,000 rubles [R]."

"The same actions committed using official position—are punishable by corrective labor for a period of up to two years, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities; or by deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain types of activities for a period between one and five years; or by a fine in the amount of R1,000 to R3,000, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities."

"Actions defined in parts one or two of this article, but aggravated by violence directed at a journalist or his relatives, or damage to or destruction of their property; or by threat of violence against him or his relatives, or of damage to or destruction of their property; or committed by way of bribery—are punishable by incarceration for a period of up to two years, or corrective labor for the same period, or by a fine in the amount of R3,000 to R5,000, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities."

3. Part two of Article 130 to read as follows:

"Slander in a published or otherwise replicated written work, or in the mass media, or in an anonymous letter, as well as that committed by a person previously convicted of slander—is punishable by corrective labor for a period of up to two years, or by a fine in an amount up to R3,000, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities."

4. Part two of Article 131 to read as follows:

"Criminal insult in printed matter or the mass media, or insult perpetrated by a person previously indicted for criminal insult—is punishable by corrective labor for a period of up to two years, or by a fine in an amount up to R3,000, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities."

II. To enter following changes in the RSFSR Civil Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, 1964, No. 24, p. 407; 1987, No. 9, p. 250):

1. Article 7 to read as follows:

"Article 7. Protection of Honor and Dignity

"A citizen or organization is entitled to demand through court the refutation of information injurious to their honor and dignity, unless whoever is spreading such information proves that it is true.

"If information that is untrue and injurious to the honor and dignity of a citizen or organization is spread through organs of the mass media, it must be refuted through the same mass media organs.

"If information that is untrue and injurious to the honor and dignity of a citizen or organization is contained in a document originating from an organization, such a document is to be replaced.

"The procedure for refuting injurious information in other circumstances is determined by the court.

"A citizen or organization in regard to whom mass media organs published information limiting their rights and legitimate interests has the right to publish their reply in the same mass media organ.

"The demand of a citizen or organization to publish a refutation or reply in the mass media organ is considered by the court only if the editor of the mass media organ refused such publication or did not publish it in accordance with procedures stipulated by law.

"Moral (exemplary) damages suffered by a citizen as a result of a mass media organ spreading information that is untrue and injurious to the citizen's honor and dignity, or other exemplary damages suffered by him, are compensated for, by the decision of the court, by the mass media organ as well as by officials or citizens responsible for such damage, in the amount determined by the court."

III. To enter the following changes and additions into the RSFSR Administrative Law Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, 1984, No. 27, p. 909; 1985, No. 9, p. 306; No. 40, p. 1398; 1986, No. 6, p. 176; No. 23, p. 638; 1987, No. 7, p. 201; No. 23, p. 800; No. 24, p. 839; No. 27, p. 961; 1988, No. 12, p. 341; No. 14, p. 397; No. 31, p. 1005; 1989, No. 10, p. 248; No. 50, p. 1477; 1990, No. 1, p. 3; No. 10, p. 287; No. 21, p. 232):

1. To consider Article 171<sup>1</sup> Article 171<sup>4</sup>.

2. To add to the Code Articles 171<sup>1</sup>, 171<sup>2</sup>, and 171<sup>3</sup> the following contents:

"Article 171<sup>1</sup>. Violation of the Order on Production and Distribution of a Mass Media Product

"Production and distribution of a mass media product without registering it or after the decision to cease its production or publication—is subject to a fine in an amount up to R500 with confiscation of the edition of the mass media product.

"The same actions undertaken by a person in official position—are subject to a fine in an amount up to R1000 with confiscation of the edition of the mass media product.

"The same actions undertaken by a person who in the year prior to the action was subject to administrative sanctions for a violation listed in parts one and two of



this article—are subject to a fine in an amount up to R1000 with confiscation of the edition of the mass media product, and with or without confiscation of the technical means used in production and distribution of the mass media product

"Article 171<sup>2</sup>. Violation of the Order on Disclosing Publisher's Particulars

"Production and distribution of printed publications or mass media products without required publisher's particulars, or with incomplete or knowingly false publisher's particulars—is subject to a warning or fine in an amount up to R200 for individual citizens and in an amount up to R500, with or without confiscation of the edition of the mass media product, for officials.

"The same actions undertaken by a person who in the course of one year prior to the action was subject to administrative sanctions for one of the violations listed in part one of this article—are subject to a fine in the amount of R1000 to R3,000, with or without confiscation of the edition of the mass media product

"Article 171<sup>3</sup>. Violation of the Order to Supply Preprint and Mandatory Copies

"Violation of the order on supplying preprint and mandatory copies of printed publications, and of the order on storage of television and radio program materials—is subject to a warning or fine in an amount up to R200 for individual citizens and in an amount up to R500 for officials

"The same actions undertaken by a person who in the course of one year prior to the action was subject to administrative sanctions for one of the violations listed in part one of this article—are subject to a fine in the amount of R1000 to R3,000, with or without confiscation of the edition of the mass media product

3. To replace the numbers "170-177" in part one of Article 199 with numbers "170, 171, 171<sup>4</sup>—177"

4. To add numbers "171<sup>1</sup>—171<sup>3</sup>" to Article 202, part two of Article 247, and part one of Article 274 after number "167"

5. To replace number 171<sup>1</sup> in part one of Article 224 with number 171<sup>4</sup>

6. To add numbers "171<sup>1</sup>—171<sup>3</sup>" to paragraph two of Article 290 after number "164"

IV. To decree that reports on administrative violations listed in Articles 171<sup>1</sup> and 171<sup>2</sup> in the RSFSR Administrative Law Code are drawn up by authorized representatives of the internal affairs organs.

Reports on administrative violations listed in Article 171<sup>2</sup> in the RSFSR Administrative Law Code may also be drawn up by officials of state organs where the corresponding mass media are registered.

Reports on administrative violations listed in article 171<sup>1</sup> in the RSFSR Administrative Law Code are drawn up by officials of state organs where the corresponding mass media are registered.

V. To enter the following changes and additions to Article 126 of the RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, 1960, No. 40, p. 592; 1965, No. 50, p. 1243; 1968, No. 35, p. 946; No. 38, p. 1039; 1970, No. 22, p. 442; 1972, No. 51, p. 1207; 1973, No. 16, p. 353; 1974, No. 29, p. 781, 782; 1975, No. 33, p. 699; 1978, No. 15, p. 410; 1980, No. 20, p. 536; 1984, No. 5, p. 166; 1985, No. 5, p. 163; No. 40, p. 1398; 1986, No. 23, p. 638; 1987, No. 27, p. 961; No. 36, p. 1295; No. 43, p. 1501; 1988, No. 14, p. 396, 397; No. 33, p. 1081; No. 48, p. 1529; 1989, p. 16, p. 397; No. 28, p. 739; No. 37, p. 1074)

—to replace number "131" in part one with the words "131 part one";

—to add in part three after the words "130 part two and three" the words "131 part two"

VI. To enter the following changes to Article 406 of the RSFSR Civil Procedure Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, 1964, No. 24, p. 407; 1985, No. 5, p. 163):

—to replace the words "up to R200" in part four with the words "up to R500";

—to exclude from part five the words "However, the total amount cannot exceed R1000"

VII. This law becomes effective from the moment of its publication

B.N. Yeltsin, chairman,  
RSFSR Supreme Soviet  
RSFSR House of Soviets,  
Moscow, 21 March 1991

### Moscow Militia Workers Object to Organizational Changes

91UN1341A RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian  
17 Apr 91 p.4

[Article by Vladimir Yershkov and Aleksandr Nadzharov: "But Did They Ask the Militia?"]

[Text] In an attempt to overcome the stalemate with the leadership of the capital's service which maintains public order, the presidium of the Moscow Soviet passed a resolution to establish a municipal militia.

What is this? The Moscow Soviet considers it to be the same militia, only subordinated to and financed by the municipal authorities. Workers of the law enforcement organs have a different opinion. They are convinced that some services must be part of the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and of the RSFSR. For example, the Department for Combating Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation

[OBBkSS], the investigating staff, and criminal investigation. You see, still fresh in the memory of the capital's investigators is the Moscow "trade affair," a sensation in its time, when it was the municipal authorities who attempted to go easy on the main criminals. Further, how is a case of visiting racketeers conducted, for example, when there is no authorized communication with colleagues from other republics?

In our opinion, these points of view are not that irreconcilable, and they make it possible to search for joint resolutions. But the presidium of the Moscow Soviet does not leave time for these searches: It has decided to stop contributing its share of resources to the budget of the capital militia, to suspend construction of its facilities, and to stop preferential allocation of places in kindergartens, housing, and commodities for families of employees of services that maintain law and order.

What do the workers of the Moscow militia themselves and the directors of its rayon subdivisions think of this?

**Sergey Tsykin, chief of the 52d Militia Detachment of the Proletarskiy RUVD [Rayon Administration for Internal Affairs]:**

"In essence, the militia detachment is a municipal militia. All other levels are federal. The action of the Moscow Soviet with respect to curtailing financing of the militia contradicts logic. Because we are not idle."

**Valeriy Dolgov, chief of the inquiries group of the Moskvoretskiy RUVD:**

"The militia should be subordinate to the organ of executive authority. A municipal militia is a step forward. So far there are no objective reasons for the efficiency of militia activity to increase. The conflict itself between the City Administration for Internal Affairs [GUVD] and the Moscow Soviet creates an unhealthy situation in militia collectives."

**Yuriy Alimov, sergeant of the 1st Militia Detachment of the Moskvoretskiy RUVD:**

"It is necessary to leave everything in its place and for every individual to work honorably, performing his duties. Then the yard cleaner will look after neatness, and the militia will not knock down icicles, but will fight crime."

**Yevgeniy Gensler, chief of the 46th Militia Detachment of the Baumanskiy RUVD:**

"We need stability, and most of all stability of authority. In addition, some rayons (industrial) have the resources to finance, to supply equipment, and to create everyday living conditions for employees, but others do not (the so-called bedroom communities). Therefore, employees working in different rayons will find themselves, essentially, in unequal conditions. There is also the fear that after the regular elections the changed composition of deputies may, referring to the law on the militia and the

president's ukase, stop its financing. I consider the actions of the Moscow Soviet to be dishonorable."

**Vladimir Lipunov, chief of the Zheleznodorozhnyy RUVD:**

"I have a sharply negative attitude toward the situation that is evolving, because it does not promote a strengthening of cooperation between the ispolkoms [executive committees] and the Rayon Administration for Internal Affairs. There was mutual understanding before, and there were even promising plans regarding material incentives, material-technical cooperation, and social and daily living questions. As the confrontation between the City Administration for Internal Affairs and the Moscow Soviet increased, the implementation of many plans was stopped."

"For us it is important that the decisions reached by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Moscow Soviet do not drive a wedge between the Rayon Administration for Internal Affairs and the ispolkoms. At present, unfortunately, the opposite is happening. On the one hand, a session of the Moscow Soviet makes a decision, not taking the opinion of the City Administration for Internal Affairs collective into account. On the other hand, in the absence of a law on the status of Moscow, an ukase appears on the creation of a main administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for Moscow and Moscow Oblast. However, the advisability of such an association was talked about a long time ago."

"What will happen with the provision of housing and the promised additional payment? What will happen to kindergartens and food product orders? This by far is not a full list of the questions that trouble employees of the administration."

**But what is the result? In our opinion, the usual fight of late to put one's own person in the right chair. No matter what it costs. Incidentally, until now no one from the Moscow Soviet has submitted a request to the City Administration for Internal Affairs to help calculate what, as a matter of fact, the municipal militia will cost. But there is no use calculating—for it is not the presidium of the Moscow Soviet that pays, but the voters.**

**But for now, Moscow has two militia directors—I. Shilov and V. Komissarov.**

#### **Greater Autonomy for Moscow Militia Demanded**

*9 UN13441 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 91 p 1*

[Article by N.V. Fedorov, RSFSR minister of justice and USSR people's deputy: "Then Whom Is My Militia Protecting?"—On the Question of Creating a Union Administration for Internal Affairs for Moscow"]

[Text] By an ukase of the USSR president, a vitally important organ was torn out of the body of a city of 10

million people and transplanted to an already cramped family of Union main administrations. With hundreds of detachments, with the legendary Moscow Criminal Investigation, with firemen, and with passport officials. With all of the buildings and transport, and communications, and ammunition.

By what right?

By the right of the fox whose bark-covered hut was better than one made of ice. There is no need to be surprised. Just about everything has been concocted in our rarely law-governed state. A deputy from the philatelists, lower and upper parliaments, legally-binding laws, some kinds of inconceivable moratoriums on laws in effect, and constitutional rights. And also a president, aside from three divisions of authority, which does not prevent him from adopting legal norms himself, and implementing them himself. In general, there is no counting the experiments in the field of law creativity, and it is no wonder that the cart comes to a stop for lawyers without an agrarian education.

However, let us return to the militia. It is necessary to render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's. Does the Union authority have the right to create a Union militia? There is such a right, and it itself, the Union, quite recently recorded it for itself, although, according to the Treaty of 1922 "About the Formation of the Union," this was not envisaged. Article 7 of the law on the Soviet militia, which was adopted on 6 March 1991, states clearly: The militia is divided into Union and republic. Does the Union authority itself have the right to establish its own Union organs of administration? Once again, based on current Union laws, adopted in a rather unilateral procedure—unquestionably. Which it is doing with success: We became witness the other day to the reconstitution of more than 50 ministries. Does Union authority also have the right to form a Union administration of a Union militia and determine the structure of this administration? In this plan, it still has a legal chance of establishing new GUVd's [City Administration for Internal Affairs] under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for Leningrad, for example, considering that this was the former capital, or for Sverdlovsk, inasmuch as the current head of the Russian parliament came from there.

So that which evokes a protest in the president's ukase is not that one more main administration has been established in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, but the fact that it was done in an illegal way and at someone else's expense. It is not just a matter of material resources. The Union usurped a function that does not belong to it at all—the function of maintaining order on the territory of a sovereign republic. To prove this, it is not at all necessary to be guided by the laws of Russia. The head of the USSR has once again openly ignored the laws of the USSR.

Start with the fact that in the ukase on transferring the Moscow City Administration for Internal Affairs to the

Union, the president referred to paragraphs in the USSR Constitution, in which he is called upon to guarantee observance of the rights and freedoms of citizens and protection of the sovereignty of the USSR and the Union republics. Lawyers have already spent several weeks on this riddle, journalists are fantasizing, and politicians are bewildered. What did the president have in mind? It is difficult to imagine that retention of their militia by Muscovites would threaten the rights of city residents and, even more so, the independence of the country and of Russia.

What kind of sovereign republic is it that is deprived of the ability to maintain order in its own home? And is it for this reason that Moscow hospitably sheltered the Union authorities so that they would present it with their own regulations? Less than 70 years ago, the 1,000-year-old Moscow was designated pluralistically the capital of the state in four words; however, because of this, it stopped being the heart of Russia. This is why it is clearly stated in Article 71 of the constitution that Moscow and Moscow Oblast are components of the RSFSR. However, in the case of the president's ukase, the oblast is left out, and it is suffering for somebody else's mistakes. They made it broader in order to bypass the Moscow Soviet. Except that Russia, you see, is big, and you cannot make it all into a capital district.

Now, about the Moscow Soviet. The president directly violated Article 146 of the USSR Constitution where it states that local soviets of people's deputies ensure compliance with laws, the maintenance of state and public order, and the rights of citizens. The president ignored the USSR law "On General Principles of Local Self-Government and Local Administration of the USSR," according to which local soviets form their own organs and independently establish their structure and staffs.

One of the most curious aspects of the presidential ukase is the instruction to the new Union main administration to arrange itself "on a local basis." It is not worth talking about the fact that this is not a Union base, that the famous building at 88 Petrovka, to put it in bookkeeping language, is on the balance sheet of the City Administration for Internal Affairs of the Moscow City Ispolkom [Executive Committee], that every year this ispolkom took more than 100 million rubles [R] from the city for its militia. But what about the law of the USSR "On Property in the USSR"? Let us recall with what dazzling publicity it was passed a year ago by the Union parliament. Article 23 of this law specially singles out the property of administrative-territorial formations in which there is property belonging to local organs of authority and administration. All kinds of guarantees are envisaged in the law for the one whose property is being confiscated: He can obtain this property on demand, he can go to court, he can call the seizure invalid, and he can demand the elimination of all violations of his rights.

So we are demanding. Immediately after the Russian parliament, immediately after the Moscow Soviet, and

immediately after everyone who is sick to death of preaching rights in a cassock over a uniform. It is said that people can become free only when they become slaves to laws. We are for this kind of slavery. Let us get out of the primordial condition.

#### **In the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs**

The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, having examined the decision of the Moscow Soviet presidium of 8 April 1991 "On Measures To Establish a Moscow Municipal Militia" and "On Measures To Implement the Decisions of the Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and the RSFSR Government on Questions Relating to the Moscow Militia" believes it necessary to express the following views.

The statement of the question of the Moscow Soviet presidium before the RSFSR Supreme Soviet concerning the formation of a local militia is entirely lawful. This possibility is envisaged by Article 7 of the USSR law of 6 March 1991 "Concerning the Soviet Militia."

At the same time, a local militia should also be created, but not as an alternative Union militia, and its functions should be strictly coordinated with the functions defined by Article 10 of the USSR law "On the Soviet Militia." As the practical work of our country and of foreign countries shows, the tasks of local militia are limited to the maintenance of public order and rendering social and legal assistance to the population.



### TASS Director on Changes in Official Reporting, Technical Challenges

Moscow *PRATTELSTVENNYY VESTNIK* in Russian  
No 2, Jan 91 pp 10-11

[“Interview with TASS General Director Lev Nikolayevich Spiridonov” by V. Yurteyev; place and date not given]

[Text] **PAGES FROM HIS BIOGRAPHY:** Born in 1931, Russian. Graduated philosophy faculty at MGU [Moscow State University], candidate of philosophical sciences. Engaged in Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] work; worked in the system of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as editor of the newspaper *MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA*, and as sector chief of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. Recently was first deputy editor in chief of the newspaper *PRAVDA*. He is married and has a daughter. He loves books and tennis.

[Yurteyev] Lev Nikolayevich, what new ideas and approaches would you like to realize in the agency's activity?

[Spiridonov] TASS is developing according to its own objective laws in the correct direction both from the standpoint of information strategy and in its technical support. This path is the result of the collective creativity of many generations of TASS workers. When I began to learn about the work of our immense collective I could not but note the wonderful and quite feasible ideas that had been put forth in the past few years alone. Only talented people, patriots of their organization who were deeply concerned about its destiny, could have come up with them.

It is difficult to think of anything principally new that I will be able to offer during the first few months; the main thing for me now is to accumulate and understand the avalanches of information that have gushed from all TASS subdivisions and also from organizations, institutions, departments, and editorial offices associated with us.

But it is already quite obvious that we must change the relationship between the intra-Union and international information. TASS needs an authorized group of political observers whose professional level and status are equal to, say, those of *PRAVDA*, *IZVESTIYA*, or the USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting]. These should be people whose names are known in journalism, whose opinions carry weight in the country and abroad. It is quite clear also that it will be necessary to exert maximum effort for technically retooling the agency and bringing it up to the modern world level. It will also be necessary to create a powerful commercial subdivision in the TASS system.

Our basic task is to reach the level of technical support of the largest information agencies of the world such as,

say, *REUTERS* and *UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL*. Here we need integrated organizational solutions and a considerable amount of money. But this is a question of life and death for TASS as a world and all-Union agency.

[Yurteyev] The TASS network of correspondents encompasses the entire country and practically the entire world. How can you increase the effectiveness of its use?

[Spiridonov] We do indeed have a broad network of correspondents. But we already have reasonable proposals concerning its improvement, both in terms of its structure and in terms of the distribution of correspondent points. It is also possible to use the correspondents' network to conduct sociological research. We have experience in this. An "express poll" is conducted regularly throughout the country. We have experience in cooperating with foreign partners. Thus we have twice conducted joint sociological investigations with the Japanese agency *KYODO TSUSHIN* on the question of Soviet-Japanese relations.

[Yurteyev] Lev Nikolayevich, we know that previously TASS had a special procedure for covering official functions which was established by the party echelons. How is the protocol regulated now?

[Spiridonov] TASS always has been and still is a conveyor of official protocols and announcements. And this is one of its very important functions. The CPSU Central Committee sends its information through us for the party newspapers and the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers—for their publications. But everyone has probably observed that the volumes of official protocol on the pages of the press has decreased considerably in recent years. Incidentally, this was also done on the initiative of the TASS board.

The USSR Union of Journalists, the *PRAVDA* editors, and TASS made their suggestions regarding the delimitation and differentiation of the coverage of official functions. And the issue was essentially resolved. The first things to disappear from the pages of the newspapers were the immense sheets of names of officials who were accompanying and greeting people, and during the past year and a half or two years it has become the practice to give out a fairly clearly differentiated transmission of official information in sharply reduced volumes.

The differentiation of information has enabled the central and local newspapers to free up a large amount of space for their own articles. The first pages of newspapers are finally beginning to gain their own image, and they have gotten rid of the typical uniformity—the same pictures, the same text...

[Yurteyev] So is TASS now completely independent in its strategy and tactics?

[Spiridonov] Judge for yourself. In the area of technical development TASS has not been under anyone's control

for a long time; we know better than anybody else what we need. If we need subsidies for the development of new communications systems, we will submit a request to the government. Unfortunately, a number of its decisions concerning purchasing the latest equipment for us have been implemented very poorly.

Recently I continued the bad tradition of "begging" and sent another letter to the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Relations asking that they implement the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers and allot us hard currency for carrying out a technical project that is vitally important to the agency. Without its implementation it will be more and more difficult for us to compete and cooperate with the largest information agencies of the world.

By reaching new speeds in transmitting information TASS will rapidly recoup the state currency expenditures and will return them to the budget with interest. In keeping with the decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers, orders were placed for the delivery of equipment and contracts were signed with foreign partners. In this situation it would be good to avoid delay in subsidizing the project.

Based on the new conditions and tasks, we are now completing work on new provisions concerning TASS. These include a good number of interesting ideas and mechanisms which will enable us to work more rapidly.

[Yurteyev] How is TASS arranging relations with republic information agencies?

[Spiridonov] All republic information agencies have had creative, financial, and material independence for a long time. Relations are arranged on a contractual basis with some of them. But there is one peculiarity: All of them handle intrarepublic information exclusively, and they get their international and all-Union information from us.

[Yurteyev] It is known that it is planned to create a Russian telegraph agency. Is TASS prepared to help with this?

[Spiridonov] Some time ago during negotiations between my predecessor, L. Kravchenko, and the RSFSR leadership an agreement was reached as to how to improve the coverage of Russian life. I am deeply convinced that this is one of the most important areas for TASS at the present time. Whether or not it will be necessary to create a Russian information agency—this is another matter. And whoever works on it will, in the first place, immediately encounter the problem of the allotment of immense monetary and material funds. In the second place, there will be an inevitable duplication of the information flow since a large part of the TASS network of correspondents is on the territory of Russia. God willing, the Russian publications will at least do a good job with the information about the RSFSR which we give them each day.

### **New Goskompechat Association Consolidates Printing Industry**

91UN1333B Moscow PR (TELSTVENNY)  
VESTNIK in Russian No. 7, Feb 91 p. 2

[Article by B. Kuzmin, deputy chairman of the USSR Goskompechat: "The Press: Who Holds the Reins"]

[Text] **The Aspol State Association of Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations of the Printing Industry was created by a government decree. We asked USSR Goskompechat [State Committee for Printing and Publishing] Deputy Chairman B. Kuzmin to comment on this.**

During the 25 years of the existence of the USSR State Committee for Printing and Publishing a unified scientific and production base has been created for publishing activity. In order to preserve and protect this potential, which is of statewide significance, on the initiative of the USSR Goskompechat and at the suggestion of the labor collectives of the industrial enterprises and organizations in its system, an association was formed. Its main goal is to concentrate all means on strengthening and developing the country's printing.

The association is a corporate body, it has its own books, and it operates on the basis of its own charter within the limits of the authority granted to it by collectives that have voluntarily entered it. It creates autonomously financed organizations (firms, centers, services) for rendering to enterprises that are members of the association commercial, planning-design, construction, scientific, technological, foreign economic, and other services. It is of no small importance that the association establishes prices (rates) for all kinds of products, jobs, and services provided by its enterprises with the exception of prices that are established centrally.

One must also take into account that beginning in 1991 our branch will not have the centralized funds or state allocations for expanded reproduction or strengthening of the scientific and material-technical base for printing. Aspol should take over all of this.

With the creation of the Aspol Association, along with the previous formation in the USSR Goskompechat system of associations of publishing houses, book trade workers, and joint stock and leasing enterprises and associations, the formation of the new structure for management of the press and information branch is basically complete.

The main functions of the central apparatus of the USSR Goskompechat are also changing. It will now be possible to concentrate efforts on ensuring the rights of citizens and the entire society to obtain and disseminate information and organizing economic and legal protection of national cultures from possible negative manifestations of commercialism in the mass media. The Goskompechat will take over the registration of all-Union printing equipment, it will contribute to the opening of new book

publishing houses, and it will also render them methodological and information assistance. Among its other concerns are the development and implementation of state social publishing programs which take into account the needs and interests of various categories of the country's population.

### **IZVESTIYA Editor States Paper's Political Principles**

9JUN1394A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 91  
Union Edition p 3

[Article by N. Yefimov, IZVESTIYA editor-in-chief  
"Common Sense—Our Salvation"]

[Excerpts] In recent months from time to time in the press there have been reports about our newspaper and the situation in the editorial office. And they have invariably asked: What positions does IZVESTIYA hold? Where are the editors headed? The readers are also concerned: Expressing alarm in their letters, they have addressed the same questions to me as editor-in-chief.

Hence I have developed a desire to share certain thoughts with you, dear readers. Perhaps not all of them will seem incontrovertible to you, but it seems to me that such a statement is necessary, and if you, in turn, share your concerns, I assure you that they will meet with attention and serious interest in the editorial offices.

[Passages omitted]

We have no middle classes in our country. And they will obviously not appear soon. Nonetheless under our conditions, where mob emotions and passions take the upper hand over reason, a policy of common sense is more necessary than anywhere else and, perhaps, more than ever before. At the present time, unlike in other states, common sense cannot rely on a social base, but it can rely on the ideas that unite and consolidate the society and all those who do not think that politics is a continuation of the war but with different means, to paraphrase a well-known expression.

The role of the press in supporting, clarifying, and developing these ideas is extremely great. Potentially, we have just as many people with common sense as we ever did: Nobody is ultimately his own enemy. It would seem that these people comprise majority of the readers. For serious, responsible publications—on a rayon or all-Union scale—the policy of common sense is natural and organic. With respect to the press this means to look for the golden mean, to cover events thoughtfully, to proceed from the interests of the majority of the people, and to not impose hasty or ill-considered decisions on them. Such a policy is essentially constructive. Impatience is destructive, but common sense is creative. That is why it is so basic.

What does this mean specifically for IZVESTIYA? It seems to me that with our materials, our calm, reasonable tone, and our respectful attitude toward the opinions of others we must show the reader and persuade the reader that the policy of common sense is not a utopia, that it is realistic and possible even in the hardest of times if we do not lose our heads and if we do not lapse into prejudice (of which, alas, even our newspaper is not free, and this must be corrected). It is more difficult to run a publication with this course: You are attacked from both the left and the right, from above and below. With all my respect for the policy of common sense, I am convinced that a newspaper is no place for monolithic thinking. Let writers representing various viewpoints and various trends in political life appear on its pages, but their articles must be accurate, well argued, and worthwhile. Although, I assume, these are not the writers who are called upon to hold sway in IZVESTIYA but those who profess common sense, proceed from positions of civil harmony, and support perestroika, reforms, and democratization. IZVESTIYA is a newspaper for all the soviets—from the village soviet to the USSR Supreme Soviet. On the pages of IZVESTIYA the reader should find the entire spectrum of the deputies' attitudes. It is always broad. Each soviet obviously has a left and a right, and—most important—each has a center that exhibits common sense. I think this was USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's point of departure when proclaiming the policy of centrism.

Such a course on the part of the newspaper would be unthinkable without a critical approach toward everything and everyone, toward any figure in the state. At the same time we must never lose sight of the thought expressed by USSR people's deputy, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksiy II succinctly expressed in our newspaper: Things are built to last for years but they are destroyed for centuries. It would seem that there is no more concise or clear way to express what is happening to us and to our country. Behind these words lies concern for our country's present, its future, and its appropriate place in the world community. And the fear that we might mess things up even worse. And I cannot envision a serious newspaper operating according to the principle of destroying things and then waiting to see what happens. This has nothing to do with common sense.

In my view, three directions are especially important for the newspaper in the near future.

First, protection of human rights. Man is the basis and foundation of everything, the criterion and measure of the justice and legality of all our transformations and processes. The press, including IZVESTIYA, is considerably, if not greatly, in arrears in its coverage of human rights. It is in debt to the Russian-speaking population (we did not take note but remained silent when a number of republics under various pretexts began to flout the USSR Constitution and encroach on the interests of minorities, and not just the Russian-speaking population), it is in debt to the Soviet Germans and the

Meskhethian Turks, who are not being allowed to return to their native regions, and it is in debt to the Gagauz, the Crimean Tatars, the peoples of the North, and hundreds of thousands of refugees. We are in debt to the Moldavians and Latvians. We must understand everyone. It would be simpler to list the people to whom we are not in debt.

Interethnic relations have ended up in the foreground but protection of human rights, of course, is not restricted to this. Tomorrow other problems may burst into the picture, above all those related to the market and market relations. Political? Socioeconomic? Regardless of which ones appear, each affects the fates and lives of many people. They all share, for example, the principle that nobody should be a "cog" in the system of the state enterprise. Nor should there be any "cogs" in businesses with different forms of ownership, and problems are already arising here. Protecting the interests and dignity of the individual is a truly popular theme in our newspaper.

Second, there is the theme of the law and legality. In a rule-of-law state any events or actions by any officials or any independent organizations must be evaluated primarily from the position of the law as a social, cultural, and moral value developed by mankind. When adopting laws, parliaments of all levels ideally proceed from this. The law is written not just for simple mortals but also for the powers that be. And everyone must be guided by it. Whether people like it or not, as long as the law is in effect, as long as it has not been abolished or amended, or a new one has not been adopted—it is the law. Otherwise we will have neither a rule-of-law state nor elementary order nor a normal life. Otherwise we will sink once and for all into lawlessness and chaos, and as a result the "iron fist" will appear, with all the consequences that ensue from that.

And, finally, third, is the fate of the renewed Union. As the referendum showed, the majority of the population is unconditionally in favor of the new Union. It is a guarantee of state security, economic stability, and good interethnic relations. It is a guarantee for large and small peoples, for each of us, for each family. Yes, because of perestroika and the new thinking, the situation in the world has become considerably more relaxed and things have changed for the better. The threat of war has disappeared. But who can say that this is how it will always be? Who can predict what difficulties—not necessarily military ones—our country will encounter in 30 or 50 years? What awaits our children and grandchildren? These are questions we cannot brush aside, they are ones which generation after generation of our forefathers took seriously. It is no accident that they created a great power which has withstood more than one difficult test, including the attack by Hitler's Germany and the countries allied with it. But what legacy are we leaving? Instead of a powerful state, separate fragments, which certain people favor openly, without shame? I am convinced that it is the duty of a serious newspaper to

contribute to the consolidation of the renewed Union. Common sense and the majority of the people demand this.

When contemplating the destiny of the homeland in these disturbing times (and when were they ever not disturbing?), when thinking about who has what in store for it, A. Blok in his famous poem exclaimed:

Even if they lure you  
and deceive you,—  
You will not be lost,  
you will not vanish

Such a power as ours is not destined to vanish or disappear. That is true. But what about deceiving it, luring it, driving it to stupidity, superficiality, or intolerance, into an abyss of trouble? It is terrifying and awful to imagine. It would take our posterity a tormentingly long time to climb out of the abyss. What terrible word will be associated with our time if, God forbid, there is a catastrophe. Do we really not have enough common sense to avoid our impending doom? Will quarrels and internecine strife really take the upper hand over reason, which has already happened in our history and against which, alas, we have no insurance? So we all need common sense. Our hope. Our national salvation.

### Paper's Attacks on Polozkov Rejected

91UN14141 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 30 Apr 91 p 1

[RIA report followed by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* comment: "This is something! The Communist Party of Russia Against the Newspaper of the USSR Communist Party"]

[Text] Moscow—The manager of the press center of the RSFSR Communist Party, Vladimir Markov, has rejected the attacks of the newspaper *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* on Russian communist leader Ivan Polozkov.

In a response given to RIA [Russian Information Agency] and presented in fairly sharp tones, it is asserted that the author of the two articles in *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* is playing "apparatus games" by ascribing to Polozkov serious accusations against the president and general secretary, the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, the prime minister, in his speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum. Markov thinks the newspaper's assertions are "slander" and "false information."

RIA has the full text of the rejoinder which amounts to 3,600 keystrokes (two typewritten pages). Inquiries may be made at the telephone number in the commercial directory.

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As we publish this report we are forced to admit that, unlike RIA, we do not have the aforementioned document. But we are in no hurry to request it from the agency directors because *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* journalists



have never worked with "slander" or "false information." We have defended and will continue to defend the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and pluralism of opinions.

### **Kravchenko on TV Company Activities, Conflict With Russian TV**

91UN1333C Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 9, Feb 91 p 12

[Interview with new All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company Chairman L. Kravchenko: "A Closeup of What's Behind the Screen"]

[Text] By order of the president of the USSR, USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] has been transformed into the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company. Our correspondent talks with its chairman, L. Kravchenko.

[Correspondent] Leonid Petrovich, people are now locking horns and having the most heated discussions about how our television should be. And this is understandable: Even without Kashpirovskiy's hypnosis, the "blue screen" has an immense influence over people. This is extremely important today. And therefore the public cannot but be disturbed by the changes in television. But what is this—a radical renewal or just a switching of signs?

[Kravchenko] It would be absolutely incorrect to speak about switching signs. We have in mind a radical transformation of the entire system of management of television and radio broadcasting. First of all, it should be noted that Gosteleradio in the form in which it existed previously has by now ceased to be a ministry of Union-republic significance with its rigid jurisdictional structure. I would say that this committee lost its identity long before the ukase was issued: Certain republic television studios had left it and those that remained were also trying to become independent and get out from under the jurisdiction of the Center. So life itself forced Gosteleradio to change its status in keeping with what really existed. Herein lies the basic content of the improvement of our structure.

[Correspondent] But what "legacy" will be left to the All-Union Television and Radio Company?

[Kravchenko] The company will unite Central Television, All-Union Radio, and foreign language broadcasting. As before, Moscow and also Leningrad television and radio will remain under our jurisdiction. The republic centers are now completely independent.

But the communications channels are in the hands of the USSR Ministry of Communications and the corresponding republic ministries. We have signed and will be signing agreements for the use of transmitters and communications channels. Let me note that this is far from inexpensive for us. Of the more than three million rubles [R] received from the Union budget, 70-75 percent were

automatically paid to the ministry. Not very much money is left for preparing the programs.

I wish to draw attention to the question of ownership. The company has been assigned the entire material and technical base that belonged to Gosteleradio, all of its fixed capital and property, and also the associations, enterprises, and organizations under its jurisdiction.

[Correspondent] Many problems have arisen in the relations between Central Television and Radio Broadcasting and the All-Russian Television and Radio Company, which claims part of Central Television's property. How, in your opinion, can this conflict be resolved?

[Kravchenko] If all these problems were approached in a businesslike way, if they were not politicized so much, as is deliberately being done now, in my view, we could find an acceptable solution. Even by the time I had come to Gosteleradio as its chairman, an agreement had been reached in principle concerning Russian radio broadcasts. I emphasize that this was an act of good will on the part of the previous leadership.

They also wanted to reach an agreement about television and give Russia additional time for its own broadcasting, which would not have been controlled by anyone. They had reached that point. It was intended that all the necessary technical means would be provided for the amounts of broadcasting according to the normatives that were in effect for Gosteleradio. That is, the rights of the Russian company were in no way encroached upon.

Moreover, personnel were transferred to them and a personnel quota was even determined. By now the earmarked limit has been exceeded. The personnel matters were resolved quickly: The wages for the Russians, including the leaders, were considerably higher than ours—in some cases by a factor of 1.5. So many of them, especially engineering and technical personnel, were glad to switch to their new positions.

But the difficulties did not end there. They still had to resolve the question of the material and technical support not only for the television structures created in Moscow but also for the immense number of television and radio centers that were dispersed throughout Russia. Previously they were all supported by Gosteleradio.

Apparently this financing should have been conducted through the Russian Government. But neither it nor the new company was prepared for such functions. Therefore we are agreeing on a transition period: Since the new company has nothing so far except warehouses, the solutions to all its problems are left up to Gosteleradio for the time being—construction, reconstruction, technical supply, and the delivery and batching of equipment.

Thus everything had reached a point where by the transition time the needs of the republic were satisfied without disturbing the basis for television and radio that had been created and was in operation. And suddenly, to

our surprise, when we thought we had almost reached an agreement with the leaders of the Russian television company, they began to make complaints: They wanted all of the second all-Union television channel to be turned over to Russia. We would have agreed to this without a second thought if we had had another such technical, and I stress technical, channel. But now only two all-Union channels are in operation. The second, which is on the air for 18 hours, is taken up by the programs of the Union republics and national and international sports programs, which are difficult to accommodate on the first channel.

Let me add that it would be very difficult to provide for an additional six hours of television broadcasting on the second channel. It would be necessary to discontinue many current programs on Central Television. After all, our technical capabilities are limited and do not allow us simply to increase the volumes of original new broadcasting. We are suffocating with the current technical base and are asking the government for help in creating a new radio building and a special center for information broadcasting. Moreover, to discontinue six hours of the current broadcasting would mean discharging one out of five television journalists from the Central Television system.

[Correspondent] So the question of dividing up property cannot even be discussed.

[Kravchenko] Exactly, because there is not even a hint of a legal basis for it. According to the plan drawn up by Russian representatives, we would have to turn over more than half of our technical equipment to them. Even from the standpoint of common sense, the television center is a unified, indivisible electronic organism.

Remember that we are turning the fixed capital of numerous television and radio centers, worth R575 million, over to the jurisdiction of the Russian Television and Radio Company. As concerns the Ostankino Television Center, it is Union property, created with funds from the state budget.

But, perhaps, central television and radio devote an impermissibly small amount of attention to life in Russia? Here are a couple of figures. More than 70 percent of the overall volume of broadcasting on all channels of Central Television is for Russia and is devoted exclusively to Russian materials. Thus it is not that we have discriminated against Russian television viewers. The question is essentially one of creating television with special political coloring.

We have reasonably raised the question of a transition period and how to deal with the situation until Russia has its own technical center and channel, including for satellite broadcasting. I am convinced that we must not be in conflict with one another. We must approach the problem reasonably. Unfortunately, so far political ambitions and emotions are taking the upper hand over reason.

[Correspondent] Apparently it is impossible to regard such actions as anything other than pressure, including, incidentally, the well-known announcement from the group of cinematographers. What do you have to say about that?

[Kravchenko] I think this was an unreasonable declaration of war against us, the leaders of Central Television. We must recognize that essentially a boycott has been declared against Soviet television viewers and that this is depriving them of the opportunity to see good films and programming with the participation of the leading movie workers.

As we know, the main demand in the letter is that Russia be granted the second television channel immediately and without conditions. Here is what is surprising: Many of the people who signed it were representatives of various other Union republics. Do they not understand that by doing this they are depriving their republics of the possibility of having access to a second all-Union channel, which we regard as a channel for interethnic communication?

[Correspondent] Could you clarify the situation regarding the popular program "Vzglyad?"

[Kravchenko] Indeed there has been a great deal of fuss about it. More than 250 articles criticizing me have already been published. One of the deputies made an inquiry to the USSR Supreme Soviet. "Vzglyad" workers have taken me to court, knowing full well in advance how absurd and illegal this maneuver was. They are simply trying to gather the largest possible number of political points in the eyes of the ill-informed television viewers.

I shall try to present the essence of the matter as briefly as possible. The program that was not aired at the end of December, as its authors conceived it, was devoted to the retirement of E. Shevardnadze. I made an official inquiry and telephoned the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I was told not even to think about the ministry's participation; it had no intention of giving any interviews to anyone in the near future. I suggested a substitute—a meeting with G. Yanayev, who had just been elected vice president. The discussion could have been interesting, since the appointment was a surprise to many people and there were many questions about possible changes in the president's policy and so forth. But the person in charge of "Vzglyad," A. Lyubimov, said: He is not right for us. As a result, we scrapped not only this program but also the next one, for 4 January, which again had to do with E. Shevardnadze.

What positions do the authors of "Vzglyad" defend? All of them are RSFSR people's deputies and were elected on the Democratic Russia ticket. One of them, A. Lyubimov, is a member of the Russian parliament and has repeatedly used it as an audience for criticizing Central Television. In principle, a somewhat strange

impression is produced by the very fact that the parliament member can work as a political observer, a commentator, or a television leader. This does not happen in international practice. It has turned out that on state television we have a group of people who consistently put up stiff opposition to the president and the USSR Government, and use state television in a monopolistic way in the interests of a particular political platform. The airing of "Vzglyad" was halted until contractual relations can be worked out both with the leaders of the program and with everyone else who works in broadcasting. This, incidentally, is envisioned by the ukase of the USSR president published last year.

In principle, all workers of the company are changing over to a competitive contract system. This in no way signifies any kind of "purge" or settling of accounts. This is a lever for increasing the creative potential. For we must not forget that the main goal of the restructuring of television and radio is to make them more interesting. It is considerably more difficult to do this now than it was before, since our society has become extremely politicized. And the journalists themselves have been divided up according to their political sympathies. But let us be optimistic. I hope that we will be able to conduct the

reorganization of television and radio broadcasting without causing harm to the creative processes.

**'Authors' TV' Program Appeals to Remain on Air**

*LD1404221691 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 1850 GMT 14 Apr 91*

["Author's Television" program presented by Ivan Kononov]

[Excerpt] Good Evening: It's been a long time since we met. Last Sunday, due to reasons beyond our control, Authors' Television was broadcast only in the Far East and in some areas of Siberia. We therefore apologize in advance to the inhabitants of those areas for a certain amount of repetition. I do not know whether you have noticed, in general, but internal life in television—like in the country as a whole—is for the moment becoming increasingly uncertain with every day. Today, for instance, we are simply compelled to appeal to our fellow creatures from Russian Television, dear, beloved, and warmly awaited as they are: Please, do not let yourselves be used to squeeze Authors' Television from the Second Program, too: Come on, lads, let's live amicably! [passage omitted: preview of program]

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